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Chapter- I 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIC ISSUES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal strategy or policy refers to the budgetary policy of the 
government in power. It includes tax policy, expenditure policy, public debt 
policy and any other policy, which is implemented through the budget. 
Though the concept of fiscal policy emerged only after the 
Keynesian revolution of economics, its basic philosophy can be traced to the 
18"^  century. The Mercantilist economic policy and more importantly the 
commercialists views on the role of the government in the national 
economic life of the nation were the prelude of the embracing role of the 
government in modern democracies. The Mercantilists preached a 
protectionist policy. But the cameralists advocated a much more 
comprehensive intervention of the government in the national economic life 
of the nation. 
The scope of government economic activity widened substantially 
only during and after the Great Depression of 1930s. During the post-war 
years, the scope of the role of government further widened particularly in 
the developing countries in the content of the need for government economic 
planning for achieving rapid economic development. The role of the 
government was also influenced by the success of national economic plans 
in socialistic countries. 
It may be observed that fiscal policy emerged as a branch of applied 
economics under the name of macro-economic analysis. Now fiscal policy 
in developing countries involves a judicious mistrue of macro-economic 
policies of the government to achieve multiple objectives. 
The government in modern democracies discharges various and 
varied socio-economic responsibilities mostly through the instrumentality of 
its budget. Budget is a predominant instrument in the hands of the 
government to formulate and implement various policies and programmes to 
achieve the multiple objectives of fiscal policy. 
The budget includes an annual estimate of (proposed) expenditure to 
be incurred, expected revenue, borrowing and debt repayment with a view to 
achieving explicit objectives of the government. In order to be effective in 
achieving these objectives, the budgetary instruments namely, taxation, 
borrowing, lending, spending, spending and transfer payments should 
influence the national economy through the major economic variables such as 
levels and rate of growth of income, consumption, prices, balance of payments, 
etc., both at aggregate and sectoral and micro levels. When these economic 
variables are influenced by the national budget, they in turn influence various 
components of the budget through the change in their levels, rates of growth 
and direction. The influence of the budget on the national economy is mainly 
deliberate as various budget instruments are altered so as to alter significant 
economic variables. However, a well designed budgetary (fiscal) policy may 
also influence the economy automatically during the interval between two 
budget periods or policy decisions. This is known as the "built-in-flexibility" of 
fiscal measures. Similarly, the economy after being influenced by the 
budgetary policies experiences significant changes in terms of major economic 
variables. It changes not only the economic variables of the economy such as 
income, consumption, price, etc. but also gets the automatic responses through 
the level of expenditure, etc. In this way the national fiscal policy and the 
national economy interact mutually. But the main objective of fiscal policy is 
to influence national economy in the desired direction rather than being 
influenced by it. This interaction between the national economy including 
private sector economic activity and the fiscal policies emanating from the 
public sector budget is very close and effective. 
The role of the government has to be extended to a vast variety of 
fields and today the objectives of fiscal policy have multiplied. For example, 
during the days of Laissez-faire philosophy when the government was confined 
to the limited area, the main objective of taxation was to raise revenue adequate 
enough to meet the minimum requirements of the 'police state' functions. But 
subsequently the role of the government got extended to economic 
development, the role of taxation has come to be identified with raising 
resources or diversion of increased income from private sector to the public 
sector for increasing total domestic savings. Similarly, the role of the public 
expenditure which was confined only to providing essential public service has 
been extended to the sphere of social security, old age pension and the like plus 
public sector investment for maintaining economic stability as well as 
promoting economic development in developing countries. Public debt policy 
which was intended to be used in emergencies like war has come to be justified 
for the purpose of maintaining economic stability and subsequently it has been 
extended to the area of economic development. These consequential extensions 
and expansions in the field of taxation, public expenditure and public 
borrovv'ing have caused the size of the government budget in the democracy to 
increase very fast. Adolf Wagner hypothesized that as economic development 
proceeds in a smooth linear line, the demand for 'public goods' will increase 
and as a result the government expenditure will increase faster than the national 
output. But the government expenditure has increased even during the period of 
economic stagnation. In fact fiscal policy and the consequent extended role of 
the government came to be justified only during stagnation and depression in 
order to initiate recovery and subsequently to maintain economic stability. 
Fiscal policies are required if society desires to alter the distribution of 
output between government and private uses. This is a special case of the 
general choice between consumption, private investment and government 
expenditure. The problem of dividing out correctly for final use is a matter of 
efficient allocation of resources and the solution depends on the preferences of 
society. Fiscal policies are also required to promote equity in the distribution of 
income and wealth. Volatile disturbances distribute the income and capital 
losses from inflation or unemployment in a haphazard manner which is 
contrary to society's expenditures are the only feasible methods available for 
mitigating the haphazard incidence of misfortune. Efficiency and equity 
consideration require that fiscal policies form an important role in the 
formulafion of economic policies. 
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Because of the large macroeconomic disequilibria characterized by 
inflation, balance of payments difficuldes, and increasing debt obligations, In 
recent years many countries have adopted economic programs aimed at 
"adjusting" their economies. By and large, adjustment has aimed at reducing 
the rate of inflation, improving the balance of payments, and promoting 
economic growth. 
Adjustment requires many policy changes, including devaluation, 
opening of the economy, financial reforms, reduction of excessive regulations; 
and removal of price controls. All these adjustment programs adopted by 
countries (whether supported by the International Monetary Fund or the World 
Bank or undertaken without outside support) have required that substantial 
attention be paid to the fiscal situation. The reason for this is obvious. In 
countries facing major macro-economic difficulties, the public finances are 
often in substantial disequilibrium. A reduction of this disequilibrium becomes 
a necessary condition for improving the macro-economic situation. The need 
for fiscal reform is now widely recognized but at the same time it has been 
experienced that the fiscal reform is very difficult. Infact, it has been found to 
be the most difficult of the various policy changes required in adjustment 
programs. The difficulties are partly political, partly institutional, and partly 
conceptual. Dealing with fiscal deficits remains today one of the most vexing 
problem for the majority of developing countries. For many, growing fiscal 
deficits led to money creation as the main source of financing followed by 
spiralling inflation, an erosion of the tax base, and even larger fiscal 
imbalances. Even countries that contained their fiscal deficits usually did so at 
great costs mainly by indiscriminate expenditure cutfing. 
One of the central tenets of macro-economies is that fiscal policy can 
be effective in stimulating aggregate demand and reviving a stagnant economy. 
At the same time, a growing body of research-based primarily on industrial 
countries-suggests that there are circumstances in which expansionary fiscal 
policy cannot be used to pull an economy out of a recession. In particular, 
when levels of public debt are already high, increasing the budget deficit may 
lead to lower private sector investment and private consumption, negating the 
effect of higher public sector spending or tax cuts on aggregate demand. 
In fact, several studies of OECD countries have shown that reducing 
fiscal deficits can accelerate growth when the level of public debt is high and 
unsustainable. Reduced government borrowing to finance deficit spending 
pushes down interest rates generally, thereby encouraging investment. Lower 
interest rates also raise asset values and this "wealth effect" encourages private 
consumption and investment. Furthermore, shrinking deficit lead the private 
sector to reduce its estimate of current and future tax liabilities, providing a 
further boost to investment and consumption. 
These studies also indicate that how deficits are reduced is important. 
Fiscal tightening that is achieved primarily by cutting subsidies, transfer (such 
as pensions), and the government wage bill tends to last longer and can be 
expansionary, while fiscal tightening achieved by increasing taxes and cutting 
public investment tends to be contractionary and unsustainable. 
"What is the causal relationship between expenditure composition, 
fiscal adjustment and growth? Using an econometric model that examined the 
impact of several fiscal variables (such as the fiscal deficit and budget 
composition) and other control variables (including private investment, school 
enrollment, and labour force participation on real per capita GDP growth in the 
39 countries, we found that, on average, fiscal adjustment did not dampen 
growth. A one percentage point of GDP improvement in the fiscal balance had 
a significant positive impact on the rate of GDP growth, raising it by at least 
one-fourth of a percentage point. An increase in spending on government 
wages, and salaries had a negative impact on growth, while expenditure on 
other goods and services and capital projects tended to raise the growth rate 
significantly. Quality fiscal adjustments, based on the reallocation of public 
expenditure to more productive uses and the reduction of budget deficits, were 
thus conducive to higher growth in countries with unfavourable macro-
economic conditions".' 
According to the World Bank, Country Economic Memorandum 
(CEM) on India, economic crisis which triggered the reform process in 1991 
itself was diagnosed as the consequence of the severe fiscal imbalance that 
afflicted the economy throughout the 1980s, a detailed review of achievements 
and challenges of fiscal adjustment efforts is opportune. Fiscal reforms must 
therefore be analysed from the perspective of whether and to what extent they 
have helped to achieve economic growth. 
1.3 RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF FISCAL AND MONETARY 
MEASURES 
In recent years, the objectives of monetary policy in India has been 
two-fold. It has to facilitate the flow of an adequate volume of bank credit to 
industry, agriculture and trade to meet their genuine needs and provide 
selective encouragement to sectors which stand in need of special assistance 
such as the weaker sections of the community and the neglected sectors and 
areas in the country. If the same time, to keep inflationary pressures under 
check it has to restrain undue credit expansion and also ensure that credit is not 
diverted for undesirable purposes. As the central monetary authority, the RBI's 
chief function is to ensure the availability of credit to the extent that is 
appropriate to sustain tiie tempo of development and promote the maintenance 
of internal price stability. 
The first decade of the plan era saw the revival of the traditional 
weapons of monetary control; during the second half of that decade the 
regulating functions were developed. In the sixties, the problems of 
stabilization were replaced by a greater concern for economic growth and 
control over the accompanying increases in money supply. By the 1970's and 
through 1980, the twin objectives of provision of credit for attaining faster 
economic growth and price stabilization assumed importance. This policy has 
come to be known as "controlled expansion". 
Indian Monetary policy is not able to achieve its objectives because of 
its limited success in regulating money supply growth in the economy. Use of 
different monetary regulations/instruments requires pre-requisite conditions, 
which are not fully existent in India. To mention a few : 
(i) High Currency Deposit (C-D) Ratio : In India, the large part of the money 
stock is still held in the form of currency. There is lack of cultivation of 
banking habits among the savers. RBI's control is exercised on deposits/banks 
and hence as long as share of deposits in money supply is less, effectiveness of 
monetary regulation is not fully realised. However, the currency deposit ratio in 
India (C/T+D) has steadily fallen from 1.53 in March 1951 to 0.25 March 
1990-91. 
(ii) Underdeveloped Financial Markets : The Indian money market is 
dichotomous in nature. It comprises two sectors viz. (a) organised and (b) 
unorganised. 
The organised money market works within the provisions of Indian 
Banking Companies Act (1956) and its accounts are open to audit. This market 
comprises : 
(a) RBI and the commercial banks including co-operative credit system and 
regional rural banks and 
(b) Sub-markets 
(i) Treasury Bill Market 
(ii) Commercial Bill Market 
(iii) Call Money Market 
(iv) Inter Corporate Funds Markets, and 
(v) Certificate of Deposit Market 
The sub-markets in India are not fully developed and they are mainly regulated 
by the monetary authority. 
The unorganised money market operates the outside the provisions of 
the Indian Banking Companies Act (1956). This sector comprises indigenous 
bankers, money-lenders, nidhis and chit funds. The unorganised sub-markets 
meet a large part of the working capital requirements of the Indian economy 
such as wholesale trade, retail trade, export trade, manufacturing industries 
units, construction, firm production and hotels etc. About 30 percent to 70 
percent of total credit used in urban sector and rural sector is provided by these 
markets. In rural areas these markets are the largest single source of credit to 
agriculture and village artisans. Rate of interest in these markets are high. Both 
white and black money flow in this market. 
Inspite of the exorbitantly higher interest rates in the unorganised 
money market the borrowers approach this market. It is because of their easy 
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access lo this market and not many formalities as required to get loans from the 
organised financial institutions. But the lenders in this sector of the money 
market generally exploit borrowers. 
As the unorganised sector is beyond the provisions of the public 
bodies to control, implementation of monetary policy in the economy lags 
behind in its effectiveness. Squeeze in credit from the organised sector is liable 
to be supplemented by resource to the unroganised sector. Hence for proper 
implementation of the monetary policy, these two sectors of the money market 
require to be integrated. Alternatively the REI should enlarge the organised 
sector so that the poorest can approach the financial institutions to get the 
smallest amount demanded. 
Indian fiscal policy has been led by the requirement of planned 
economic development since the advent of the First Five Year plan. To realise 
the varied objectives, the government has used its budgetary policy to mobilise 
resources for economic development. Among the different sources of financing 
plan budgets in India, contribufion of domestic resources is very high. 
Borrowing is the single biggest item of domestic resources. The 
government has a good and extensive captive market in the form of 
nationalised banks, public sector financial institutions, public provident fund 
etc. which supply a big amount of funds to the government. 
By a process of both widening and deepening of the tax base, the 
combined tax revenue of the central, states and union territories, as percent of 
GDP. Government of India's revenue is not sufficient to meet its current 
expenditure. 
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""India's fiscal policy influences are stronger, faster and more 
predictable than the monetary policy influences. It may be attributed to the 
under-developed financial markets and existence of the informal credit markets 
which limit the working of monetary policy in India". 
1.4 HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY 
The strategy of fiscal adjustment followed by different countries could 
he categorised into two types, viz. 'Type I' and 'Type 2' (Alessina and Perotti, 
1996).^  Type 1 (followed by most of the European countries in the 1990s) 
relies primarily on cuts in expenditure on transfer, social security and 
Government wages and employment. Tax increases are not emphasised and 
taxes on households either are not raised or are even reduced. On the contrary, 
'Type 2' adjustments (as followed by most of the European countries in the 
1980s) rely mostly on broad-based tax increases, and often the largest increases 
are on taxes on households and social security contributions. Expenditure cuts 
are almost all on public investment, while Government wages, employment, 
and transfer are completely untouched, or only slightly affected. There are 
episodes of fiscal consolidation where countries (e.g. in Ireland and Italy), 
which began with 'Type 2' kind of fiscal adjustment, later switched over to 
•Type r . 
Empirical results show that for the same size of fiscal adjustment, 
"Type r adjustments induce a more lasting consolidation of the budget and are 
also expansionary. The present study has formulated the following testably 
hypotheses. 
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1. The reduction in revenue deficit is budgeted to be achieved from 
higher growth in revenue receipts and lower growth of revenue 
expenditure. 
Apart from the type of adjustment, the size of fiscal adjustment has 
been a crucial element in the success of the fiscal adjustment efforts. This is 
because the size of fiscal consolidation is related to the overall scope of the 
reform programme and enhances the credibility of the governments 
commitment to the consolidation. 
2. The fiscal consolidation is sustainable in those cases where fiscal 
correction in terms of reduction of fiscal deficit is higher (4.0 percent 
of GDP in a two-year period). 
It is found that in many cases, where the extent of correction was 
smaller, fiscal consolidation could not be sustained (Medermott and Wescott, 
op.cit).^ It has also been found that fiscal corrections do not have intended 
effects if they fail to indicate a permanent and decisive change in the stance of 
fiscal policy (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996).^ 
1.5 PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENT 
Given the size and complexity of most government budgets, it 
becomes important to develop broad indicators that convey a sense of the 
impact of fiscal policy on domestic demand and financial resources. Ideally, 
such indicators should reflect a comprehensive coverage of the government 
activities and be easily derived from budget documents and other available 
statistical sources. The reality is often different, considerable efforts are 
frequently required to piece together accurate and conceptually appropriate 
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indicators of the impact of fiscal policy. Usually this requires analysis of 
policies effected both inside and outside of the budget. Also, taking into 
account the way in which the budget affects, and is affected by, other economic 
variables can require important adjustment to official data. 
A commonly used indicator to assess the stance of fiscal policy is the 
overall balance, which measures the difference between revenues and grants, 
and expenditure and net lending. This balance may be in surplus or deficits. 
While the overall balance is an important indicator for assessing fiscal policy, it 
is a measure that needs to be judged with caution. Since it offers a perspective 
on the aggregate demand effects of fiscal policy, it is, not surprisingly, 
deficient as an indicator of the impact of fiscal actions on other policy variables 
of concern (growth, monetary, stance, sustainability, etc). Moreover, as a 
simple indicator, it abstracts from the range of items that comprise government 
operations - importantly the way the deficit is financed as well as from the 
particular institutional and other factors that affect the impact of fiscal policy in 
any country. 
When attention shift to supply side of the economy, the structure of 
fiscal policy takes on greater significance, and simple indicators of fiscal policy 
stance become less useful. Indeed, structural fiscal adjustment may be needed 
even when stabilization is not an issue. This is because high taxes can faster a 
misallocation of resources and creates work and savings disincentives, and 
government spending at the margin may be less productive than private 
spending. 
A deficit may be financed from domestic or external sources. Any 
assessment of fiscal policy stance would need to take account of the way the 
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deficit is financed, since each method of financing has particular 
macroeconomic effects and costs. 
There are a number of other fiscal indicators which are often used to 
provide additional insights into the impact of a government's fiscal policy 
stance. 
• The current fiscal balance represents the difference between current 
.revenue and current expenditure. It provides a measure of the 
government's contribution to national savings when positive, it suggests 
that the government can at least finance consumption from its own 
revenue. A fundamental concern with this measure is the implicit 
assumption that all current expenditure is of a consumption nature that 
does not contribute to growth. 
The primary balance excludes interest payments from expenditure. It can 
be said to provide an indicator of current fiscal effort, since interest 
payments are predetermined by the size of previous deficits. For countries 
with a large outstanding public debt relations to GDP, achieving a primary 
surplus is normally viewed as important, being usually necessary (though 
not sufficient) for a reduction in the debt/GDP ratio. 
Cyclically adjusted or structural balances seek to provide a measure of the 
fiscal position that is net of the impact of macroeconomic developments 
on the budget. This approach takes account of the fact that, over the 
course of the business cycle, revenues are likely to be lower (and such 
expenditure as unemployment insurance benefits higher) at the trough of 
the cycle. Thus, a higher fiscal deficit cannot always be attributed to a 
loosening of the fiscal stance but may simply reflect that the economy is 
• 
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moving into a trough. Essentially calculation of a cyclically adjusted or 
structural balance involves an estimation of what revenues and cyclically 
adjusted expenditure (and thus the deficit) would be if the economy were 
at its potential or for some measures of the structural balance - its trend 
output, rather than its actual output. The usefulness of these indicators is 
limited by difficulties in identifying potential and trend output, and, 
consequently, in distinguishing cyclical and underlying elements of this 
fiscal deficit. 
• The cross-country experience suggests that several important issues arise 
in the content of fiscal adjustment. 
These include : 
the size of the fiscal adjustment to be made; 
the composition of fiscal adjustment in terms of whether the adjustment 
needs to be carried out through cuts in expenditure or by raising revenue 
or a combination of both, and the components of expenditure and revenue 
to be adjusted. 
The policy mix that must accompany a major fiscal adjustment; 
Concern for non-policy factors such as global economic growth which 
effects the consolidation process, 
Reversibility of the fiscal consolidation process; 
The possible adverse macroeconomic impact of fiscal adjustment; and 
Adoption of appropriate accounting standards and adherence to a fiscal 
rule framework, that make for transparent and accountable budgeting. 
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1.6 NATURE AND PROBLEMS OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENT IN 
INDIAN ECONOMY 
India's fiscal problem has deep roots in its federal fiscal system, where 
multiple players find it difficult to coordinate adjustment. The size and closed 
nature of the Indian economy, aided by its deep domestic capital markets and 
large captive pool of domestic savings, has disguised the cost of fiscal laxity 
and complicated the building of a consensus on reform. The new fiscal 
responsibility act establishes a new rules-based system to overcome this 
coordination failure. A Central Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management 
Law (FRBM) have been approved and some states are following suit. But the 
job of convincing politicians and society that adjustment is necessary is made 
more difficult by the apparent absence of any symptoms of fiscal illness. 
To deal with fiscal imbalances FRBM law was enacted in 2003. Its 
key objective is to restore fiscal sustainability by setting a medium term target 
to guide fiscal policy. The target is embedded within frameworks that places 
increased emphasis on transparency. The rule under India, FRBM possesses 
some features that set it apart from other emerging market fiscal responsibility 
frameworks. One key aspect is that, although the states fiscal deficit is almost 
half of the general Govt, deficit, the new framework only targets the Central 
level of government. 
The FRBM requires the central government to eliminate its revenue 
deficit by March 2008, although the 2004-05 budget proposses amending the 
FRBM to extend the deadline to March 2009. The balanced revenue deficit rule 
effectively allows the Government to run a deficit to finance investment. The 
new rule may have the advantage of safe guarding capital expenditure from 
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bearing the burnt of any adjustment effort as it has in the past. On the other 
hand, by opportunistically classifying current expenditures as capital, and by 
not requiring outlays' to recoup the cost of capital, the rule may run the risk of 
leaving overall spending and deficit quite on constrained. To partly address this 
concern, from July 2004 the medium-term target is supported by rules that set a 
fiscal adjustment path that requires a minimum annual adjustment of '/a percent 
of GDP. In the revenue deficit, and 0.3 percent of GDP in the overall deficit so 
that the overall deficit is not more than three percent of GDP by March 2008. 
However, the new rules also set a generous limit of 9 percent of GDP on the 
accumulation of central government debt in 2004-05, although this ceiling is 
progressively reduced by 1 percent of GDP per year thereafter. The rules also 
impose an annual ceiling on new government guarantees. 
To ensure the quality and durability of the adjustment, fiscal 
responsibility legislation (or their supporting regulation) is generally explicit on 
the accounting procedures for the fiscal policy target. Here accounting and 
definitional procedures underpinning the law were delegated to the supporting 
rules. These rules require the government to inform parliament of significant 
changes in accounting standards but they could be strengthen by setting out the 
exact definitions of the concepts underpinning the prescribed fiscal indicators. 
Enforcement relies on the loss of reputation that the government 
experiences from not implementing the FRBM. In this country, there are no 
explicit penalties, although the new rules require the Minister of Finance to 
propose to parliament corrective measures mid-year in the event revenues fall 
below 40 percent of the budget target or the fiscal or revenue deficits are in 
excess of 45 percent of the budget target. Nonetheless breaches of the ultimate 
medium term target, or of the annual targets set under the supporting rules, are 
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still pennitted for reasons of natural disaster, security or other circumstances 
specified by parliament. The Minister of Finance is only required to report to 
parliament on the extenuating circumstances after the targets have been missed. 
The FRBM employs more exacting transparency requirements and 
supplements the existing constitutional procedures governing budget processes. 
India's budgeting system has traditionally been hierarchical in nature with the 
procedures governing the presenting of the budget in parliament granting the 
Minister of Finance strong powers. In theory once the budget is submitted, 
parliament can reduce or reject specific budget spending proposals, but has 
little power to modify the size of the budget deficit. However, in the past the 
Minister of finance has in the context of the budget debates increased 
provisions for specific expenditures. Nonetheless, the parliamentary procedures 
have to some extent helped contain the common pool problem, as the Finance 
Ministry has, in principle, a greater capacity to internalize the cost of public 
spending. 
While preserving strong hierarchical powers of the Minister of Finance 
and the executive, the FRBM imposes greater transparency requirements. The 
executive must submit to parliament additional documentation in support of its 
budget, including a medium-term fiscal policy statement assessing deficit and 
debt sustainability. 
Likewise, the credibility of the FRBM would be greatly enhanced if 
the medium-term fiscal policy statement elaborated a plan of measures that 
supports its annual targets. The statement is candid in saying that most of the 
planned adjustment will come from an increase in the tax —to - GDP ratio, and 
correspondingly sets an ambitious target for tax revenue growth. However, the 
measures that will boost revenue growth over the medium term have not been 
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specified and it is not clear how on going trade liberalization initiatives will 
impact collections. 
In the process of budgeting tract record suggests that budget estimates 
have not been unbiased. Over the past ten years, the actual Central Government 
deficit overshot its budget target by 0.8 percent of GDP, with nominal overruns 
in eight years (Table 1.1). 
Table 1.1 
Implementation of Central Government Budget 
(In Percent of GDP) 
Deficits 
Budget 
Out-turn 
Expenditure 
Budget 
Out-turn 
Revenue 
Budget 
Out-turn 
Deficit over run in % 
ofGDP(+) 
Expenditure cuts % of 
GDP (-) 
Revenue shortfall in % 
of GDP 
Overrun in % of 
expenditure 
Real GDP growth 
1992-93 
-3.8 
-4.8 
14.8 
15.4 
11.0 
10.6 
1.0 
0.6 
-0.3 
6.2 
5.1 
1998-99 
-4.4 
-5.1 
14.5 
14.5 
10.1 
9.4 
0.7 
0.1 
-0.7 
5.0 
6.5 
2002-03 
-5.5 
-5.9 
16.6 
16.0 
11.0 
10.1 
0.4 
-0.6 
-1.0 
2.3 
4.3 
Average 
1992-2002 
-4.4 
-5.2 
15.1 
15.0 
10.7 
9.8 
0.8 
-0.1 
-0.9 
5.4 
5.9 
1998-2002 
-4.0 
-5.6 
16.2 
15.4 
11.3 
9.7 
0.8 
-0.8 
-1.6 
5.0 
5.4 
Source : Ministry of Finance, India. 
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The overruns were the result of revenue shortfalls with respect to the 
estimated values and these were only partly contained by expenditure 
compression. The revenue shortfalls were concentrated in excises but in 
addition, budgets regularly anticipated disinvestment proceeds that were not 
fully realized. 
It is useful to note the stresses political rules may pose. India's 
political system has demonstrably increased the focus on local issues, some 
argue at the expense of fiscal policy. Coalition Government are highly reliant 
on the support of state-level political parties who may negotiate support in 
exchange for additional fiscal resources or may complicate the achievement of 
consensus on reform priorities (Mc Garten, 2003; Rao and Singh 2001). State 
Governments have veto powers on constitutional amendments which govern 
the assignment of tax and expenditure functions) and constitutional reforms 
require a two thirds majority in national parliament and approval by at least 
half of the State legislatures. In addition, the rolling election calender implies 
that national coalition Governments in India are subject to a perpetual electoral 
cycle, while anti-incumbency bias in state elections also suggests that 
politicians rarely fare the consequence of their spending decisions. 
Large vertical imbalances leave States in India highly dependent on 
Central Government transfer. The constitution provides for a variety of 
transfers to states. The most important are shared taxes, which comprise about 
60 percent of total transfers and about one-third of total state-level taxes. The 
constitution does not specify the revenue shares but instead provides for a 
Finance Commission (FC) to be appointed every five years to recommend how 
taxes are to be shared. The FC formulates its recommendations using 
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projections of the shortfall between States' own revenue collections and 
expenditure needs, and specifies a formula to allocate these taxes among states. 
While shared taxes de-link expenditure decisions from the incidence of 
taxation, they also transmit cyclical volatility to the states as demonstrated by 
the concurrent fall in Central and State revenues since 1994. Shared taxes are 
supplemented by various grants, which are often determined in a discretionary 
manner. The responsibility for determining the size of grants transferred is split 
between two agencies. Traditionally Planning Commission (PC) "plan" or 
block grants for implementation of state-level development plans have been the 
largest. In recent years, the "grants in-aid" recommended by the FC to fill 
projected gaps between states' own revenue resources, shared taxes and non-
plan expenditure responsibilities, and the ""earmarked grants for Central 
sponsored schemes" approved by the PC have become increasingly important 
(rising almost 40 percent of the total). 
The split in responsibility for grant allocations across agencies results 
in the envelope for state grant assistance being determined in fragmented ad-
hoc manner that largely depends on the availability of Central Government 
resources. As a result, the size of transfers can vary widely year to year and 
often fall short of budgeted amounts. The rise in earmarked grants also supplies 
that growing share of spending is dictated by the Central Government, negating 
the efficiency gains from decentralizing expenditure decisions and while PC 
grants are allocated among the states by Gadgil formula they do not address 
deficiencies in basic minimum levels of public service provision across states. 
It also gives rise to common pool problems. States have little incentives to 
increase their revenue raising efforts when they do not derive the full benefit of 
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the extra resources in a revenue pooling system. They can reduce the tax 
burden on its citizen by increasing their reliance on transfer or they can off-
load additional spending costs onto others. Indeed, States own revenue has 
fallen since the mid-1980's while expenditures have risen per annum. 
Many emerging market economics impose tight controls on sub-
national borrowing but India's borrowing allows State Government greater 
freedoms, except for foreign debt (Puafield, 2004). 
Making matters even more complicated, the Federal Government has 
an established record of bailing out states. The FC has accorded debt relief to 
the states.(Table). There is also a hands- on approach in helping State 
Governments through their payments difficulties as demonstrated by the 2002 
and 2003 debt buyback Schemes and the restructuring of arrears owed by state 
electricity enterprises. 
Table 1.2 
Debt Relief Provided under Finance Commission 
1974-1978 
1979-1983 
1984-1988 
1989-1995 
1995-2000 
1995-2000 (relief to Punjab) 
Total debt relief provided under the Finance 
Commission 
Rs. Billions 
19.7 
21.6 
22.9 
9.8 
2.12 
34.13 
110.25 
% of GDP 
2.95 
2.11 
1.03 
0.22 
0.02 
0.02 
6.58 
Source : Report of the Eleventh Finance Commission and McCarten (2003). 
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1.7 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The present study has the following specific objectives : 
1) To highlight the major causes of fiscal crisis in the Indian Economy. 
2) To evaluate the fiscal adjustment programme undertaken during the last 
decade. 
3) To analyse the fiscal deficit reduction measures in the light of the 
suggestions of the IMF and the word Bank. 
4) To analyse the efficacy of Fiscal Adjustment Programme. 
5) Lastly in the light of the findings having policy implications. 
1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The study would be based on the secondary data obtained from 
reliable Government and non-government sources. To analyse the data some 
statistical tools have also been used. Such as to measure the growth rate, the 
log-lin Model has been used. 
Well known compound interest formula is given by : 
Yt = Yo(l+r) 
Where r is the compound (i.e. overtime) rate of growth of Y. Taking the natural 
logarithm, we can write : 
LnYt 
Now letting p i 
P2 
We can write 
LnYt 
Or Ln Y, 
= LnYo + tLn(l+r) 
= LnYo 
= Ln(l+r) 
= Pl+P2t 
pi+Pst + ut 
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Therefore P2 is the measure of elasticity, which gives the formula of 
buoyancies if Yt is measures as revenue through taxes, and Xt measures as 
GDP at current market prices. 
Further, moving average method has also been used to obtain trend 
values with a fair degree of accuracy by eliminating fluctuations. 
The data and the literature available in the libraries and institutions 
would be useful in making a comparison between the FAPs (Fiscal Adjustment 
Programmes) in the Indian Economy and other developing and developed 
countries of the world. This would help in analyzing the efficacy of fiscal 
adjustment programme undertaken in India. 
1.9 SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The external payments crisis of 1991, was, to a large extent, an 
inevitable consequence of the deteriorating fiscal situation during 1980s, 
especially the second half, was marked by high and persistent fiscal deficits, 
accompanied by large revenue deficits. This had led to a significant 
enlargement of the debt servicing obligations. In order to contain the 
burgeoning debt-service obligations, Government tapped financial surpluses of 
the household sector through statutory pre-emptions from financial 
intermediaries at below market clearing interest rates. This gave rise to a 
degree of financial repression. At the same time, increased financing of the 
Government deficit through automatic monetization compromised the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and fuelled inflation. Again this background, 
when the Indian economy faced an exprecedented macroeconomic crisis in 
1991 not surprisingly fiscal consolidation constituted a major plank of the 
polic\' response. 
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The primary objective of the fiscal reforms as announced in the Union 
Budget 1991-92, was essentially to achieve a reduction in the size of deficits 
and debt in relation to GDP. It was envisaged that this would be achieved 
through revenue enhancement and curtailment in current expenditure growth 
while enlarging spending on investment and infrastructure so as to provide 
momentum to the growth process. These measures were also intended to curb 
the preemption of institutional resources by the Government and 
simultaneously to provide a level playing field to the private investors. 
Accordingly, fiscal reforms in India were initiated in three distinct but 
interrelated areas. 
• restoration of fiscal balance; 
• restructuring of public sector; and 
• strengthening of the fiscal monetary co-ordination. 
The strategy for restoring fiscal balance comprised tax and non tax 
reforms, expenditure management and institutional reforms. Public sector 
restructuring mainly involved disinvestment of Government ownership. 
Contemporaneously, the steps towards improving fiscal monetary coordination 
encompassed deregulation of financial system, elimination of automatic 
monetisation, and reduction in pre-emption of institutional resources by the 
Government. At the sub-national level, fiscal adjustments began as a 
consequence of the deterioration in States' finances, which exacerbated in the 
latter half of the 1990's. With a view to promoting State reforms, access to 
Central assistance as well as to guarantees for loans from multilateral agencies 
has been linked to their reform efforts. 
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The fiscal performance during the reform period, however, was 
characterised by a clear divide in the mid-1990s in the attainment of fiscal 
targets. There was evidence of the successful fiscal correction during 1991-92 
to 1996-97 (except for 1993-94) in terms of a significant fall in the fiscal deficit 
and in public debt as a proportion of GDP. Since then, there has been a 
significant reversal of trend. Indeed, many deficit indicators presently are even 
higher than the levels prevailing at the time of crisis in 1991. The revenue 
deficit has not only persisted, but has grown in size during this period. The 
resultant dissaving arising from the revenue deficit has reduced the aggregate 
saving and investment capacity in the economy. Consequently, there was a 
steady fall in the share of capital expenditure, impacting on the infrastructure 
investment and thereby threatening the growth potential of the economy. 
Several pointers indicate a reversal of the fiscal consolidation process in the 
recent years. These include decline in tax to GDP ratio, downward rigidity in 
current expenditure, steady deterioration in public investment in productive 
Sectors, slow progress of Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) restructuring and 
faster accumulation of public debt. A major drag on state finances has been the 
poor performance of State Public Sector Undertakings (SPSUs), particularly 
the State Electricity Boards (SEBs) and State Road Transport 
Undertakings(SRTUs). Thus, even after a decade of reforms, sustained fiscal 
consolidation remains unattained. 
The need for comprehensive fiscal reforms in India was apparent 
during the late 1980s, as there was rapid deterioration in Government finances. 
During this period, the expenditure of the Central Government rose much faster 
than its revenue leading to a steep rise in the Centre's fiscal deficit to GDP 
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ratio. For the States, given the restriction on their capacity to borrow, the 
increase in expenditure was relatively aligned to the corresponding rise in 
revenue. Consequently, the rise in the fiscal deficit of States was relatively less 
steep. The sharp increase in revenue deficit of the Central Government and the 
emergence of such deficits in State finances were the most worrisome 
developments in the fiscal scenario during the 1980s. 
Reflecting these developments, there was a sharp increase in the 
outstanding liabilities of both Central and State Governments as ratio to GDP. 
The growing of size of liabilities eventually generated a considerable debt 
service burden, with interest payments a ratio to GDP rising in case of Centre 
and states during the same period. 
The underdeveloped nature of the Government Securities market and the 
heavy dependence of Small Saving Collections on the level of income resulted 
in an implicit upper ceiling on Government's access to the market resources. 
This necessitated a large order of monetary accommodation from the Resource 
Bank with its attendant monetary implications. The outstanding net Reserve 
Bank credit to the Government as ratio to GDP rose from 11.4 percent as at 
end - March 1981 to 15.6 percent as at end - March 1991. In order to partially 
abate the inflationary pressure emanating from growing monetisation of fiscal 
deficits, discrete upward changes in Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) were 
necessitated. With both CRR and Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) approaching 
their Statutory upper limits at the time of the onset of unprecedented 
macroeconomic crises of 1991, and given the deleterious macro-economic 
consequences of high fiscal deficit the only option available was to adopt a 
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quick fiscal restructuring programme along with other macro-economic and 
institutional reforms. 
The present study has tried to show how much Government is successful 
in making adjustment in revenues and expenditures with the help of various 
statistical tools. 
1.10 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Before embanking upon a research project it is absolutely essential to 
review the literature on the some or similar subject. Keeping this in mind an 
effort has been made here to review some of the existing literature on fiscal 
adjustment or fiscal consolidation. 
Chelliah R.J. (1969) in his study of fiscal policy in less developed 
countries attempts to analyse the fundamental problems of fiscal policy in less 
developed countries the basic structure of public finance with emphasis on tax 
structure and fiscal policies, against the background of planned economic 
development. The greater part of his work in carried on with special reference 
to India. He has also observed that the fiscal policy appropriate for a country 
will depend, apart from many other factors, on the stage of its development and 
on the social grounds. 
Musgrave, R.A.(1969)^ in his study of fiscal systems has examined the 
essential characteristics of fiscal system in the content of certain key features 
of economic life. His study deals with the adoption of fiscal systems to the 
requirements of Centrally planned and decentralized market economy. 
Gowda, K.V. (1987)^ in his work has criticized the long term fiscal 
policy (LTFP) that it has placed exclusive reliance not on fiscal policy with all 
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its various segments. For it does not touch on expenditure policy monetary 
policy debt management and international economic policy but on tax policy. 
In his study he explains how fiscal policy instruments are to be integrated 
with all other instruments of macro-economic policy in order to realise the 
desired results and underlines the complications of pursuing fiscal policy in 
isolation. 
Singh, S.K. (1988)'° has examined the nature of the fiscal crisis in India 
and evaluated long term fiscal policy as a response to this crisis. The study 
explains that since 1975-76, the tax ratio has not kept pace with the expenditure 
ratio resulting in the long run imbalance between Government revenues and 
expenditures. This gap which widened during the sixth plan became much 
larger during the seventh plan. Thus the Central Government has to borrow 
even to meet its current expenditure. His analysis indicates that the LTFP, as a 
response to the challenging problem of fiscal crisis has failed to offer any clear 
direction in two vital areas, namely, (I) how to restrain the increase in non-plan 
expenditure on revenue account, and (ii) how to argument the surpluses of 
PSUs. Finally he has warned that without proper advance in these areas the 
fiscal crisis will persist. 
Rakshit, M. (1991)" in his work has studied the fiscal roots of macro-
economic imbalance in India, and found that during 1980, fiscal imbalance 
assumed alarming proportions due to widening gap between revenue and 
expenditure. In his work he has discussed macro-economic adjustment 
programme introduced by the government to resolve the fiscal crisis finally he 
raises a number of important issues regarding viability of fiscal management. 
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Mundle, S. and M. Govinda Rao (1992)'^ have analysed the nature of 
fiscal crisis in India in 1990 and related issues in the growth and composition 
of public expenditure, the tax system and mobilization of tax revenues and non-
tax revenues. They have shown that the fiscal imbalance was mainly a 
reflection of the increasing gap between revenue receipts and revenue 
expenditure. There was a spurt in spending mainly on account of interest 
payments subsidies, plan and non-plan grants to State Governments, defence 
and failure of public sector undertakings etc on the other hand, the growth of 
tax and non-tax revenues was stagnated. Finally, they have endorses the fiscal 
stabilization measures initiated in 1991. 
Chhibber, A. and Mansoor Dailama (1993) argues for a need for a 
broader approach to the relationship between fiscal policy and private 
investment in developing countries. Such an approach needs to emphasize the 
role of fiscal policy and stabilization, the competitiveness between public and 
private investment and the taxation of income from capital. While these issues 
have long been recognised in the literature in the context of both developed and 
developing countries, they have assumed particular urgency and importance in 
the context of the ongoing liberalization and privatization trends evident in 
most developing countries. 
Cornia, G.A. and F. Stewart, (1993)''' reviews changes in the fiscal 
policy of developing countries undergoing economic adjustment during 1980s. 
Macro choices in the areas of overall taxation. Government expenditure and 
fiscal deficit are first examined. It appears that although a few countries 
managed to combine raising government expenditure per head and a falling 
budget deficit thanks to increase in the ratio and\or to overall growth, in the 
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Such type of model is known semilog Models. In this model, the slope 
coefficient measures the constant proportional or relative change in Y for a 
given absolute change in the value of the regressor (in this case the variable t) 
i.e. 
Relative change in regreesand 
h= 
Absolute change in regressor 
(Yt-Yt.O/Yt., 
Here X = t 
(Xt-x,o 
Another statistical tools such as Linear Trend Models has been used. 
Yt = Pi + p2t + Ut. If the slope coefficient is in this equation is positive, 
there is upward trend in Y, where as, if it is negative there is a downward trend 
in Y. 
To calculate the buoyancies log-log model has been used such as: 
Ln Y,= p, + p2LnXt 
Differentiating the above equation 
1 (dYO 
dXt 
P7 = 
= h 
dY/Y, 
1 
Xt 
Here p2 
dX,/Xt 
Proportionate change in Yt 
Proportionate change in Xt 
= elasticity 
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majority of the countries analysed, traditional fiscal policy emphasizing rapid 
reductions in budget deficits through expenditure reductions compounded the 
negative effects of falling incomes on the welfare of the poor. Finally, they 
conclude that the main elements of fiscal policy approach are aiming at 
protecting the poor during adjustment. 
De Melo, Martha (1993)'^ has proposed the use of a sustainable deficit 
concept to estimate the minimum fiscal adjustment required in a high debt 
country. The sustainable deficit is defined to be compatible with a sustainable 
debt, which the borrower is willing and able to service. His work provides 
empirical estimates of the need for fiscal adjustment in a small group of high 
debt countries in the mid 1980s. Their experience is compared to that of small 
group of low debt countries to distinguish the differences in the adjustment 
required and its determinants during this period. The results illustrate the extent 
to which the appropriate size of the fiscal deficit depends on the macro-
economic content. 
Faini, Ricardo and Jaime de Meld (1993)"^ takes a look at the evidence 
of fiscal adjustment in developing countries. They found that, while on an 
average, developing countries were successful after 1985 in cutting their 
primacy deficits, rising interest costs and stagnant fiscal revenues implied 
limited progress towards reducing fiscal imbalances. Most of the improvement 
on the fiscal front was achieved by cuts in capital expenditures. Then they have 
focussed on issues such as the size of fiscal adjustment, the macroeconomic 
impact of deficit reduction and the choice between expenditure cuts and tax 
increases. 
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Gulati, I.S. (1993)''' has dealt with some questions concerning the 
growing burden of internal public debt in India. These questions that have 
lately been raised with a Shideney not noticed before focus on reducing the 
fiscal deficit, a term that hardly ever figured in the lexicon of fiscal policy in 
India. 
Kapila, U, (1993)'^ in her analysis of public finances of India has shown 
that the fiscal situation which was under strain throughout the 1980s, reached a 
critical situation in 190-9% Throughout the eighties, all the indicates of fiscal 
imbalance were on the rise. The unabated growth of non-plan expenditure and 
poor returns from investments made in the public sector have been the main 
contributory factor in the fiscal crisis. Government initiated the fiscal 
stabilization and intended to continue it. She has also suggested that for the 
realisation of the fiscal stabilization, it is imperative to restrain the rise of 
expenditures. Fiscal discipline is also necessary on the part of PSEs to hasten 
the process of fiscal correction. 
Mookherjee, D. (1993)'^ has analysed the fiscal stabilization reforms in 
the Indian economy. In this work he has highlighted that at the term of the 
eighties into the nineties, serious action on the fiscal front was urgently needed 
to correct the macro-economic imbalances. The principal instruments of fiscal 
stabilization in 1991-92 were plan expenditure and subsidies on exports and 
fertilisers. Disinvestment of equity holding in central public sector enterprises 
also provided a cushion. Initially government succeeded in its determined 
effort at fiscal stabilization and brought the fiscal deficit down. 
Mundle, S. and Hiranya Mukhopadhyay (1993)^° in their study have 
analysed the impact of alternative fiscal policies on macro-economic 
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performance of the Indian economy. The most important lesson emerged from 
their work is that in reducing the deficit, greater revenue mobilisation would 
be preferable to expenditure compression. This should be attempted through 
tax reform rather than raising rates. There are, however, limits to how for tax 
reforms can raise the buoyancy of tax revenue. Hence fiscal correction will 
have to depend in part on public expenditure compression. They have shown 
that in the post reform period public expenditure on almost all items except 
interest payments have been cut in real terms. However, the sharpest cuts have 
fallen on those items of expenditure which ought to be protected. 
Tanzi, V. (1993) has observed that fiscal reform has proven difficuU to 
implement for poUtical, institutional and conceptual reasons. In his work he has 
discussed the determination of the correct size of the fiscal adjustment needed, 
the problems in measuring fiscal disequilibrium the desired fiscal measures and 
the sequencing of the required fiscal reforms. Finally, he argues that fiscal 
reform require time to be successful. 
Taylor L. (1993)^^ has attempted to study fiscal policy issues that arise 
during macroeconomic stabilization in developing countries. His work is based 
on the study of stabilization episodes in eighteen countries. He has observed 
that the effects of fiscal stabilization and adjustment on income distribution are 
less clear cut and stabilization programme should take into account specific 
country conditions. 
Thirsk, W.R. (1993)^^ has observed that many countries have 
overhauled their tax systems during the past decade. His work reviews the 
profile of a typical developing country tax system prior to the recent wave of 
reforms. A detailed description of tax reforms in several developing countries 
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is presented. Comparison across countries indicate an emerging consensus on 
the desirable characteristic of a tax system neutrality and the adoption of a 
more uniform system of taxation, the progressive abandonment of special tax 
distinctions and exemption and simple tax designs. 
Shand Ric and K.P. Kalirajan (1994)^'' in their study indicated that the 
reforms implemented in India since 1991-92 have been yielding the anticipated 
positive results. Though the reform process has been gradual, it is becoming 
increasingly clear that sustainability is not in question. The study concludes 
that Indian economy may be evolving a new paradigm of growth which could 
be relevant to other developing countries with similar structural linkages. 
Bhattacharya, B.B. (1995)^^ in his work has evaluated the factors 
responsible for fiscal imbalance in 1990 and analysed the performance of fiscal 
stabilization measures. He has shown that the basic problem of the fiscal 
stabilization in India was that the government expenditure was rising faster 
than the Government income. As a result all the measures of deficit such as 
fiscal deficit, revenue deficit, primary deficit, etc have rising trends. Finally, he 
suggested that the fiscal deficit should be reduced by showing down growth of 
non-plan and wasteful expenditures on the one hand and improving direct tax 
revenue and surplus of public enterprises on the other. 
Datta, R. and R.K.Sen (1995)^^ have shown in their study that in India, 
the budgetory and fiscal deficits of the Central Governments had been growing 
significantly during the sixth and seventh plan periods. They have cautioned 
that in the process of enforcing fiscal discipline and aiming at fiscal 
stabilization. Contrary steps should be avoided not only in the policy packages 
but also in the measures adopted at the central and state levels. 
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Ghosh, A. and R.K. Sen (1995)^'' have observed in their study that 
during 1980s not only the revenue receipts have been rather inelastic but the 
expenditure accounts particularly of the non-plan outlays have also gone up 
quite rapidly. This has been ternied by them as the main cause of the fiscal 
imbalance. They have also suggested that it requires to be attended with 
policies to reduce the non-plan expenditure drastically. 
Nayak, P.B. (1996) in his work has revealed that in the fiscal sector 
government expenditure had been 'far outpacing revenues for more than a 
decade, leading the government to resort to substantial borrowings, both 
internal and external. As a result interest payments become largest expenditure 
head of the central Government budget. Non-essential expenditure continues to 
grow unabated. He has also observed that the tax to GDP ratio is already 
reasonably high and the prospect of having it increased further appears to be 
limited at least in the short run. So, there is not much choice left and 
expenditures have to be cut in several vital areas. 
Rao, M.G., Tapas, K. Sen and M. Ghosh (1995)^^ have analysed in their 
study that after 1980-81, expenditure growth was higher than that of revenue 
receipts. Within total expenditure, revenue expenditure grew at rates higher 
than that of capital expenditure. Growth of revenue expenditure was 
particularly sharp in the case of interest payments, subsidies, wages and 
salaries, while those on maintenance of capital assets lagged behind. So fiscal 
imbalance becomes inevitable by the end of 1980s. The analysis also points 
towards the difficulty in achieving fiscal equilibrium in the short and medium 
tenn content. So long as the interest groups succeed in securing a large and 
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increasing share of expenditures on categories beneficial to them compression 
of fiscal deficit become difficult. 
Chakraborty, P. (1997)^° has attempted to examine whether the lowering 
the rates of direct and indirect taxes in recent years has resulted in higher tax 
mobilization. The study concludes that compared to indirect taxes, direct taxes 
were more buoyant during the post reform period. It has been observed by the 
author that generally reduction in tax rate cannot make a taxes more buoyant 
instantly. There is a time lag involved. 
Shome, P. (1998)^' attempts to assess the state of fiscal stabilization in 
the past reform period. He has shown that after an initial improvement in the 
fiscal deficit, the government faced difficulty in controlling the fiscal deficit / 
GDP ratio. The tax / GDP ratio also declined and the central government 
passed down certain expenditure responsibilities to state governments, thereby 
managing to reduce the expenditure / GDP ratio to some extent. His work 
focuses on the performance of the fiscal sector and the direction for ftiture 
policy imperatives 
Mc Dermott, C. John and Robert F. Wescott (1996) '^^  in their study tried 
to use the fiscal expansion and consolidation experiences of the industrial 
countries over the period 1970 to 1995 to examine the interplay between fiscal 
adjustments and economic performance. A key finding is that fiscal 
consolidation need not trigger an economic slowdown, especially over the 
medium term. Fiscal consolidation that concentrates on the expenditure sides, 
especially transfers and Government wages, is more likely to succeed in 
reducing the public debt ratio than tax-based consolidation. Also, the greater 
the magnitude of the fiscal consolidation, the more likely it is to succeed in 
reducing the debt ratio. 
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Lahiri, K. Ashok and R. Kaman (2004)^^ in their study examines tiie 
sustainability of fiscal deficits, the differences between monetary versus debt 
financing of fiscal deficits, the increasing importance of revenue deficits. 
According to them high fiscal deficits are not exclusive to India but high 
sustained deficit are quite unique, specially in the content of relative stability of 
the external balance of payments. The authors allude to two factors to explain 
sustainability: that the interest rate has been more or less consistently below the 
rate of growth of nominal GDP and the deficit has been mostly financed 
domestically rather than through external savings. 
Sarma, E.A.S. (2004)'^ '* focusses his study on the limited discretion of 
the Central Government to reduce public spending and the determinants of the 
quality of Generally sponsored Scheme (CSS). His cursory look at the 
composition of Central Government spending sets the stage for discussion. 
According to him about 29 percent of central government spending finances 
interest payments, 16 percent defence, 16 percent administrative expenditure, 8 
percent subsidies and 26 percent 'plan' expenditure. The direct implication of 
this composition is that cutting government spending for deficit reduction in 
practice translates into reforming 'plan' expenditure and subsidy programmes. 
Srivastava, D.K. and C. Bhujanga Rao (2004) discuss the importance 
of implicit and explicit government. Subsidies in the economy the authors 
argue that the estimates of explicit subsidies neither in the budget nor in the 
national income accounts provide a full picture. Many subsidies are implicit 
with publicly provided goods and services priced below cost. Based on 1998-
99 data, according to Srivastava and Rao, measured subsidies are 13.4 percent 
of the GDP or 1.5 times the fiscal deficit. This high estimate illustrates the 
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possible beneficial impact that introduction of sustainable pricing policies in 
the production o f private goods and services by the Indian public sector can 
have on the fiscal deficit. A reform of the subsidy regime requires a very close 
disaggregated look at the cost of subsidies. 
Premchand, A. and Saumen Chattopadhyay (2004)^ ^ examine the role of 
budgeting, budget implementation, and accounting (expenditure management) 
on prudent fiscal management. They address the question if prudent fiscal is 
the goal of government, how is it to be served by the expenditure management 
machinery? They argue persuasively that allocation of authority rights is 
critical to the implementation of prudent fiscal policies. 
Mohan, R. (2000) has analysed trends in state and central Government 
revenues and expenditures and suggested ways to climb out of debt trap. He 
has observed that rapid economic growth is the only solution to the problem of 
poverty and such growth is not possible without significant fiscal correction. 
They key objective of fiscal reform has to be a reduction in public debt service 
payments. 
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Kapits, G. (2001) assesses the potential usefulness of fiscal policy 
rules for India, in the light of rapidly growing International experience in this 
area. As part of his assessment he explores various design options and 
Institutional arrangements that seem relevant for India in the content of the 
Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Bill. He also outlines 
preparatory step, for successful implementation. 
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1.11 PLAN OF RESEARCH WORK 
The study of the topic is divided into six chapters. In chapter first, I have 
dealt with the introduction of the study. This chapter covers the concept of 
fiscal policy and nature, problems and size of fiscal adjustment. After that, 
survey of relevant literature has been undertaken. Second chapter is devoted for 
the causes of fiscal adjustment and problem of increasing debt servicing. 
Chapter third covers the fiscal adjustment and Government expenditure 
management on different heads. In this chapter various types of expenditure 
with its growth rates have been analysed. Chapter four attempts to review the 
fiscal adjustment and mobilization of resources to reduce the fiscal deficit of 
the Central Government. This chapter also analyses the factors responsible for 
low mobilization of revenues and their growth rates with statistical tools. 
Chapter five has analysed the effectiveness of fiscal adjustment programmes 
initiated after 1991 crisis and tools used for having effective fiscal adjustment 
programmes. Finally, in Chapter six, conclusions draw from the study are made 
and some suggestions have also been put forward. 
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Chapter-II 
FISCAL ADJUSTMENT AND PUBLIC DEBT 
I.llntroduction 
India's stellar growth performance during 1980s and 1990s was 
exceeded by only a handful of countries but so was the size of its fiscal 
deficits. Montek Ahluwalia presents data showing that India's fiscal and 
debt indicators are comparable to or worse than in Argentina, Brazil and 
Turkey, countries which have actually experienced a serious recent 
macroeconomic crisis. He nevertheless concludes that India is not 
vulnerable to a repeat of its 1991 fiscal and balance of payment (BOP) crisis 
because of the build up of foreign exchange reserves, capital controls, 
flexible exchange rate system and widespread public ownership of banks. 
He argues for fiscal consolidation to eliminate the threat to sustained growth 
stemming from the crowding out of public and private investment, and 
constraints imposed on the domestic financial system by the financing needs 
of the Government budget. Therefore, there is need for strong fiscal 
consolidation because government debt and interest payments are already at 
levels which constrain counter-cyclical fiscal policy. During the 2003-04 
Union Budged discussions, the finance minister informed the Rajya Sabha 
that "of our revenue, 50 percent is swallowed by payments of just interest on 
(government) debt another 20 percent goes on subsidies and 25 percent on 
defence what am I left with? (Times News Network, The Times of India, 
New Delhi, March 14, 2003). In other words the composition of government 
spending has deteriorated and options for adjustment are going to be 
constrained by the high level and non-discretionary nature of interest 
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payment. The build up in reserves offer insurance against a 1991-type crises, 
but this does not rule out a fiscal crises itself. Even the impressive 6 percent 
trend growth over the 1980s and 1990s has not been enough. India starts the 
2 r ' century with per capita income around half that of China and Indonesia 
countries that in 1970 were at comparable stages of development.•^ Not 
surprisingly, the National Development council mandated a target of 8 
percent per year in real GDP growth for the Tenth Plan (2002-03 - 2006-07) 
but the macroeconomic chapter of the plan makes it clear that achieving this 
goal calls for a substantial cut in the fiscal deficit to rise public savings and 
investment. Fiscal adjustment is needed not to stave off an imminent crisis, 
but because postponing reform would place long-turn sustained growth in 
jeopardy but post posing fiscal adjustment will push the debt burden to 
unmanageable levels. 
2.2 TRENDS AND ADJUSTMENT IN INTERNAL LIABILITIES : 
Increasing resort to borrowing over the years has led to a continuous 
growth in the total outstanding debt (Table 2.17). Internal liabilities 
registered a sharp increase in the 1980s, from 42.9 percent of GDP in 1985-
86 to 49.8 percent in 1990-91. This trend can also be seen from deviation 
from trend value, which is positive during 1980, (Table 2.1). This was due 
to a combination of revenue deficits (Table 2.11) and poor return on assets 
financed by capital receipts a summary measure of which is the fiscal 
deficit. Liabilities did decline marginally (Table 2.3 and Figure 2.3) which 
was 48.6 percent of GDP in 1991-92. Other liabilities (small savings, 
provident funds etc.) have risen much more than narket borrowings. Their 
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share in total internal liabilities also increased. Internal liabilities increased 
from 48.1 percent of GDP in 1992-93 to 50.1 percent of GDP in 1993-94 
(Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2). The percentage change in Internal liabilities was 
20 percent over its previous period. (Table 2.3 and Figure 2.3). The increase 
in it was mainly because of the increase in internal debt, which rose from 
26.6 percent of GDP in 1992-93 to 28.6 percent of GDP in 1993-94 (Table 
2.5 and Figure 2.5). Other internal liabilities registered only a small increase 
(Table 2.18). The share of market borrowing in total internal liabilities. In 
1995-96, internal debt declined to 46.7 percent of GDP. This was due to 
decline in internal debt. 
The process of fiscal correction over the last few years has had a 
moderating influence on the accumulation of aggregate internal liabilities of 
the Central Government. The internal liabilities increased to Rs. 722962 
crore in 1997-98 from Rs. 621438 crore in 1996-97. This shows an increase 
in the growth of internal liabilities from 12.0 percent in 1996-97 to 16.3 
percent in 1997-98. Reflecting there trend internal liabilities as proportion of 
GDP also increased in this same period. This increase is mainly contributed 
both by market borrowings and other internal liabilities. 
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Table 2.1 
Trend value of Internal Liabilities 
(Rs. Crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Actual 
119331 
146247 
172338 
204025 
239849 
283033 
317714 
359654 
430623 
487682 
554984 
621438 
722962 
834551 
962592 
1102596 
1294862 
1499589 
Trend Value 
-53937.85 
20081.44 
94100.73 
168120.02 
242139.31 
316158.60 
390177.89 
464197.18 
538216.47 
612235.76 
686255.05 
760274.34 
834293.63 
908312.92 
982332.21 
1056351.49 
1130370.79 
1204390.10 
Deviation from 
Trend value 
173268.9 
126165.6 
78237.3 
35905.0 
-2290.3 
-33125.6 
-72463.9 
-104543.2 
-107593.5 
-124553.8 
-131271.1 
-138836.3 
-111331.6 
-73761.9 
-19740.2 
46244.5 
164491.2 
295198.9 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues. 
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Growth model of internal liability as per cent of GDP is as follows: 
3.808 + 0.0093 Xt 
(0.031) (0.003) 
(123.734) (3.280) 
0.94% 
Log value of internal liabilities of GDP 
time period 
Internal liabilities as per cent of GDP has increased at 0.94 per cent with 
compound annual growth rate (Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2). 
Table 2.2 
Internal Liabilities as Percentage of GDP 
t 
CAGR 
Where, Lnl LGDP = 
Xt 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Per cent 
42.9 
47.0 
48.6 
48.4 
49.3 
49.8 
48.6 
48.1 
50.1 
48.2 
46.7 
45.4 
47.5 
47.9 
49.7 
52.4 
57.0 
60.9 
Source : Calculated. 
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Table 2.3 
Percentage Change in Internal Liabilities 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage change 
-
22.6 
17.8 
18.4 
17.6 
18.0 
12.3 
13.2 
19.7 
13.3 
13.8 
12.0 
16.3 
15.4 
15.3 
14.5 
17.4 
15.8 
Source : Calculated. 
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2.3 TRENDS AND ADJUSTMENT IN INTER 
There has been a change in the structure of debt since 1990-91, with 
the share of market borrowing in total internal liabilities falling from 2.8 
percent in 1990-91 to 1.0 percent in 1992-93. Market borrowing a percent of 
internal debt has also declined from 5.2 percent to 1.8 percent in the same 
period (Table 2.9). "Other" Internal Debt such as treasury bills has 
substituted this. The share of other liabilities" (such as small savings, 
provident fund etc.) has remained also unchanged. 
Table 2.4 
Trend Value of Internal Debt of the Central Government 
(Rs. Crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Actual Value 
71039 
86312 
98646 
114498 
133193 
154004 
172750 
199100 
245712 
266467 
307869 
344476 
388988 
459696 
714254 
803698 
913061 
1020688 
Trend Value 
-78647.81 
-26947.67 
24752.47 
76452.61 
128152.75 
179852.89 
231553.04 
283253.18 
334953.32 
386653.46 
438353.60 
490053.74 
541753.88 
593454.03 
645154.17 
696854.31 
748554.45 
800254.59 
Deviation from 
Trend value 
149686.8 
113259.7 
73893.5 
38045.4 
5040.3 
-25848.9 
-55803.0 
-84153.2 
-89241.3 
-120186.5 
-130484.6 
-145577.7 
-152755.9 
-133758.0 
69099.8 
106843.7 
164506.6 
220433.4 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues. 
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Growth model of internal debt of Central Government as per cent of GDP is 
as follows: 
+ 0.0207 llXt 
(0.006) 
(3.483) 
3.172 
(0.64) 
(49.295) 
2.1% 
Log value of internal debt as percentage of GDP 
time period 
Internal debt as per cent of GDP has increased at the compound rate of 
growth of 2.1 per cent (Table 2.5 and Figure 2.5). 
Table 2.5 
Internal Debt of the Central Government as Percentage of GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
25.6 
27.7 
27.8 
27.2 
27.4 
27.1 
26.5 
26.6 
28.6 
26.3 
25.9 
25.2 
25.5 
26.4 
36.9 
38.2 
40.2 
41.4 
Source : Calculated 
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2.4 TRENDS AND ADJUSTMENT IN MARKET BORROWING 
Market borrowing as percentage of GDP was 1.8 per cent in 1985-
86, increased to 2.0 per cent in 1998-99. Again it consistently declined up to 
1992-93. In 1993-94 it was 3.4 per cent of GDP. In 1996-97 it declined and 
reached to 1.5 per cent of GDP. From 1998-98 onwards it is more or less 3.5 
per cent of GDP (Table 2.8 and Figure 2.7) 
If market borrowing is analysed in terms of percentage change, 
there was negative changes during 1989-90, 91-92, 1992-93, 1994-95, 1996-
97. The highest change was witnessed in 1993-94 (Table 2.7 and Figure 
2.6). 
Table 2.6 
Percentage Change in 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
the Market Borrowing 
Percentage change 
-
13.3 
6.0 
43.6 
-12.0 
8.1 
-6.1 
-51.1 
686.9 
-29.7 
62.8 
-39.5 
62.4 
112.3 
1.9 
3.8 
20.3 
28.7 
Source : Calculated 
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Table 2.7 
Market Borrowing as Percent of GDP since 1985-86 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
1.8 
1.8 
1.7 
2.0 
1.5 
1.4 
1.1 
0.5 
3.4 
3.0 
2.8 
1.5 
2.1 
4.0 
3.6 
3.5 
3.9 
4.6 
Source : Calculated 
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2.4.1 Market Borrowing and Debt-GDP ratio 
The share of market borrowings in total internal liabilities, which 
was 4.1 per cent in 1985-86 has been declining over the years reached to 
1.0 per 
Table 2.8 
Market Borrowing as Percent of Total Internal Liabilities and Internal 
Debt 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
As percent of 
Internal liabilities 
4.1 
3.8 
3.4 
4.1 
3.1 
2.8 
2.4 
1.0 
6.7 
4.2 
6.2 
3.2 
4.5 
8.3 
7.3 
6.6 
6.8 
7.5 
As percent of 
internal debt 
6.9 
6.4 
5.9 
7.4 
5.6 
5.2 
4.3 
1.8 
11.8 
7.6 
10.7 
5.8 
8.4 
15.0 
9.8 
9.1 
9.6 
11.1 
Source : Calculated 
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cent in 1992-93. However the share increased to 6.7 per cent in 1993-94 
(Table 2.8 and Figure 2.8) because of the inclusion of loans in conversion of 
maturing treasury bills and zero coupon bonds. Further this has declined and 
reached to 4.2 per cent, this is because of a reduction in the statutory 
liquidity ratio. In 1995-96, this share has increased due to incentive provided 
by market based rates on government securities. 
Table 2.9 
Central Government Deficit and Debt Stock (Percentage of GDP) 
1985-86 to 2002-03 
(as percent of GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Gross Fiscal 
Deficit 
Percentage 
7.9 
8.5 
7.6 
7.3 
7.3 
7.8 
5.6 
5.4 
7.0 
5.7 
5.1 
4.9 
5.8 
6.5 
5.4 
5.6 
6.2 
5.9 
Internal Debt 
Stock 
Percentage 
25.6 
27.7 
27.8 
27.2 
27.4 
27.1 
26.5 
26.6 
28.6 
26.6 
25.9 
25.2 
25.5 
26.4 
36.9 
38.2 
40.2 
41.4 
External Debt 
(Percentage) 
6.5 
6.5 
6.6 
6.1 
5.8 
5.5 
5.7 
5.6 
5.5 
5.0 
4.3 
4.0 
3.6 
3.3 
3.0 
3.1 
3.1 
2.4 
Source : Calculated 
66 
o C-
Q 
o 
U-
C/5 
O 
O 
^ 
o 
o 
1 -^  
= U 
— a> (U iS 
£ uJ IH 
0-
O 
o 
0) 
u 
u 
I . 
o 
P. 
t« 
S! 
o 
-^  
C/2 
• t a -
x i 
u 
Q 
-a 
B 
u 
a 
E 
s 
u 
> 
o 
<> "I 
'» <l 
IT) 
'^ 
o 
T t 
LO 
ro 
O 
ro 
>r^  
(N 
O 
(N 
—r-
o 
3 S B ; U 3 3 J 3 J 
eo-2003 
30-1003 
lO-OOOZ 
00-6661 
66-8661 
86-/.661 
A6-9661 
96-S661 
S6-t'66I « 
t'6-£66l "^ 
£6-3661 
36-1661 
16-0661 
06-6861 
68-8861 
88-A861 
/.8-9861 
98-S861 
u 
I. 
3 
on 
>' 
67 
2.5 TRENDS IN CENTRE'S GROSS FISCAL DEFICIT AND ITS 
FINANCING 
Fiscal consolidation, a key element in the package of economic 
reforms remains an unfinished task. One of the components of economic 
reforms, inadequate progress has been made in consolidating the fiscal 
deficit. After showing some signs of reduction in the mid-nineties, the fiscal 
deficit started rising from 1997-98. The fiscal deficit declined from 6.6 per 
cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 4.1 per cent in 1996-97 and then rose to 4.8 per 
cent in 1997-98 and further to 6.2 per cent in 2001-02 (Table 2.11). Higher 
fiscal deficits, besides constraining growth have resulted in higher 
Government borrowings. The change in the composition of fiscal deficit of 
the Centre is an equally worrisome feature. The revenue deficit, which 
constituted 41.6 per cent of fiscal deficit in 1990-91, accounted for 71.1 per 
cent of fiscal deficit in 2001-02. This is reflective of the fact that a large 
portion of fiscal deficit goes to finance public consumption expenditure pre-
empting public investment. A number of factors have contributed to this 
deterioration. The main factors are rising expenditure on salaries, unfunded 
pensions, interest payments, improperly targeted subsidies and stagnation in 
the tax-GDP ratio. The share of wages and salaries in total Central 
Government expenditure increased from 9.7 per cent in 1996-97 to 10.5 per 
cent in 1999-2000 and remained at 10.3 per cent in 2000-01 as per economic 
and functional classification. 
A break up of GFD into its various components like Revenue deficit 
(RD), capital outlays and net lending along with its sources of financing 
through external assistance, market borrowing, other liabilides which 
comprises small savings and other sources and drown down of cash payment 
has been given in Table 2.10. It may be observed that decomposition of 
68 
GFD as a ratio to GDP shows an almost stagnant ratio of revenue deficit. In 
1985-86 it was 2.1 per cent of GDP and increased to 3.3 per cent in 1990-91. 
In 1996-97 it was 2.4 per cent of GDP, which increased and was 4.3 per cent 
of GDP. The revenue deficit as per cent of GDP increased at the compound 
rate of growth of 3.5 per cent. 
Capital outlay as per cent of GDP has a declining trend. It was 2.8 
per cent of GDP in 1985-86. It declined and was 2.1 per cent of GDP. In 
1996-97 it was 1.0 per cent. It reached to 1.2 per cent of GDP in 2002-03. 
The axe of expenditure management has fallen on the capital outlay. The 
CAGR of capital outlay is negative and is 6.1 per cent during the period 
1985-86 to 2002-03. Net lending, which is the difference between loans and 
advances and recoveries of loans, has declined as per cent of GDP over the 
period of time. It was 3.0 per cent in 1985-86 declined to 2.5 per cent of 
GDP in 1990-91. In 1997-98 it was 1.7 per cent of GDP, which further 
declined to 0.6 per cent of GDP. 
We can also analyse the trend of revenue deficit, capital outlay and 
net lending as percentage of gross fiscal deficit. Revenue deficit as per cent 
of GFD has increased over the period of time. CAGR for this is 5.7 per cent. 
The capital outlay as per cent of GFD was 35.0 per cent. It declined to 27.2 
per cent in 1990-91. In 1996-97 this percentage reached to 2.13 per cent. 
Further there was decline of capital outlay as per cent of GFD, which was 
20.9 per cent in 2002-03. The capital outlays as per cent of GFD have 
declined at the compound annual growth rate of 4.1 per cent. Net lending as 
per cent of GFD has also declining trend. It was 35.0 per cent in 1985-86, 
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which declined to 31.2 per cent in 1990-91. It reached to 30.5 per cent in 
1996-97. In 2002-03 the net lending as GFD was 9.5 per cent. The CAGR of 
net lending as GFD is -6.5 per cent. This declining trend was due to increase 
in recoveries of loans. 
Market borrowings financed 61 per cent of the gross fiscal deficit in 
1998-99 compared with 36.5 per cent in 1997-98 (Table 2.10). Other 
liabilities accounted 37.6 per cent in GFD in 1998-99 as against 63.3 in 
1997-98 (Table 2.10). The external loan contributed 1.7 per cent of the total 
financing of the gross fiscal deficit in 1998-99. Budgetary deficit as per cent 
of GDP has declining trend between 1985 to 2003. It was 1.9 per cent in 
1985-86 which reached to 0.2 per cent in 2002-03. Budgetary deficit as per 
cent of GFD has errafic increase upto 1996-97. The Budget announcement 
of 97 discontinued the use of ad-hoc treasury bills. It has a negafive value in 
1997-98 both as GDP and GFD. It was 0.2 per cent as ratio of GDP and 3.6 
per cent as ratio of GFD. 
In recent years, after 1997-98, fiscal deficit of the Central 
Government got magnified on account of surge in small savings collections. 
This also contributed towards accumulation of long term liabilities of the 
State Governments as three fourths of the small savings are lent to the states 
on a much higher maturity. With liberalization in the financial sector, the 
market is also increasingly influencing interest rate determination. 
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Table 2.11 
Trends in Deficits of Central Government as Percent of GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Revenue 
deficit 
2.1 
2.5 
2.6 
2.5 
2.5 
3.3 
2.5 
2.5 
3.8 
3.1 
2.5 
2.4 
3.1 
3.8 
3.5 
4.1 
4.4 
4.3 
Primary 
deficit 
5.2 
5.5 
4.5 
3.9 
3.7 
4.1 
1.5 
1.2 
2.7 
1.3 
0.9 
0.5 
1.5 
2.0 
0.7 
0.9 
1.5 
1.2 
Fiscal 
deficit 
7.9 
8.5 
7.6 
7.3 
7.3 
7.8 
5.6 
5.4 
7.0 
5.7 
5.1 
4.9 
5.8 
6.5 
5.4 
5.6 
6.2 
5.9 
Revenue deficit 
as per cent of 
fiscal deficit 
26.9 
29.5 
33.8 
34.0 
33.4 
41.6 
44.8 
46.2 
54.3 
53.8 
49.4 
48.9 
52.2 
59.1 
64.6 
71.7 
71.1 
72.0 
Source : Calculated. 
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2.6 TRENDS IN SALARY AND PENSION PAYMENTS 
One of the factors, which have trained the fiscal position of the 
Central Government, has been the sharp escalation in its salary bill (pay and 
allowances) and pension payments. Consequent to the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Fifth Central Pay Commission, the salary bill and 
pension outgo of the Central Government Civil ministries and departments 
including defence services (excluding Telecom, Post and Railways) 
escalated sharply by 33.6 per cent and 35 per cent respectively in 1997-98. 
The expenditure on salaries and that on pensions accounted for 12.5 per cent 
and 3.8 per cent respectively of the revenue expenditure in 1997-98. Salary 
bill and pension payments now absorb more that one-fifth of the total 
revenues receipts of the Central Government as is evident from the Table 
2.12. Expenditure on salaries and pensions alone of the Central Government 
civil ministries and departments including defence services (excluding 
Telecom, Post and Railways) accounted for about 2 per cent of GDP in 
1997-98. Salary and pension payments being in the nature of contractual 
obligations divert resources away from vital social and infrastructure 
sectors. Most public pensions including that prevailing in India is based on 
pay as - you - go system meaning that pensions are also paid out of current 
revenues and not from payments made by present recipients during their 
working lives. The pension obligations are likely to rise further as life 
expectancies improve and the ratio of pensioners to work force in the 
Central Government increases in the coming years. 
76 
Table 2.12 
Expenditure on Salaries and Pension of the Central Government 
(Rs. crore) 
(A) Salary Bill 
(B) Pension 
(C) Total (A+B) 
1995-96 
14895 
(18.1) 
4300 
(17.3) 
19195 
(17.9) 
1996-97 
17013 
(14.2) 
5108 
(18.8) 
22121 
(15.2) 
As per cent of Revenue Receipts 
1. Salaries 
2. Pension 
13.5 
39.9 
13.5 
4.0 
1997-98 
22732 
(33.6) 
6896 
(35.0) 
29627 
(33.9) 
(net to centre) 
16.4 
5.0 
1998-99 BE 
26484 
(16.5) 
7356 
(6.7) 
33840 
(14.2) 
16.3 
4.5 
Note : Figures within parentheses indicate percentage change over the 
preceeding years. 
Source : Economic Survey, 1998-99. 
The share of pensions in total Government expenditure has also 
increased from 2.2 per cent in 1996-97 to 3.7 per cent in 1999-2000 and 
remained at 3.6 per cent in 2000-01. 
2.7 TRENDS IN INTEREST ON INTERNAL LIABILITIES AND 
AVERAGE COST OF BORROWINGS : 
The increasing fiscal deficits and consequent borrowings from the 
domestic private sector have also put upward pressure on interest rates. This 
is reflected in the increasing trends in average rates. The average rate of 
interest on internal liabilities rose from 7.2 per cent in 1985-86 to 8.4 per 
cent in 1991-92 (Table 2.14), because of the continued replacement of old 
lower interest debt by new higher interest debt. The rate of interest on 
external liabilities similarly increased from 3.2 per cent in 1985-86 to 8.4 
per cent in 1991-92. This was due to the reduction in the proportion of soft 
loans provided by multilateral lending institutions (IDA etc.) and the 
hardening of international interest rates in the 1980s. 
Table 2.13 
Interest on Outstanding Internal Liabilities of Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Outstanding 
internal liabilities 
(Rs. crores) 
119331 
146247 
172338 
204025 
239849 
283033 
317714 
359654 
430623 
487682 
554984 
621438 
722962 
834551 
933000 
1047976 
1196245 
1323704 
Interest on 
internal liabilities 
(Rs. crores) 
6974 
8480 
10275 
13036 
16241 
19664 
23892 
27546 
33017 
40034 
45631 
55255 
61527 
73519 
85741 
94900 
103175 
113238 
Average cost of 
borrowings (Percent 
per annum) 
-
7.1 
7.0 
7.6 
8.0 
8.2 
8.4 
8.7 
9.2 
9.3 
9.4 
10.0 
9.9 
10.2 
10.3 
10.2 
9.8 
9.5 
Note : (i) Average cost of borrowings is the percentage of interest payment 
in year 't' to outstanding liabilities in year ' t-l ' . 
(ii) Outstanding internal liabilities exclude NSSF loans to states, 
with no interest liability on the part of the centre. 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues. 
The growth in internal and external liabilities and the increasing rate 
of interest have resulted in a mounting burden of interest payments. While 
gross interest payments as a ratio of total expenditure has more than doubled 
between 1980-81 and 1991-92 from 11,6 per cent to 23.7 per cent interest 
payments net of interest received increased by nearly four times from 3.6 
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per cent to 13.9 per cent. The fiscal correction measures introduced in the 
1991-92 budgets marginally reduced the total (internal and external 
liabilities to GDP ratio from 55.3 per cent in the 1990-91 to 54.3 per cent in 
1991-92 (Table 2.17). However this has not helped in reducing the net 
interest liabilities. 
Another features which has been witnessed that is the reduction of 
the difference between the interest rate on market borrowings and 'other 
internal liabilities (small savings, provident funds, etc.) during 1992-93. 
This is an indication that Central Government 'market loans' are now really 
becoming "market" related. 
2.8 TRENDS AND ADJUSTMENT IN EXTERNAL DEBT 
(OUTSTANDING) 
External liabilities are shown in the budget converted at the 
exchange rate prevailing in March of the year in which they are incurred. 
The ratio of these liabilities to GDP has come down.from 6.5 per cent 
inl985-86 to 5.7 per cent in 1991-92 (Table 2.15 and Figure 2.12). When 
external liabilities are converted at the current end of the year exchange rate, 
to reflect the burden of the debt fully, it has risen rapidly. When external 
liabilities were evaluated at market exchanger ate it jumped sharply due to 
change in exchange rates. 
External liabilities estimated in the budget are at the historical rates 
of exchange. A historical rate, the ratio of external debt stock to GDP has 
been on downward slid for many years. The repayment burden of the debt 
stock is better reflected by valuing the debt stock at exchange rates at the 
end of the relevant fiscal year. When this is done, external liabilities as a 
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proportion of GDP turns out to be much higher, although the ratio has 
shown a declining trend since 1991-92. 
Table 2.15 
External Debt of the Central Government as Percent of GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Actual (Rs. crores) 
18153 
20299 
23223 
25746 
28343 
31525 
36948 
42269 
47345 
50929 
51249 
54238 
55332 
57255 
58437 
65945 
71546 
59612 
As Percentage of 
GDP 
6.5 
6.5 
6.6 
6.1 
5.8 
5.5 
5.7 
5.6 
5.5 
5.0 
4.3 
4.0 
3.6 
3.3 
3.0 
3.1 
3.1 
2.4 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues. 
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2.9 TRENDS AND ADJUSTMENT IN OUTSTANDING 
GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES 
In addition to the size of debt appearing on the budget/balance 
sheets of the governments, there has been a steep rise in the off-budget 
liabilities arising on account of guarantees extended by the Government. 
The guarantee given by the Government rose in nominal term from Rs. 
58,088 crores as at end-March 1993 to Rs. 95,859 crores as at end March 
2002 though as a ratio to GDP it declined from 7.8 per cent to 4.2 per cent 
during the same period. Thus, in terms of contingent liabilities, there are 
clear signs of fiscal prudence by the Centre in the reform period (Table 2.16 
and Figure 2.13). 
Table 2.16 
Outstanding Government Guarantees 
Year 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
Amount (Rs. crores) 
58088 
62834 
62468 
65573 
69748 
73877 
74606 
83954 
86862 
95859 
90617 
Per cent of GDP 
7.8 
7.3 
6.2 
5.5 
5.1 
4.9 
4.3 
4.3 
4.1 
4.2 
3.7 
Source : Data on centre's guarantees are sourced from finance accounts and 
budget documents of the Central Government. 
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2.10 SUSTAINABILITY OF DEBT AND FISCAL DEFICIT 
Questions have been raised whether Government debt in India has 
become unsustainable as it has been rising faster than GDP. For fiscal 
sustainability, it is required that a rise in fiscal deficit is matched by a rise in 
the capacity to service the increased debt. It has been argued that from this 
angle, borrowing for generation of assets may be justified. Apart from the 
fact that a little less than 70 per cent of borrowing is presently not being 
spent on capital assets even where there is capital expenditure, the return on 
assets is negligible. Even the more indirect return through higher growth to 
match the growing interest liabilities has not been forthcoming. It requires 
the combination of high growth and tax buoyancy that is higher than one. In 
fact, the high level of fiscal deficit combined with the rising debt-GDP ratio 
has led to a fall in the current government expenditures net of interests and 
pensions. 
The combined debt-GDP ratio of the Central and State governments 
at the end of 2002-03 was about 76 per cent of GDP, subject to some 
qualifications. First, the Government budget documents give the Centre's 
external debt as evaluated at the historical exchange rates, i.e. exchange 
rates in the years in which the debt was incurred. Since the exchange rate 
has depreciated over the years, it makes a difference if external debt is 
evaluated at the current exchange rates. This difference was as large as 
nearly 11 percent in 1991-92. However, over the years, this difference has 
steadily come down. In 2002-03, if external debt is evaluated at the current 
exchange rates, about 5.6 per cent would need to be added to the debt-GDP 
ratio. This would take the combined debt-GDP ratio in 2002-03 to 81.6 per 
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cent. The second qualification is that in accounting for the liabilities of the 
State Governments, certain liabilities of reserve funds and deposits are not 
included. In 2002-03, about 3.4 percentage points of GDP needs to be added 
on this account, taking the overall debt-GDP ratio to 85 per cent. These 
figures do not include contingent liabilities, which amount to more than 11 
percent of GDP. 
The growth in debt-GDP ratio has accelerated since 1996-97 when 
it was 56.3 per cent. During the period of 1995-96 to 2002-03, the combined 
debt-GDP ratio rose from 56.3 percent to 7.6 percent in 2002-03, i.e. an 
increase of a little less than 20 percentage points in a span of 6 years. This is 
an unprecedented increase in this growth of the debt-GDP ratio in such a 
short span of time. As pointed out in Rangarajan and Srivastava"*, one way 
of looking at the source of increase in the debt-GDP ratio during this period 
is to decompose the increase in terms of the contribution of cumulated 
primary deficits and that of the differential between growth and interest 
rates. For three consecutive years, viz. 2000-01, 2001-02 and 2002-03, the 
nominal growth rate fell below the effective interest rate. In these years, 
instead of absorbing the impact of primary deficits, the growth interest 
differential, being negative, worked in the reverse by adding to the debt-
GDP ratio. For the period 1996-97 to 2002-03, therefore the excess of 
growth over interest could not absorb any part of the impact of cumulated 
primary deficits, the benefit in the first three years being negated by the 
opposite effect in the latter three years. The entire increase therefore was 
due to accumulation of primary deficits, which remained unabsorbed by any 
excess of growth over interest rates.^ 
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High levels of debt-GDP ratio result in high interest payments 
relative to revenue receipts. Since interest payments are committed 
expenditures, revenue deficits are bound to increase when revenue receipts 
to GDP ratios remain sluggish. This has the effect of lowering the Saving 
rate on the one hand and increasing the fiscal deficit on the other to maintain 
primary expenditures. Eventually these changes have the potential of 
developing into a spiral of rising fiscal deficits, debt, interest payments, 
revenue deficits and back to a higher fiscal deficit. This gives rise to the 
issue of sustainability of debt. 
Table 2.17 
Total Outstanding Liabilities of the Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Rupees crores 
137484 (49.5) 
166546(53.5) 
195561 (55.2) 
229771 (54.5) 
268192(55.2) 
314558(55.3) 
354662 (54.3) 
401923 (53.7) 
477968 (55.6) 
538611(53.2) 
606233(51.0) 
675676 (49.4) 
778294(51.1) 
891806(51.2) 
1021029(52.7) 
1168541 (55.5) 
1366408(60.1) 
1559201 (63.3) 
Note : Figure in parentheses are as per cent of GDP. 
Source : (i) Actual values - from economic survey - various issues, 
(ii) Figures in parentheses are calculated. 
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Table 2.18 
Other Internal Liabilities of the Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Rupees crores 
48292(17.4) 
59935(19.3) 
73692 (20.8) 
89527(21.2) 
106656(21.9) 
129090 (22.7) 
144964 (22.2) 
160554(21.5) 
184911 (21.5) 
221215(21.8) 
247115 (20.8) 
276962 (20.2) 
333964(21.9) 
374855(21.5) 
248338(12.8) 
298898(14.2) 
381801 (16.8) 
478901 (19.4) 
Note : Figure in parentheses are as per cent of GDP. 
Source : (i) Actual values - from economic survey - various issues, 
(ii) Figures in parentheses are calculated. 
As per the current Indian budgetary practice there are three sets of 
liabilities which constitute Central Government public debt viz. (a) internal 
debt, (b) external debt, and (c) "other liabilities". Internal debt and external 
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debt constitute public debt of India and are secured under the Consolidated 
Fund of India. The Indian Constitution under Article 292 provides for 
placing a limit on public debt secured under the Consolidated Fund of India 
but precludes "other liabilities" under Public Account. 
Internal debt includes market loans, special securities issued to RBI, 
compensation and other bonds, treasury bills issued to RBI, state 
governments commercial banks and other parties, as well as non-negotiable 
and non-interest bearing rupee securities issued to international financial 
institutions. 
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Chapter - III 
FISCAL ADJUSTMENT AND EXPENDITURE 
MANAGEMENT 
3.1INTRODUCTION 
During recent years, there has been a growing recognition of the 
roles of expenditures and expenditure management in fiscal adjustment and 
in the pursuit of prudent fiscal policies over the medium term. There is also 
recognition that a prerequisite to the pursuit of sustainable fiscal policies, 
the quality of expenditure needs to be improved.^  In turn, the improvement 
of the quality involves higher outlays in some sectors such as education and 
health, while reducing wherever possible, unproductive expenditures 
including a reduction in the wage bill, a reduction in the range of activities 
undertaken by governments, a substantial reorganization of the structure of 
implicit and explicit subsidies, streamlining the focus of some social outlays 
and rationalizing defence expenditures without any erosion in the 
fundamental capacity of the governments. The structural changes are within 
the ambit of expenditure policies as distinct from the mechanics of 
expenditure management. 
Expenditure management, in its broad perspective includes three 
major elements - resource allocation, resource utilization and resource 
utilizing accounting, which are translated in day-to-day parlance into 
budgeting budget implementation, and accounting. Expenditure policy is a 
byproduct both in intent and outcome, of the working of these three inter-
related phases. Expenditure policies aim at dealing both with the above 
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mentioned structural issues, as well as with the immediate concerns that are 
addressed as a part of the overall annual budgetary policy. 
Some of the major expenditure reduction/management policies 
undertaken during the nineties after the initiation of the economic reform by 
the Central Government of India were in the following manner. Immediately 
after the balance of payments crisis, the stabilization package was adopted 
in 1991 to restore fiscal discipline. The successful reduction in fiscal deficit 
as a percentage of GDP during 1991-92 could be attributable to : 
• the decision to abolish the export subsidies. 
• to increase the fertilizer prices as well as, and 
• steps taken to keep non-plan expenditure (including defence expenditure 
in check). 
The Economic Survey for 1992-93 considered expenditure reform to 
be as important as tax reform though the focus of expenditure reform was 
rather limited. It remained confined to "a continuous monitoring of 
performance" of welfare expenditures administered by states with the 
objective of bringing about significant improvements in cost-effectiveness. 
During 1992-93 several other measures were also adopted. They are as 
follows : 
• The budgetary support of the Central plan was maintained at the nominal 
level of the previous year budget estimate. 
• Non-plan revenue expenditures were controlled. 
• The decontrol of phosphatic and potassic fertilizers checked the 
expenditure on fertilizer subsidies. 
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• As a part of expenditure control strategy and in order to regulate the 
level of borrowing from RBI, fiscal deficit, ceiling were prescribed for 
the quarters ending June, September, and December 1992. 
• The existing expenditure control mechanisms were strengthened. 
During 1994-95 steps were also taken to control the growth of expenditure. 
They are as follows : 
• Reduction of posts at various levels. 
• Cut in the overall expenditure on consumption of petrol/diesel, on 
telephone, restricting the purchase of vehicles. 
It was recognized that further steps needed to be taken more 
effective financing through user charges. 
The first major discussion on expenditure reduction and its 
management began in 1997-98 with the release of a Discussion paper on 
subsidies by the government of India entitled "Government subsidies in 
India" to generate debate and initiate a more open approach to subsidies. 
Another important step towards fiscal discipline was taken when the 
financing of the budgetary deficit through the ad-hoc treasury bills was 
discontinued. 
The Union Budget for 1999-2000 recognized the importance of 
adoption of a medium term fiscal correction target of eliminating revenue 
deficit and bringing down fiscal deficit to 2 percent of GDP in four years. It 
was announced that an Expenditure Reform Commission was to be set up to 
examine the entire gamut of expenditure in an unbiased way, free of any 
Departmental interests. To promote transparency and curb the growth of 
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contingent liabilities, the budget constituted Guarantee Redemption Fund, 
with an initial corpus of Rs. 50 crore and later the states will be asked to do 
the same. 
The Fiscal Responsibility and the Budget Management Bill 2000 
was introduced in the Lok Sabha in December 2000. The proposed 
legislation was supposed to provide a legal and institutional framework to 
eliminate revenue deficit and bringing down the fiscal deficit to ensure fiscal 
sustainability in terms of a stable debt to GDP ratio. 
The Union Budget for 2000-01 proposed a number of policy 
measures with the objective of checking the momentum of built in 
expenditure growth owing to the large proportion of pre-committed 
expenditure in total expenditure. 
• Subjecting all ongoing schemes to zero based budgeting. 
• Reviewing the norms for creation of post and fresh recruitment in 
government budgeting. 
• Redeployment of Surplus staff and making VRS more effective. 
• All subsidies to be reviewed in line with the cost based user charges 
wherever feasible. 
• Budgetary support to autonomous institutions would be reviewed and 
they will be encouraged to generate internal resources. 
During the course of the year, the government took a series of 
measures for controlling growth in non-plan non-developmental 
expenditure. 
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Expenditure management, broadly speaking, featured as one of the 
major objectives of tiiis government in the Union budget 2001-02. The 
objectives as stated in the Budget speech, mainly referred to three aspects, 
stringent expenditure control of non-productive expenditure, rationalization 
of subsidies and improvement in the quality of the expenditure. 
Further, as an institutional arrangement, the Government constituted 
an Expenditure Reform Commission (ERC) to look into areas of expenditure 
correction. Areas identified by the ERC include, interalia creation of a 
national food security buffer. Stock and minimisation of cost of buffer stock 
operations and rationalization of fertilizer subsidies through dismantling of 
controls in a phased manner. It also included optimizing government staff 
strength by a ban on the creation of new posts for two years, introduction of 
VRS and redeployment of surplus staff in various government departments 
and autonomous institutions, to which Government provides budgetary 
support through grants. With a view to promoting transparency and curbing 
the growth of contingent Government liabilities a Guarantee Redemption 
Fund has been set up as a part of expenditure management strategy. Steps 
undertaken in the light of above proposals included : 
• dismantling of the Administered Price Mechanism (APM) in the 
petroleum sector and the Oil Pool Account effective from April 2002; 
• restriction on fresh recruitments to 1 percent of the total civilian staff 
strength over the 4 years beginning fiscal 2002-03; and 
• introduction of a new pension scheme of defined contribution for new 
recruits in the Budget for 2003-04. 
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3.2 TRENDS AND COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN 
INDIA 
Fiscal consolidation was an integral part of economic reform 
introduced in the early nineties. After a promising start in the early nineties, 
progress in fiscal consolidation faltered somewhat from 1997-98. Fiscal 
deficit of the Central Government after declining from 6.6 percent of GDP 
in 1990-91 to 4.1 per cent in 1996-97, had risen to 4.8 per cent of GDP in 
1997-98 and thereafter maintained a rising trend till 2001-02. In order to 
understand the current fiscal predicament of the Central Government it is 
necessary to examine the pattern of Central Government expenditure over 
the years. 
The total expenditure of the Central Government increased from an 
average of 16.8 per cent of GDP in 1980-85 to about 20.5 per cent in 1985-
90 and has then declined to between 16 to 17.5 per cent in the late 1990s. At 
the same time non-plan expenditure has increased substantially from about 
10 per cent in the early 1980s to about 13 per cent of GDP in 1998-99 
(Table 3.1). What is most notable is the very significant increase in 
expenditure that occurred in the second half of the 1980s. These increases 
took place in almost all categories of non-plan expenditure such as interest 
payments, defence expenditure, subsidies, pensions, and loans to states. 
During this period other non-plan expenditures, which consists mostly of 
salary payments to government servants, remained roughly stationary at 
about 2.25 per cent of GDP. 
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Table 3.1 
Profile of Expenditure 
Non-plan 
expenditure 
Interest payment 
Defence 
Total subsidy 
Food subsidy 
Other subsidy 
Police 
Pensions 
Loans and advances 
to states and UTs 
Grands to state and 
UTs 
Otlier non-plan 
expenditure 
Plan expenditure 
Total expenditure 
(Plan + non-plan) 
Revenue expenditure 
Capital expenditure 
Developmental 
Expenditure 
Non-developmental 
expenditure 
Total expenditure 
(Developmental + 
Non-developmental) 
1980-
85 
10.09 
2.20 
2.81 
1.41 
0.44 
0.97 
0.21 
0.27 
0.51 
0.43 
2.25 
6.73 
16.82 
10.69 
6.13 
10.76 
7.32 
18.06 
of Central Government (per cent of GDP) 
1985-
90 
13.41 
3.38 
3.35 
1.95 
0.60 
1.34 
0.28 
0.42 
1.23 
0.56 
2.25 
7.06 
20.47 
13.70 
6.78 
11.38 
8.79 
20.16 
1990-
95 
12.72 
4.38 
2.63 
1.78 
0.51 
1.27 
0.29 
0.40 
0.96 
0.46 
1.82 
5.17 
17.89 
13.27 
4.62 
9.49 
8.89 
18.39 
1995-
99 
12.17 
4.63 
2.43 
1.34 
0.54 
0.84 
0.32 
0.47 
1.09 
0.40 
1.48 
4.18 
16.35 
12.78 
3.58 
7.72 
8.94 
16.66 
1997-
98 
12.22 
4.64 
2.49 
1.38 
0.53 
0.85 
0.35 
0.49 
1.12 
0.31 
1.45 
4.17 
16.39 
12.74 
3.65 
8.02 
9.11 
17.13 
1998-
99 
13.14 
4.75 
2.53 
1.52 
0.54 
0.98 
0.35 
0.62 
1.47 
0.28 
1.62 
4.21 
17.34 
13.42 
3.92 
7.96 
9.04 
16.99 
1999-
2000 
11.46 
4.87 
2.53 
1.32 
0.45 
0.87 
0.33 
0.56 
0.01 
0.45 
1.39 
4.26 
15.73 
13.13 
2.60 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Source : Government of India, Budget Documents, various issues. 
Table 3.2 
Composition of Expenditure of Central Government 
(Per cent of Total Expenditure) 
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Non-plan 
expenditure 
Interest payment 
Defence 
Total subsidy 
Food subsidy 
Other subsidy 
Police 
Pensions 
Loans and advances 
to states and UTs 
Grants to state and 
UTs 
Other non-plan 
expenditure 
Plan expenditure 
Total expenditure 
(Plan + non-plan) 
Revenue expenditure 
Capital expenditure 
Developmental 
Expenditure 
Non-developmental 
expenditure 
1980-
85 
59.90 
13.07 
16,72 
8.35 
2.62 
5.74 
1.24 
1.60 
2.86 
2.58 
13.48 
40.10 
100.00 
63.55 
36.45 
59.53 
40.47 
1985-
90 
65.52 
16.52 
16.35 
9.52 
2.94 
6.58 
1.35 
2.04 
6.03 
2.76 
10.95 
34.48 
100.00 
66.91 
33.10 
56.41 
43.59 
1990-
95 
71.02 
24.59 
14.70 
9.86 
2.85 
7.01 
1.65 
2.25 
5.31 
2.52 
10.14 
28.98 
100.00 
74.30 
25.70 
51.56 
48.44 
1995-
99 
74.41 
28.34 
14.89 
8.20 
3.09 
5.11 
1.94 
2.87 
6.62 
2.49 
9.07 
25.59 
100.00 
78.15 
21.85 
46.34 
53.66 
1997-
98 
74.54 
28.28 
15.20 
8.40 
3.23 
5.17 
2.11 
2.97 
6.82 
1.90 
8.86 
25.46 
100.00 
77.71 
22.29 
46.81 
53.19 
1998-
99 
75.75 
27.40 
14.61 
8.76 
3.09 
5.67 
2.00 
3.57 
8.48 
1.61 
9.33 
24.25 
100.00 
77.38 
22.62 
46.82 
53.18 
1999-
2000 
72.89 
30.99 
16.09 
8.39 
2.89 
5.51 
2.08 
3.57 
0.04 
2.87 
8.86 
27.11 
100.00 
83.49 
16.51 
NA 
NA 
Source : Government of India, Budget Documents, Various years. 
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Plan expenditures were kept high at about 6.5 per cent to 7 per cent 
of GDP throughout the 1980s. Correspondingly capital expenditures of 
Central Government were sustained at levels of 6 per cent to 7 of GDP. Both 
plan expenditures and capital expenditures of the Central Government have 
fallen. 
The non-sustainability of fiscal expansion is demonstrated by the 
sustained increase in interest payments from 2.2 per cent of GDP in the early 
1980s to about 4.5 percent now. Interest payments now constitute the largest 
component of expenditure of the central government. The Fifth Pay 
Commission is currently regarded as the villian of the piece in causing the 
current fiscal problems. It is clear from examination of the data is that the 
1980s were characterised by a significant increase in public sector 
investment as well as other government expenditure. It is noteworthy that 
defence expenditure increased substantially in the late 1980s, rising from 
about 2.8 per cent of GDP in the early 1980s to about 3.4 per cent in the late 
1980s and then declining to a relatively constant level of about 2.5 per cent 
of GDP. 
3.3 FISCAL ADJUSTMENT AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE 
Because of large macroeconomic disequilibria characterised by 
inflation, balance of payments difficulties, and increasing debt obligations, 
in recent years many countries have adopted economic programmes aimed at 
adjusting their economies. By and large, adjustment has aimed at reducing 
the rate of inflation, improving the balance of payments, and promoting 
economic growth. Adjustment requires many policy changes.^ Under the 
process of adjustment, special attention is to be paid to the fiscal situation. 
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since for improving macroeconomic situation, public finance is in 
disequlibrium. That's why need for fiscal reform is widely recognised. 
Fiscal reform can be conveniently discussed under four headings. 
1. the determination of the correct size of the fiscal adjustment needed; 
2. the problems that arise in measuring the existing fiscal disequilibrium; 
3. the kind of fiscal adjustment that would be most beneficial to the 
country, and 
4. the phasing of the required fiscal reforms. 
Now the determination of the size of fiscal adjustment depends upon 
the elimination of proportion of the fiscal deficit.'' A traditional and 
orthodox rule, which requires the elimination of the fiscal deficit is a 
balanced budget, but it is not free from difficulties.^ This balanced budget 
rule might require an excessive reduction of expenditures with potentially 
detrimental effects for the efficiency of the economy or for the social 
function played by the government. 
A more flexible rule is one that states that, during the program period, 
the fiscal deficit must be cut to a level at which the deficits is financeable 
without inflation or other major macro economic difficulties at least over the 
medium run.^ Limiting the fiscal deficit to the level that can be financed 
internally in a non-inflationary manner or externally through available, 
ordinary credit, a country would eliminate the short run problems associated 
with the fiscal imbalance. Thus, an adjustment program would require that 
the fiscal deficit be reduced enough to eliminate the need for inflationary 
financing.^ 
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There are various problems of a more conceptual nature in the 
measurement of the fiscal deficit. Some of these problems often arise out of 
the fact that the fiscal deficit as conventionally measured, (i.e. total 
expenditure less ordinary revenues), is highly sensitive to the rate of 
inflation and to the exchange rate. Other definitions of the fiscal deficit 
have been introduced in recent years and are often used in adjustment 
programs. One such concept is the operational deficit which seeks to remove 
from total expenditure the part of interest payments that is considered a 
"monetary correction" and that might be seen a being closer to amortization 
than the interest payments in strictly economic, rather than accounting, 
terms. The practical measurement of the operational deficit is very difficult 
and its theoretical underpinnings are controversial.^ Therefore, this concept, 
though useful is treated with caution, especially when the rate of inflation is 
very high and the actual measured rate of inflation differs from the expected 
rate. It is a mistake to believe that in high inflation situations, this is the 
correct measure of the fiscal disequilibrium. 
The primary deficit, which excludes all interest payments from the 
measurement of the deficit, is a tool more useful in assessing the size of an 
adjustment made than to determine ex ante how much fiscal adjustment is 
needed. The primary deficit, or rather the primary surplus, is useful in 
providing an indication of the amount of current resources available to a 
government to service its public debt. It has limited value in indicating what 
the fiscal correction should be. 
While the impact of inflation on the deficit has received attention, the 
impact of the exchange rate has received much less. However, a country 
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with large foreign debt can influence the measurement of the fiscal deficit, 
as a share of GDP, by changing its exchange rate. An overvalued exchange 
rate will convert the foreign exchange interest payments on the debt into 
fewer domestic monetary units, and thus, will give the impression of a lower 
fiscal deficit. This lower deficit may mislead policymakers into believing 
that the fiscal problem is less serious. 
Timing issues also create difficulties. A deficit can be measured on 
the basis of cash flows (i.e., actual cash receipts and payments) or it can be 
measured on a commitment basis for expenditure and on an accrual basis for 
revenues. When arrears are increasing, an adjustment program, which 
employs the cash concept, may miss the pressures measures on resources 
and on demand associated with expenditures made but not yet paid for." 
This aspect of fiscal policy has received relatively little attention by 
economists. These timing issues arise frequently and introduce great 
difticulties in pursuing adjustment in the fiscal area. 
3.4 FISCAL DEFICIT AND TOTAL EXPENDITURE 
It is generally agreed (though not unanimously) that a series of large 
fiscal and revenue deficits is inimical to macroeconomic performance.'^ 
Such deficits to crowd out private investment, increase inflationary 
potential, weaken the balance of payments, render financial sector reform 
more difficult and impose a serious burden of adjustment on the future 
generations. The series of high fiscal deficits in the late 1980s were clearly a 
major cause of the 1991 economic crisis in India. 
Among the top twenty five countries in terms of high central 
budgetary deficit in 1997, India ranked tenth, after Greece, Turkey and 
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Pakistan, among others, High deficits at the state government levels have 
further compounded the problem. According to the IMF, 'Weak revenue 
performance and lack of expenditure control at both the Central and State 
Government levels caused the consolidated deficit of the public sector to 
rise sharply to around 11 percent of GDP in FY 1999/2000, with public 
sector debt exceeding 80 percent of GDP.''* 
If suppose the model in which total expenditure is a function of 
capital expenditure. This can be written in the mathematical model. 
TE = a + (3 C E 
where 
TE = Total Expenditure 
CE = Capital Expenditure 
Model-1 
TE = 12.221 + 1.243 CE 
(26.416) (12.241) 
R^ = 0.904 ^ ^ = 0.897 
D-W= 1.197 
F = 149.944 
Model-2 
In this model Total expenditure is a function of Revenue expenditure 
TE =f(RE) 
TE = a , + p,RE 
TE= -17.283 + 2.646 RE 
(-2.620) (5.266) 
R^ = 0.634 
103 
^2 = 0.611 
F = 27.733 
D-W = 0.218 
Model -3 
In this model Total expenditure is regressed on Capital expenditure 
and Revenue expenditure. 
RE = f (CE,RE) 
TE = a i i + P,, C E + p u R E 
T E - - 1.345 +0.97 CE+ 1,122 RE 
(-0.626) (13.975) (6.360) 
R^  = 0.974 
'R^ = 0.970 
F = 279.893 
Explanation of the Model 
Using the regression technique in model, one total expenditure (TE) 
is regressed on capital expenditure (CE). The estimated Total expenditure of 
the model shows that if the capital expenditure increases by one percent of 
GDP, then estimated total expenditure increases by 1.243 percent of GDP. 
Capital expenditure explains the 90 percent variation in the total 
expenditure. 
In the model-2 Total expenditure is regressed on the revenue 
expenditure of GDP there is one percent change in Revenue expenditure 
then estimated change in total expenditure is 2.64 percent of GDP which is 
greater than the first model. If both the models are compared it is found that 
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revenue expenditure is more effective then capital expenditure in explaining 
the change in total expenditure. 
In model-3 total expenditure is regressed simultaneous on capital 
expenditure and revenue expenditure. From the model it is clear that impact 
of change in revenue expenditure is greater on the estimated average 
expenditure than the change in capital expenditure. Revenue expenditure 
and capital expenditure explain 97 percent change in total expenditure. 
We can have the growth models of total expenditure, revenue 
expenditure and capital expenditure as per cent of GDP by regressing the log 
value of these variables on time. 
LnTEGDP = 3 . 0 6 - 0.2241 Xt 
Se = (0.039) (0.00372) 
t - (77.703) (-6.164) 
CAGR = -2.22% 
When Ln TEGDP = Log value of total expenditure as per cent of GDP 
Xt = time period 
Total expenditure as per cent of GDP has declined at 2.22 per cent 
compounded annually. 
LnREGDP = 2.611 - 0.004173 Xt 
Se = (0.027) (0.003) 
t = (95.983) (-1.661) 
CAGR = -0.42% 
When Ln REGDP = Log value of revenue expenditure as per cent of 
GDP 
Compound annual decline in revenue expenditure is 0.42 per cent. 
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LnCEGDP = 2.079 - 0.0788 Xt 
Se = (0.085) (0.008) 
t = (24.407) (-10.023) 
CAGR - -7.58 
When Ln CEGDP = Log value of capital expenditure as per cent of 
GDP 
Decline in capital expenditure as per cent of GDP compounded 
annually is greater than the decline in revenue expenditure, which is 7.58 
per cent (Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1). 
When log value of fiscal deficit in Rs. crore is regressed to know the 
growth rate, then following results of the growth model is received 
LnFD = 9.877 + 0.112997 X, 
Se = (0.103876) (0.004719) 
R^ = 0.97 
CAGR = 12.0% 
Where, LnFD == Log value of Fiscal deficit in Rs. crores 
Xt = Time period 
The fiscal deficit in Rs. crores grew at the compound rate of growth of 12 
per cent over the whole period of time. 
There are five aspects of the deficit problem that have attracted 
attention. 
1. The deficit itself, which is a large proportion of GDP. 
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2. The composition of the deficit, in particular the sizable revenue deficit 
that goes to finance current consumption of the government and the 
primary deficits, which is the fiscal deficit less interest payments. 
3. The growing debt, which is the accumulated deficit from the past. 
4. The growing interest burden on public debt, which is an obligatory 
expenditure and constrains the flexibility available with the government 
in resource allocation. 
5. The financing a part of the high deficit through borrowings from the 
Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 
There are two tracks of discussions about high fiscal deficit in India 
that could be categorized into the orthodox and the Keynesian ones. 
According to orthodox School, high fiscal deficit poses considerable risks to 
macroeconomic stability and comprises the growth prospects of the 
economy. In the orthodox track, the emphasis has been on measures to 
safeguard against the vulnerabilities that a large fiscal deficit induces and on 
how to restore 'sustainability'. The Keynesian school, on the other hand, 
while wanting a change in the fiscal stance, regrets that, it is the bugbear of 
fiscal deficit, il seems, that has held the government back in following an 
expansionary fiscal programme, even when there is considerable slack in the 
economy.'^ 
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Table - 3.3 
Expenditure 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Trends of Central Government as percent of GDP 
Total expenditure 
20.1 
21.5 
20.5 
20.0 
20.3 
19.7 
18.1 
17.4 
18.3 
16.9 
14.2 
14.2 
14.3 
14.6 
15.4 
15.6 
15.9 
16.2 
Revenue 
expenditure 
12.9 
13.9 
13.9 
13.7 
14.1 
13.7 
13.4 
13.1 
13.4 
12.8 
11.8 
11.7 
11.9 
12.4 
12.9 
13.3 
13.2 
13.8 
Capital 
expenditure 
7.2 
7.6 
6.6 
6.3 
6.3 
4.4 
4.7 
4.3 
4.2 
4.1 
2.4 
2.3 
2.4 
2.2 
2.5 
2.3 
2.7 
2.5 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues. 
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Debt and Deficit : The debt to GDP ratio of the Central Government 
increased sharply during the 1980 (Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2). The Centre's 
debt, as a proportion of GDP, after declining by 1.9 percent points during 
1970-71 to 1980-81, rose almost 18 percentage points during 1980-81 to 
1990-91. 
Table 3.4 
Deficit and Debt of Central Government (P 
Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
Deficit 
5.77 
5.14 
5.64 
5.94 
7.09 
7.86 
8.47 
7.63 
7.34 
7.33 
7.85 
5.56 
5.37 
7.01 
5.70 
5.07 
4.88 
5.84 
6.51 
5.43 
5.36 
ercentage of GDP) 
Debt 
43.08 
42.29 
7.15 
45.77 
49.21 
52.51 
57.38 
58.96 
59.51 
60.46 
61.43 
65.44 
64.22 
64.99 
62.22 
59.21 
56.35 
58.09 
58.16 
59.56 
62.03 
Source : Handbook of Statistics 2001, Reserve Bank of India and Economic 
Survey 2001-02. 
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One of the principal factors responsible for the consistent rise in 
fiscal deficit was ^a similar rise witnessed in revenue deficit. Central 
government maintained surplus in revenue account during the first three 
decades after independence. 
But again it moved to a deficit of 1.4 percent of GDP in 1980-81 and 
increased further to 3.81 percent in 1993-94 (Table 3.5 and Figure 3.3). 
Table 3.5 
Selected Fiscal Indicators of the Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-99 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Fiscal 
deficit 
7.9 
8.5 
7.6 
7.3 
7.3 
7.8 
5.6 
5.4 
7.0 
5.7 
5.1 
4.9 
5.8 
6.5 
5.4 
5.6 
6.2 
5.9 
Primary 
deficit 
5.2 
5.5 
4.5 
3.9 
3.7 
4.1 
1.5 
1.2 
2.7 
1.3 
0.9 
0.5 
1.5 
2.0 
0.7 
0.9 
1.5 
1.2 
(as 
Revenue 
deficit 
2.1 
2.5 
2.6 
2.5 
2.5 
3.3 
2.5 
2.5 
3.8 
3.1 
2.5 
2.4 
3.1 
3.8 
3.5 
4.1 
4.4 
4.4 
percent of GDP) 
Revenue deficit 
as percentage 
of fiscal deficit 
26.9 
29.5 
33.8 
34.0 
33.4 
41.6 
44.8 
46.2 
54.3 
53.8 
49.4 
48.9 
52.2 
59.1 
64.6 
71.7 
71.1 
72.0 
Source : Calculated. 
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From table 3.5, it is clear that deterioration started in fiscal 
imbalances after mid eighties. Fiscal deficit was high up to 1990. After 
1991. Government of India started fiscal consolidation, it started declining 
and reached to minimum of 4.9 per cent of GDP in 1996-97. Then 
afterwards it has increasing trends. The main factors that had contributed to 
the fiscal deterioration are relatively higher level of expenditure on salaries, 
unfunded pensions, mounting interest payments, improperly targeted 
subsidies and deterioration in the tax-GDP ratio. 
High revenue deficits indicate a problem in the quality of the fiscal 
deficit. From the table 3.5 it is observed that revenue deficit has a rising 
trend except in the period 1995-96 and 1996-97. By using the regression 
method compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of revenue deficit is found 
to be 3.138. 
Revenue deficit as percent of fiscal deficit has a continuous increase 
in percentage term. Revenue deficit was 26.5 per cent of fiscal deficit in 
1985-86. It increased and reached 72.0 per cent of fiscal deficit in 2002-03. 
The contribution of Revenue deficit in fiscal deficit is more than two-thirds. 
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Table 3.6 
Change of the Fiscal Deficit over Previous Period. 
(as percent of GDP) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Fiscal deficit 
8.3 
9.0 
8.1 
7.8 
8.0 
6.6 
4.7 
4.8 
6.4 
4.7 
4.2 
4.1 
4.8 
5.1 
5.4 
5.7 
6.2 
5.3 
Change over the 
previous period 
-
0.7 
-0.9 
-0.3 
0.2 
-1.4 
-1.9 
0.1 
1.6 
-1.7 
-0.5 
-0.1 
0.7 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.5 
-0.9 
Change in two 
years period 
-
-
-0.2 
-1.2 
-0.1 
-1.2 
-3.3 
-1.8 
1.7 
-0.1 
-2.2 
-0.6 
0.6 
1.0 
0.6 
0.6 
0.8 
-0.4 
Source : For fiscal deficit, Economic Survey, various issues. 
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The size of fiscal adjustment has been a crucial element in the success 
of the fiscal adjustment efforts. This is because the size of fiscal 
consolidation is related to the overall scope of the reform programme and 
enhances the credibility of the Governments commitment to the 
consolidation. It was observed that fiscal consolidation was sustainable in 
those cases where fiscal correction in terms of reduction of fiscal deficit was 
higher (4.0 percent of GDP in a two year period). In other cases where the 
extent of correction was smaller, fiscal consolidation could not be sustained 
(Medermott and Wescott, ). It has also been found that fiscal corrections do 
not have intended effects if they fail to indicate a permanent and decisive 
change in the stance of fiscal policy'^ (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1996). 
From table 3.6, it is clear that during the period of study there is 
decline in the fiscal deficit over the previous period from 1986-87 to 
1987-88 again it has increased by 0.2 percent of GDP. Further it has 
declined for two consecutive years. From 1996 to 2000-01 there is positive 
change in fiscal deficit over the previous period, indicating increase in fiscal 
deficit. 
If we take the question of fiscal consolidation according to the 
criterion given by Medermott, there is no single year in which reduction in 
fiscal deficit was higher than 4.0 percent of GDP in a two year period. This 
proves that fiscal adjustment is not successful. This also proves that fiscal 
consolidation and reform programme in the fiscal consolidation is not 
effective and fiscal corrections do not have intended effects. 
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Table 3.7 
Trends of Fiscal Deficit in Two Yearly Moving Average 
(as percent of GDP) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Fiscal deficit 
8.3 
9.0 
8.1 
7.8 
8.0 
6.6 
4.7 
4.8 
6.4 
4.7 
4.2 
4.1 
4.8 
5.1 
5.4 
5.7 
6.2 
5.3 
Two yearly Total 
-
17.3 
17.1 
15.9 
15.8 
14.6 
11.3 
9.5 
11.2 
11.1 
8.9 
8.3 
8.9 
9.9 
10.5 
11.1 
11.9 
11.5 
Two yearly 
Moving Average 
-
8.7 
8.5 
8.0 
7.9 
7.3 
5.7 
4.8 
5.6 
5.5 
4.4 
4.1 
4.4 
5.0 
5.2 
5.5 
6.0 
5.8 
Source : Economic Survey various issues for FD 
Trends of fiscal deficit is analysed by using two years moving 
average (Table 3.7), from period 1985-98 to 1992-93 there is declining trend 
in fiscal deficit. In 1993-94 there was slight increase in FD trend, but again 
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started declining up to 1997-98. Then between the period 1998-99 to 2001-
02 there is increasing trend in growth of fiscal deficit. 
3.4.1 Plan expenditure and Non-plan expenditure : 
The steady growth of Government expenditure, particularly non-plan 
expenditure has been the main reason for the country falling into a fiscal 
crisis. A significant element of this is the growth in interest payments (Table 
3.17), which in an efficient system would have been fully covered by returns 
on production capital expenditure and investment financed by debt. This has 
resulted in wastage of scare resources. The decreasing share of plan 
expenditure (Table 3.8 to 3.11) going for capital expenditure has further 
compounded the problem. 
The growth of non-plan expenditure (percentage change) in 1993-94 
to 1994-95 was 14 to 15 per cent. An important element of expenditure was 
various subsidies, such as on fertilizers, which had risen over the years. 
When total expenditure (TE) in Rs. crores is regressed on plan 
expenditure and non-plan expenditure in Rs. crores we have the following 
regression equation. 
TE = 7221.933 + 0.325 plan exp. + 1.22 Non-plan exp. 
Se = (4828.42) (0.475) (0.158) 
R^ = 0.996 "R^  =0.996 
D-W = 1.632 
From the above model it is clear that non-plan expenditure is the main 
contributor in total expenditure since 1 unit change in non-plan expenditure 
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brings 1.22 unit change in total expenditure which 0.32 unit in case of plan 
expenditure. 
where, TE 
Plan exp. 
Non-plan exp. 
Total expenditure 
Plan expenditure 
Non-plan expenditure 
Table 3.8 
Expenditure of the Central Government- Plan and Non-Plan 
Expenditure 
(Rs. Crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1990-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
CAGR 
Plan Expenditure 
19854 
22996 
24209 
26151 
27520 
28365 
30961 
36660 
43622 
47378 
46374 
53534 
59077 
66818 
76182 
82669 
101194 
111454 
10.40% 
Non-Plan expenditure 
32811 
39920 
44052 
52960 
65388 
69907 
80452 
85958 
98191 
113361 
121911 
136802 
157259 
189521 
221871 
242923 
261116 
288942 
13.44% 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues. 
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Plan expenditure in regressed on time to calculate rate of growth 
In PLE = 9.7495 +0.989 X, 
Se - (0.0321) (0.0029) 
t = (303.42) (33.34) 
R2 = 0.9858 ^ ^ = 0.9849, F value = 1112.14, CAGR-10.40% 
where, 
PLE = Plan Expenditure 
From the above equation it is clear that over the period 1985-86 to 
2002-03, the plan expenditure of central government grew at this rate of 
9.899 percent per year. If we take the compound rate of growth, over the 
period of study plan expenditure has grown at the rate of 10.40 per cent over 
the whole period. 
LnNPLE = 10.3579 + 0.1261Xt 
Se = (0.0238) (0.0022) 
t-value = (434.47) (57.26) 
R' 
F-value 
CAGR 
ere NPLF 
= 0.995 'R^ = 0.994 
= 3278.89 
= 13.44% 
Non-plan expenditure 
Non-plan expenditure, over the period of study grew at the rate of 
12.61 per cent per year, which is greater than the growth of plan 
expenditure. In this case compound annual growth rate is 13.44 per cent, 
which shows that over the whole period non-plan expenditure has grown on 
an average at the rate of 13.44 percent (Table 3.8 and Figure 3.4). 
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To know the growth of plan and non-plan expenditure as per cent of 
GDP we can construct the growth models by regressing the variables on 
time. 
The regression result of the growth models are as follows : 
LnPEGDP = 1.9945 - 0.0.4048 Xt . . .(1) 
Se = (0.061) (0.006) 
t = (32.658) (-7.174) 
CAGR = -3.97% 
When Ln PEGDP = Log value of plan expenditure as per cent of GDP 
Xt = time period 
LnNEGDP = 2.6035 - 0.01332 Xt . . .(2) 
Se = (0.038) (0.004) 
t = (68.192) (-3.776) 
CAGR = -1.32% 
If we compare the growth models (1) and (2), we find that decline in plan 
expenditure as per cent of GDP is greater than the decline in non-plan 
expenditure as per cent of GDP which is also obvious from Table 3.9 and 
Figure 3.5. 
From table 3.10 and Figure 3.6, it is clear that plan expenditure is per 
cent of total expenditure has declined. Annual decline is 57.41 per cent per 
annum. CAGR decline is 43.67 per cent. 
Similarly non-plan expenditure as per cent of total expenditure as 
increased. The CAGR is 0.84 per cent over the period since 1985-86 to 
2002-03. 
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Table 3. 9 
Level of Government Expenditure in India : Plan and Non-Plan 
Expenditure as Percent of GDP 
(as per cent of GDP) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1990-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Plan Expenditure 
7.6 
7.8 
7.3 
6.6 
6.0 
5.0 
5.0 
5.2 
5.4 
4.6 
3.9 
3.9 
3.9 
3.8 
3.9 
4.0 
4.4 
4.5 
Non-Plan Expenditure 
12.5 
13.7 
13.2 
13.4 
14.3 
12.3 
13.1 
12.2 
12.1 
10.9 
10.3 
10.0 
10.4 
10.8 
11.5 
11.6 
11.4 
11.7 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues. 
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Table 3.10 
Plan and Non-plan Expenditure of Central Government as Percent of 
Total Expenditure 
(% of Total Exp.) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1990-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Plan Expenditure 
37.6 
36.5 
35.4 
33.0 
29.6 
26.9 
27.7 
29.8 
30.7 
29.4 
26.0 
26.6 
27.3 
26.1 
25.5 
25.3 
27.9 
27.8 
Non-Plan Expenditure 
62.4 
63.5 
64.6 
67.0 
70.4 
73.1 
72.3 
70.2 
69.3 
70.6 
74.0 
73.4 
72.7 
73.9 
74.5 
74.7 
72.1 
72.2 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues. 
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Annual growth rate of plan and non-plan expenditure can be seen in 
Table 3.11 and Figure 3.7. Negative growth was not seen in case of non-plan 
expenditure. Sharp fluctuation is seen in plan expenditure. This conveys that 
in the name of fiscal adjustment, Government has tried to curtail plan 
expenditure to reduce the total expenditure. 
Table 3.11 
Percentage change in the Expenditure of the Central Government 
(Percentage) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1990-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Plan Expenditure 
19.6 
15.8 
5.2 
8.0 
5.2 
3.0 
9.1 
18.4 
19.0 
8.5 
-2.1 
15.4 
10.3 
13.1 
14.9 
8.5 
22.4 
10.1 
Non-Plan Expenditure 
21.4 
21.6 
10.3 
20.2 
23.4 
6.9 
15.0 
6.8 
14.2 
15.4 
7.5 
12.2 
14.9 
20.5 
17.0 
9.4 
7.4 
10.6 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues. 
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3.5 TRENDS AND COMPOSITION OF CENTRE'S REVENUE 
EXPENDITURE 
The economic crisis in 1990 which was triggered off by fiscal 
imbalances led to a reconsideration of the role of the State and brought 
public expenditure policy into sharper focus. Fiscal imbalances in India, 
which had assumed serious proportions by the mid-eighties had two 
important facets. First, the outfacing of the rate of growth of revenue 
receipts - capital receipts are by and large borrowings - by the expenditure 
growth, considerably reduced the resources available for public investment 
in the economy. The increasing use of borrowed funds to meet current 
expenditures rendered the latter self-propelling. Second, the increasing 
diversion of household savings to meet public consumption requirements not 
only resulted in the expansion of public debt to unsustainable levels, but 
also reduced the resources available for private investment. In addition to 
the usual allocative distortions arising from the crowding out of private 
Sector investments; the poor performance of public sector enterprises caused 
further decline in productivity in the Indian economy. These fiscal 
developments have had adverse macro-economic repercussions as well. A 
portion of the excess demand generated by the expansionary fiscal policy 
spilled over into higher imports and consequently, aggravated the balance of 
payments problem. At the same time, inadequate public investment outlay 
created severe infrastructural bottlenecks. All these combined together to 
create a stagflationary situation.''' In stabilizing the economy and in making 
structural adjustments, the compression of unproductive public expenditures 
and cost effective provision of public services plays a critical role. However, 
unless properly planned and executed, the expenditure compression could 
bear down more heavily not on unproductive expenditures but on more 
socially productive administrative, social and economic infrastructure 
129 
outlays. Therefore, an analysis of government expenditure trends is 
necessary to achieve planned reduction in unproductive expenditures. 
Composition of Centre's Revenue Expenditure is divided between 
five major groups. 
a) Defence 
b) Interest payments 
c) Major subsidies 
d) Grants to states and Union Territories 
e) Others 
We can also calculate the growth in revenue expenditure in Rs. crores 
through the growth model of revenue expenditure. When log value of 
revenue expenditure in Rs. crore is regressed overtime, then regression 
result of growth model is 
LnRE = 
Se 
t 
R^ 
D-W 
CAGR = 
= 10.356 
= (0.015) 
= 680.552 
= 0.998 
= 0.790 
= 14.5% 
+ 
-R2 
0.135 Xt 
(0.001) 
96.258 
= 0.998 
Where, LnRE = log value of revenue expenditure 
Compound annual growth of revenue expenditure in Rs. crores over the 
period of time is 14.5 per cent. 
We can have also growth model for total expenditure to know the 
growth in Rs. crores, over this period. 
LnTE --
Se 
= 10.797 
= (0.016) 
+ 0.119Xt 
(0.001) 
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D-W 
CAGR 
Where, LnTE 
t = 668.633 79.855 
= 0.997 "R^  =0.997 
= 1.277 
= 12.7% 
log value of total expenditure 
Total expenditure in Rs. crores increased at the compound rate of 
growth of 12.7 per cent. 
Table 3.12 
Revenue Expenditure as Percentage of Total Expenditure 
(Rs. crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 ^ 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Total Revenue 
Expenditure 
33924 
40860 
46174 
54106 
64210 
73516 
82292 
92702 
108169 
122112 
139861 
158934 
180350 
216460 
249078 
277838 
301468 
339627 
Total 
Expenditure 
52666 
62916 
68261 
79111 
92908 
105298 
111414 
122618 
141853 
160739 
178275 
201007 
232053 
279340 
298053 
325592 
362453 
404013 
Percentage 
64.4 
64.9 
67.6 
68.3 
69.1 
69.8 
73.8 
75.6 
76.2 
75.9 
78.4 
79.0 
77.7 
77.4 
83.5 
85,3 
83.17 
84.06 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues. 
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Table 3.13 
Trends and Composition of Centre's Revenue Expenditure 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Interest 
Payment 
7090 
8648 
10702 
13347 
17757 
21498 
26596 
31075 
36741 
44060 
50045 
59478 
65637 
77882 
90249 
99314 
107460 
117804 
Major 
Subsidies 
5070 
5542 
5976 
7859 
10474 
9581 
12253 
11995 
12864 
12982 
12430 
14041 
18238 
21269 
22898 
25860 
30094 
40416 
Defence 
7962 
10439 
11875 
13237 
10194 
10874 
11442 
12109 
14978 
16426 
18841 
20997 
26174 
29861 
35216 
37238 
38059 
40709 
Grants to 
State & 
UT 
3922 
4205 
4962 
5831 
5725 
7664 
8797 
2645 
2405 
2334 
5967 
6230 
4420 
4923 
6238 
14717 
15327 
13305 
Others 
2265 
2848 
3740 
4362 
4765 
6793 
7300 
8954 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
Total 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
33924 
40860 
46174 
54106 
64210 
73516 
82292 
92702 
108169 
122112 
139861 
158933 
180335 
216461 
249078 
277839 
301611 
341648 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues 
NA = Not available 
The above revenue expenditure is divided into two major components 
(A) Plan-revenue expenditure 
(a) Expenditures on services 
(B) Non-plan revenue expenditure 
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(a) Interest payment 
(b) Defence expenditures 
(c) Subsidies 
(d) Grants to states and union territories. 
From the Table 3.12 and Figure 3.8, it is evident that revenue 
expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure is continuously increasing 
except the year 1994-95, 1997-98, 1998-1999, Again there is rise in revenue 
expenditure over the period of study there is continuous rise in revenue 
expenditure a percent of total expenditure. 
Table 3.14 
Trends of Centre's Revenue Expenditure (as percent of GDP) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Interest 
Payment 
2.9 
3.2 
3.4 
3.6 
3.9 
4.0 
4.3 
4.4 
4.5 
4.6 
4.2 
4.4 
4.3 
4.4 
4.7 
4.8 
4.7 
4.8 
Major 
Subsidies 
1.8 
1.9 
1.8 
2.0 
2.3 
1.8 
2.0 
1.7 
1.6 
1.4 
1.1 
1.0 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
1.2 
1.3 
1.6 
Defence 
2.9 
3.4 
3.0 
2.9 
2.7 
2.0 
1.9 
1.7 
1.8 
1.7 
1.6 
1.5 
1.7 
1.7 
1.8 
1.8 
1.7 
1.6 
Total 
Expenditure 
13.3 
14.4 
14.3 
14.1 
14.1 
13.7 
13.4 
13.2 
13.4 
11.8 
11.5 
11.3 
11.9 
12.4 
12.9 
13.3 
13.2 
13.8 
Source : Calculated. 
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Growth model of interest payments as per cent of GDP is as follows : 
LnIPGDP= 1.190 + 0.0240Xt . . .(1) 
R2 = 0.77 
CAGR - 2.43% 
Where LnlPGDP = log value of interest payments as per cent of GDP 
Growth modjgl of major subsidies as per cent of GDP is as follows : 
LnMS - 0 .7332- 0.03321Xt .. .(2) 
R2 = 0.52 
CAGR = -3.26% 
Where LnMS = log value of major subsidies 
Growth model of defence as percentage of GDP is as follows : 
L n D E G ^ = 1.0802- 0.04037Xt .. .(3) 
R' 
CAGR 
0.67 
= -3.95% 
Where LnDEGDP = log value of defence expenditure 
If we compare the CAGR of all the above three models, we find that interest 
payments as per cent of GDP has grown rapidly over the whole period. The 
compound growth rate is 2.43 per cent. 
Major subsidies as per cent of GDP has declined over the whole 
period. Compound growth in decline is 3.26 per cent. While defence 
expenditure as per cent of GDP has also declined over the period of study 
since compound growth rate is negative which is 3.95 per cent (Table 3.14 
and Figure 3.9). 
Different composition of revenue expenditure has different trend as 
per cent of total expenditure (Table 3.15 and Figure 3.10). Defence 
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expenditure witnessed sharp decline in 198990 and further has a declining 
trend over whole period. Interest payments have a continuous increase up to 
1996-97. After this period slight decrease is seen in the figure. Major 
subsidies increased from 1987-88 till 1990-91. It declined and reached to 
8.8 pe cent of total revenue expenditure in 1996-97. Again it started 
increasing. Grants to States have very erratic growth. 
Table 3.15 
Composition of Revenue Expenditure as percent of Total Revenue 
Expenditure 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Defence 
21.7 
23.6 
21.2 
20.6 
15.1 
14.8 
13.9 
13.1 
13.6 
13.5 
13.5 
13.2 
14.5 
13.8 
14.1 
13.4 
12.6 
12.0 
Interest 
Payments 
21.6 
21.9 
23.6 
25.7 
27.7 
29.2 
32.3 
33.5 
34.0 
36.1 
35.8 
37.4 
36.4 
36.0 
36.2 
35.7 
35.6 
34.7 
Major 
Subsidies 
13.7 
13.2 
12.6 
14.1 
16.3 
16.5 
14.9 
13.0 
11.2 
9.4 
8.9 
8.8 
10.1 
9.6 
9.1 
9.3 
10.1 
12.0 
Grants to 
States & 
UT 
20.3 
18.4 
19.4 
18.1 
13.6 
18.1 
19.2 
19.4 
19.5 
16.6 
15.4 
14.8 
12.7 
11.9 
12.0 
13.6 
14.1 
12.7 
Others 
22.7 
22.9 
23.2 
21.5 
27.4 
21.3 
19.7 
21.1 
21.7 
24.4 
26.4 
25.7 
26.3 
28.7 
28.5 
28.0 
27.5 
28.6 
Source : Calculated. 
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Table 3.16 
Share of Interest and Revenue Deficit in Gross Fiscal Deficit 
(Rs. crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Gross 
Fiscal 
Deficit 
21858 
26342 
27044 
30923 
35632 
44632 
36325 
40173 
60257 
57703 
60243 
66733 
88937 
113349 
104717 
118816 
140955 
145466 
Revenue 
Deficit 
5889 
7777 
9137 
10515 
11914 
18562 
16261 
18574 
32716 
31029 
29731 
32654 
46449 
66976 
67596 
85234 
100162 
104712 
Revenue 
as per 
cent of 
GFD 
26.9 
29.5 
33.7 
34.0 
33.4 
41.5 
44.7 
46.2 
54.2 
53.7 
49.3 
48.9 
52.2 
59.0 
64.5 
71.7 
71.0 
71.9 
Primary 
Deficit 
14346 
17096 
15793 
16645 
17875 
23134 
9729 
9098 
23516 
13643 
10198 
7255 
23300 
35467 
14468 
19502 
33495 
29803 
P.D. as 
Percent 
of GFD 
65.6 
64.9 
58.3 
53.8 
50.1 
51.8 
26.7 
22.6 
39.0 
23.6 
16.9 
10.8 
26.1 
31.2 
13.8 
16.4 
23.7 
20.4 
Interest 
Payment 
7512 
9246 
11251 
14278 
17757 
21498 
26596 
31075 
36741 
44060 
50045 
59478 
65637 
77882 
90249 
99314 
107460 
115663 
Interest 
as 
percent 
ofGFD 
34.3 
35.0 
41.6 
46.1 
49.8 
48.1 
73.2 
77.3 
60.9 
76.3 
83.0 
89. i 
73.8 
68.7 
86.1 
83.5 
76.2 
79.5 
Source : Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, RBI, 2002-03. 
Share of revenue deficit and interest in gross fiscal deficit has 
increased since 1985-86. Revenue deficit as per cent of gross fiscal deficit 
was 27 per cent in 1985-86 which reached to 72 per cent in 2002-03. Interest 
as per cent of GFD was 34.3 per cent in 1985-86 reached to 80 per cent 
2002-03 (Table 3.16). 
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3.5.1 Trends and adjustment in Interest Payments 
It has almost been a decade that India embarked into the path of 
financial liberalization. One of the principal components of the financial 
liberalization was the deregulation of interest rates. Interest rate deregulation 
aimed at developing an efficient and competitive financial system to achieve 
allocative efficiency of available resources .One of the main objectives of 
improving allocative efficiency was to reduce the excessive dependence of 
government on captive investors to finance the fiscal deficit. This was done 
by gradual shift of government borrowing programme towards market-
related rates of interest. The market related borrowing programme also 
aimed at reducing cross subsidisation of interest rates and improve 
profitability of banks. In a deregulated financial system, the supply of and 
demand for funds determine the rate of interest. An increasing demand for 
funds by the government to finance its increasing fiscal deficit may create a 
shortage of loanable funds in the financial system, which in turn may create 
an upward pressure on interest rate and thus can lead to a decline in the 
interest-sensitive components of private spending such as investment. 
At theoretical level, an extensive debate has developed to explain the 
link between deficit and interest rate. There are three different theoretical 
paradigms, viz, neo-classical, Keynesian and Ricardian, under which this 
relationship can be viewed and empirically tested. According to the neo-
classical view, rise in deficit leads to an increase in the rate of interest and in 
turn crowds out private investment whereas the Keynesians visualise that 
although increase in the deficit leads to an increase in the rate of interest, 
such an increase stimulates savings and capital formation. In between the 
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neoclassical and Keynesian view, there exists the central observation of 
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem which argued that deficits merely postpone 
taxes and therefore tax financing and debt financing of deficit have equal 
impact on the economy and thus deficit does not have any impact on interest 
rate.'^ 
It should be noted that the impact of fiscal defich on rate of interest 
depends not only on the level of deficit but also on the financing pattern of 
deficit. Government can finance deficits by seigniorage and through the 
creation of debt, both internal and external. Excessive use of any financing 
mode of deficit results in the macroeconomic imbalances, viz., seigniorage 
financing leads to inflationary pressures in the economy, domestic debt 
financing leads to a credit squeeze through higher interest rates or when 
interest rates are fixed, through credit allocation, even more stringent 
financial repression and the crowding out of private investment and 
consumption. Excessive financing of deficit through external debt may lead 
to current account deficit and appreciation of the real exchange rate leading 
to a balance of payment crisis (if foreign reserves are run down) or an 
external debt crisis (if debt is too high).'^ 
Many authors have empirically tested the relationship between market 
borrowing to finance the fiscal deficit and the rate of interest and found 
contradictory results. Evans (1985), Tanzi (1985), Dalamgas (1987), Ahmad 
(1994), Kulkarni and Eric Lee (1996) found no positive link between rate of 
interest and deficit. While Cebula (1990), Correia Nunes, Jose and Loukas 
Stemitslotis (1995), Ostrosky (1979) did find evidence for the link between 
deficit and rate of interest.'^^ Only recently, an attempt has been made by 
Chakraborty that the direction of causality runs from real rate of interest to 
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deficit. This result is in conformity of the recent trend in Indian public 
finance where the share of non-interest expenditure in the total expenditure 
is on the decline. This is due to sharp increase in interest payment obligation 
arising out of the rising cost of servicing the internal debt. The reason 
beneath this can be attributed to interest rate deregulation, where the high 
interest rate fuelled the accumulation of more debt through increase in 
interest payments and the consequent debt deficit spiral 21 
Table 3.17 
Trend Analysis of Interest Payments of Central Government 
(Rs. Crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Interest Payments 
(Actual value) 
7512 
9246 
11251 
14278 
17757 
21498 
26596 
31075 
36741 
44060 
50045 
59478 
65637 
77882 
90249 
99314 
107460 
115663 
Trend values 
-7618.95 
-1206.45 
5752.05 
12437.55 
19123.05 
25808.55 
32494.05 
39179.55 
45865.05 
52550.55 
59236.05 
65921.55 
72607.05 
79292.55 
85978.05 
92663.55 
99349.05 
106034.55 
Source : Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy RBI-2002-03. 
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To analyse the trend of interest payments a linear trend line is fitted 
with the help of method of least square. 
Yi-49207.8 +6685.5 Xt 
Where Yj = Trend value of interest payment. 
It is evident from the above equation that interest payments of Central 
Government increases by 6685.5 units per every unit change of time. The 
actual values and trend values of interest payments are shown in the given 
Table 3.17 and Figure 3.11. 
Table 3.18 
Annual Growth Rates of Interest Payments of Central Government 
(Rs. Crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Interest Payments 
(Actual value) 
7512 
9246 
11251 
14278 
17757 
21498 
26596 
31075 
36741 
44060 
50045 
59478 
65637 
77882 
90249 
99314 
107460 
115663 
Annual Growth rates 
(%) 
-
23.0 
21.6 
26.9 
24.3 
21.0 
23.7 
16.8 
18.2 
19.9 
13.5 
18.8 
10.3 
18.6 
15.8 
10.8 
8.2 
7.6 
Source : Calculated. CGR 17.82% per annum 
144 
i r , 
+ -q-
X t^ 
•o o 
*o , 
c- " 
11 
.^ 
c/^  
!U 
r-
^, W 
a. 
*^  
OJ 
aj 
1 1 
P 
03 
D_ 
i/i 
u 
j ; ; 
-—^  u 
« 
..^  1 1 
c 
B 
03 
J5 
O 
— r — 
wo 
—r-
o 
£0-3003 
30-1003 
10-0003 
00-6661 
66-8661 
86-/.661 
/:6-966I 
96-5661 
S6-t766l S 
t76-£66l 
£6-3661 
36-1661 
16-0661 
06-6861 
68-8861 
88-Z.861 
L8-9861 
.Sf 
aSBjuaajaj 
145 
Over the period of study, annual growth rate of interest payment 
shows the declining growth. The maximum rate of growth was in the year 
1988-89. In the year 1990-91 growth was 21 percent, it increased in the 
subsequent period. In between the years sometimes growth increases and 
next time it declines. Compound annual growth rate has been calculated by 
using semi-log growth function which is 17.82 percent. Interest payment 
have grown on an average of 17.82 percent (Table 3.18 and Figure 3.12). 
Table 3.19 
Interest Payments as Percentage of Total Expenditure 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Interest 
Payments 
(Rs. crore) 
7572 
9246 
11251 
14278 
17757 
31075 
82292 
92702 
36741 
44060 
50045 
59478 
65637 
77882 
90249 
99314 
107460 
115663 
Total 
Expenditure 
(Rs. crore) 
52665 
62916 
68261 
79111 
92908 
105298 
111415 
122618 
141853 
160739 
178275 
201007 
216321 
255552 
298084 
325592 
362310 
414162 
Interest 
payments as 
per cent of 
Revenue 
expenditure 
22.1 
22.6 
24.3 
26.3 
27.6 
33.5 
73.8 
75.6 
33.9 
36.0 
35.7 
37.4 
36.3 
35.9 
36.2 
35.7 
35.6 
33.8 
Interest 
Payments as 
percent of 
Total 
Expenditure 
14.3 
14.7 
16.5 
18.0 
19.11 
29.5 
73.9 
75.6 
25.9 
27.4 
28.0 
29.6 
30.3 
30.4 
30.2 
30.5 
29.7 
27.9 
Source :Economic Survey, various issues. 
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Interest payments as percentage of revenue expenditure is 
continuously increasing. In 1985-86 it was 22 percent approx. continuously 
increased up 1994-95 (Table 3.19). In 1995-96 there was marginal decrease, 
but it hovered around 36 to 33 percent of revenue expenditure. Interest 
payments as per cent of total expenditure have a increasing trend (Table 
3.19 and Figure 3.13). 
To know the relationship between total revenue expenditure and 
interest payments estimated simple regression model is used. The model is 
RE - Pi + Pi IP 
RE = 11289.44+ 296 IP 
Where RE = Revenue expenditure 
IP = Interest payments. 
This equation shows that the one unit change in interest payments brings 
2.69 unit increase in revenue expenditure. 
With the help of data we can also analysis the link between real rate 
of interest and fiscal deficit. This causality run from real rate of interest to 
fiscal deficit since there is declining trend of share of non-interest 
expenditure in total expenditure (Table 3.20 and Figure 3.14). 
Growth rate of revenue expenditure in Rs. crore can be known with 
the help of growth model. If the actual value of revenue expenditure in log 
term is regressed over time. The model regression result is as follows. 
LnRE = 10.355 + 0.135 Xt 
Se = (0.015) (0.001) 
R^  = 0.99 
CAGR = 14.5% 
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Where LnRe = log value of revenue expenditure 
Xt = time period 
Table 3.20 
Composition of Non-interest Expenditure and Revenue Expenditure 
with Total Expenditure 
(Rs. crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
33924 
40860 
46174 
54106 
64210 
73516 
82292 
92702 
108169 
122112 
139861 
158933 
180335 
216461 
249078 
277839 
301611 
341648 
Total 
Expenditure 
526666 
62916 
68261 
79111 
9290? 
105298 
111414 
122618 
141853 
160739 
178275 
201007 
232053 
279340 
298053 
325592 
362453 
404013 
Non-Interest 
Expenditure 
2412 
31614 
34923 
39828 
46453 
52018 
55696 
61627 
71428 
78052 
89816 
99455 
114698 
138579 
158829 
178525 
194151 
225985 
Non-
Interest 
exp. as % 
Total 
Exp. 
50.1 
50.2 
51.1 
50.3 
49.9 
49.4 
49.9 
50.2 
50.3 
48.5 
50.3 
49.4 
49.4 
49.6 
53.2 
54.8 
53.5 
55.9 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
as % of 
Total Exp. 
64.4 
64.9 
67.6 
68.3 
69.1 
69.8 
73.8 
75.6 
76.2 
75.9 
78.4 
79.0 
77.7 
77.4 
83.5 
85.3 
83.2 
84.5 
Source : For actual value, Economic Survey, various issues. 
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The revenue expenditure in Rs. crores has increased at the rate of 
14.5 per cent over the whole period of study. 
When log value of non-interest expenditure in Rs. crores is regressed 
on time. Then the regression result of growth model is 
LnNIE= 9.549 + 0.165 X, 
Where 
Se 
R' 
CAGR 
LnNIE 
Xt 
(0.025) (0.266) 
0.73 
17.99% 
log value of non-interest expenditure 
time period 
The compound growth of non-interest expenditure is 17.99 per cent 
which greater than the growth of revenue expenditure. 
Table 3.21 
Ratio of Interest Payments to Revenue Receipts 
(Rs. crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Interest 
payments 
7512 
9246 
11251 
14278 
17757 
21498 
26596 
31075 
36741 
44060 
50045 
59478 
65637 
77882 
90249 
99314 
107460 
115663 
Revenue 
Receipts 
28035 
33083 
37037 
43591 
52296 
54954 
66030 
74128 
75453 
91083 
110130 
126279 
133886 
149485 
181482 
192605 
201449 
236936 
Ratio of Interest Payment 
to Revenue Receipts 
26.7 
27.9 
38.3 
32.7 
33.9 
39.1 
40.2 
41.9 
48.6 
48.3 
45.4 
47.1 
49.0 
52.1 
49.7 
51.5 
53.3 
48.8 
Source : Handbook of statistics on the Indian Economy 2002-03 RBI. 
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From the above Table 3.21 and Figure 3.15 it is clear that share of 
interest payments in revenue receipt has continuously increased from 27 
percent in 1985-86 to 48.6 percent in 1993-94. Approximately fifty percent of 
the revenue receipts was used to pay the debt in the form of interest. 
Table 3.22 
Interest 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Payments a Percentage 
Interest Payments as 
percent of GDP 
2.9 
3.2 
3.4 
3.6 
4.0 
3.8 
4.3 
4.4 
4.5 
4.2 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
4.7 
4.8 
4.7 
4.8 
of GDP 
Annual Growth rates 
(%) 
-
10.3 
6.2 
0.2 
11.1 
-5.0 
13.1 
2.3 
2.2 
-6.6 
-2.3 
2.4 
2.3 
2.3 
6.8 
2.1 
-2.0 
2.1 
Source : calculated. 
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The major contributing factor impacting a downward rigidity to the 
revenue expenditure relates to items of committed expenditure, of which 
interest payment is prominent. Interest payments as a ratio to GDP increased 
from 3.8 percent in 1990-91 to 4.7 percent in 2001-02 for the Central 
government (Table 3.22 and Figure 3.16). The rise in the weighted average 
interest rate on Central Government and State Government market borrowings, 
following the progressive alignment of coupon rates with market interest rates, 
led to the rise in interest payments. On the other hand, in the latter half of the 
1990s, though the cost of borrowings declined consistently due to fall in the 
market interest rates, interest payments continued to rise unabated. This 
essentially reflects the impact of sizeable outstanding liabilities contracted at 
higher interest rates during the first half of the 1990s, and also the return to 
rising deficit. 
3.5.2 Trends and Adjustment in Major Subsidies 
The word subsidy is derived from the Latin Subsidium, meaning troops 
stationed in reserve, and essentially implies 'coming to assistance from 
behind'. The perceived outcome of subsidy is manifested in the form of 
alteration in relative prices and/or relaxation of the private budget constraint. A 
subsidy in its simplest form is a negative tax - a reverse flow (transfer) from 
the government to the public - or an income/ consumption supplement for 
individuals. Subsidies, like taxes, may thus be lumpsum,, proportional 
(advalorem or specific) or progressive. Subsidies are generally classified as 
implicit or explicit. Implicit subsidies are targeted (or administered) indirectly 
and also referred to as hidden subsidies. These arise out of below cost provision 
of goods and services produced in the public sector. Explicit or direct subsidies 
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refer to income supplements or to transfers and payments at a predetermined 
rate (of production or consumption). 
So long as public expenditure (on goods and services) is financed by 
tax- and non-tax revenues, subsidies represent interpersonal transfers and 
redistribution, with the government acting as facilitator. The interpersonal 
transfers are generally achieved through price discrimination across different 
sections of consumers. So long as such price variations are revenue, neutral, 
they have an impact on the resource allocation mechanism but do not influence 
the sustainability of the Government expenditure programme. 
Often, government expenditure exceeds the sum of tax and non-tax 
revenue. The revenues then constitute the recovered costs of government 
expenditures, while unrecovered costs have to be financed by borrowings. The 
total borrowing requirement of the government from all sources is known as 
the GFD. In reality, a substantial component of the GFD may actually represent 
investment, with only a part of it subsidising the present consumption plan. A 
relevant objective of fiscal adjustment is to minimise this component of GFD. 
Subsidies are justified if there are positive externalities in the public 
provision of non-public goods. Thus, Graff (1987) writes " (If) is a simple 
point, often overlooked, but recognized in the older literature when reference 
was made to systems of taxes and subsidies. The latter were to go not only to 
those creating external economies, but to those suffering external costs".^^ 
A comprehensive estimate of subsidy would involve providing for 
estimates of justified subsidy and societal deadweight losses (the latter 
distinguish the net subsidy from gross subsidy). Justified subsidies compensate 
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for the positive externalities, and in several cases also induce a reduction in 
activities that generate negative externalities. 
Budget subsidies in India are large, mostly implicit and input based, and 
generally regressive. These subsidies obscure and promote inefficiencies. The 
Government of India, in its Discussion paper on Government Subsidies in India 
States its desire to curb subsidies. There is evidence, however, that Central 
subsidies may actually have risen sharply in the late 1990s (Table 3.23 and 
Figure 3.17). Both Central State Governments continue to provide many 
subsidies for goods and services where there are no clear externalities. At the 
same time, critical areas like health and education have suffered, as per capita 
expenditure have remained low although the degree of subsidization has been 
high. 
Subsidies are often justified on the grounds that they serve distributional 
objectives or as protection for infant industries. Distributional motives are 
behind food subsidies for below poverty line (BPL) populations and Support 
prices for farming outputs. In practice, however, subsidies have historically 
been extended to all households and the distributional objective has rarely been 
served. Further, subsidies may not always be the best means of achieving the 
distributional objectives. The infant industry argument has also been made to 
advocate subsidies for exports or small-scale industries, but the validity of this 
argument is doubtful from an efficiency viewpoint. At any rate, these subsidies 
could only be valid for temporary periods. 
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Table 3.23 
Trend Analysis of Major Subsidies of Central Government 
(Rs. Crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Major Subsidies 
(Actual values) 
4796 
5451 
5980 
7732 
10474 
12158 
12253 
10824 
11605 
11854 
12666 
15499 
18540 
23593 
24487 
26838 
31207 
44618 
Trend Values 
1200.1 
2958.12 
4716.14 
6474.16 
8232.18 
9990.2 
11748.22 
13506.24 
15264.26 
17022.28 
18780.3 
20538.32 
22296.34 
24054.36 
25812.38 
27570.4 
29328.42 
31086.44 
Source : Economic survey, various issues for actual values. 
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Trend Analysis of Major Subsidies 
To test the trends in major subsidies a linear trend line is fitted with the 
help of method of least squares. 
Y = a + b x t 
Where 
Y = Trend values of major subsidies 
a = Y intercept 
b = Slope of the trend line 
Xt = time period. 
From the fitted line the equation for major subsidies is 
Y = 16143.27 + 1758.02 Xt 
It is evident from the above equations that the major subsidies of Central 
Government increases by 1758.02 units per every unit change of time. The 
values of actuals and trend values of subsidies are given in the above Table 
3.23 and graph shows the trend of major subsidies. 
Growth in major subsidies can be explained very well by its annual 
percentage variations (Table 3.24 and Figure 3.18). About 14 percent increase 
in subsidies was witnessed in 1986-87. In 1987-88 percentage variation shows 
lesser growth approximately 10 percent over its previous period. There is a 
sharp increase in subsidies growth in the period 1988-89. This increase remains 
in the subsequent period. In period 1990-91 annual growth has declined and it 
was 16 percent. Percentage variation shows a negative growth in 1992-93 
which implies that subsidies has declined over its previous period. Since 
government of India started economic reform in 1990-91. So that between the 
periods 1990-91 to 1992-93 there was no growth in subsidies due to fiscal 
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consolidation programme. There after, in 1993-94 there was sharp jump in 
subsidies allocation. The periods 1996-97, 97-98 and 98-99 show high annual 
growth rates in subsidies. 
The compound annual growth rate for the subsidies in the period of 
study is 11.85 percent. The compound annual growth rate has been calculated 
by semi-log function. 
Table 3.24 
Annual Growth Rates of Major Subsidies of Central Government 
(Rs. Crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Major Subsidies 
(Rs. Crore) 
4796 
5451 
5980 
7732 
10474 
12158 
12253 
10824 
11605 
11854 
12666 
15499 
18540 
23593 
24487 
26838 
31207 
44618 
Annual Growth rates 
(%) 
-
13.65 
9.70 
29.29 
35.46 
16.07 
0.78 
-11.66 
7.21 
2.14 
6.85 
22.36 
19.62 
27.25 
3.78 
9.60 
16.27 
42.97 
Source : Calculated. CGR = 11.85% Per annum. 
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Table 3.25 
The Expenditure on Subsidies, as a Proportion of Non-interest Non-plan 
Revenue Expenditure 
(Rs. crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Subsidies 
4796 
5451 
5980 
7732 
10474 
12158 
12253 
10824 
11605 
11854 
12666 
15499 
18540 
23593 
24487 
26838 
31207 
44618 
Revenue 
Expenditure 
33924 
40860 
46174 
54106 
64210 
73516 
82292 
92702 
108169 
122112 
139861 
158933 
180335 
216461 
249078 
277839 
301611 
341648 
Subsidies as 
percentage of 
Revenue Exp. 
14.13 
13.34 
12.95 
14.29 
16.31 
16.53 
14.88 
11.67 
10.72 
9.70 
9.05 
9.75 
10.28 
10.89 
9.83 
9.65 
10.34 
13.05 
Source : Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, RBI -2003-04. 
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From the above Table 3.25 and Figure 3.19 it is clear that approximately 
14 percent of revenue was consumed as subsidies. There was a marginal 
decrease in subsequent period. More or less same trend was followed upto 
1993-94. From 1994-95 to 1996-97, app. 9 percent of revenue was consumed 
as subsidies. We can say that there is fluctuation in the percentage of subsidies 
expenditure between 9 percent to 17 percent of revenue expenditure. 
Performance of subsidies is observed by calculating it as per cent of 
GDP. From Table 3.26 and Figure 3.20, we find that in 1985-86 it was 1.7 per 
cent of GDP which increased to 2.2 per cent in 1989-90, it was exceptionally 
very high 12.7 per cent of GDP in 2000-01. 
Table 3.26 
Payments of Major Subsidies as Percentage of GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Major subsidies 
(Rs. in crores) 
4796 
5451 
5980 
7732 
10474 
12158 
12253 
10824 
11605 
11854 
12666 
15499 
18540 
23593 
24487 
26838 
31207 
44618 
as Per cent of GDP 
1.7 
1.8 
1.7 
1.8 
2.2 
2.1 
1.9 
1.4 
1.4 
1.2 
1.1 
1.1 
1.2 
1.4 
1.3 
12.7 
1.4 
1.8 
Source : Actual value from Economic Survey, as per cent of GDP calculated. 
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3.5.3 Trends and Adjustments in Defence Expenditure 
Among the other government expenditure, it is also noteworthy that 
defence expenditure has increased substantially in the late 1980s, rising from 
about 2.8 percent of GDP in the early 1980 to about 3.4 percent in the late 
1980s. Defence expenditure is characterised into two parts, defence 
expenditure, on revenue account and defence expenditure on capital account. 
Table 3.27 
Percentage Share of Defence Expenditure on Revenue Account to GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
as per cent of GDP 
2.9 
3.4 
3.0 
2.9 
2.7 
2.0 
1.9 
1.7 
1.9 
1.6 
1.6 
1.5 
1.7 
1.7 
1.8 
1.8 
1.7 
1.6 
Source : Economic Survey, various issues. 
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From the Table 3.27 and Figure 3.21 it is clear that defence expenditure 
started increasing during late 1980s. In 1986-87, it was 3.4 percent of GDP. 
After 1987-88 it has a declining trend during rest of the period and is relatively 
constant level of about 1.6 percent of GDP. 
Table 3.28 
Defence Expenditure as Percentage of Revenue Expenditure 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Defence Expenditure 
(RS. crore) 
7021 
9179 
8861 
9558 
10194 
10874 
11442 
12109 
14978 
16426 
18841 
20997 
26174 
29861 
35216 
37238 
38059 
41088 
as per cent of Revenue 
Expenditure 
20.6 
22.4 
19.1 
17.6 
15.8 
14.7 
13.9 
13.0 
13.8 
13.4 
13.4 
13.2 
14.5 
13.7 
14.1 
13.4 
12.6 
12.0 
Source ; Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, RBI 2002-03 
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Defence expenditure on the revenue accounts as a percent of revenue 
expenditure has a declining trend over the period of study. It was 21 percent of 
revenue expenditure in 1985-86 has declined and reached to 12 percent of 
revenue expenditure (Table 3.28 and Figure 3.22). 
3.5.4 Trends and Adjustment in Expenditure by Functional Category: 
Social and Community Services Economic Services 
Expenditure on social services formed about 2.78 per cent of total 
expenditure in 1985-86 (Table 3.29 and Figure 3.23). As this services are 
employment intensive, wages cost predominated. As seen in the case of 
aggregate expenditure, the growth of expenditure and social and community 
services showed a noticeable increase during the period of study. 
Expenditure on economic services formed about one fourth of total 
expenditure in 1985-86 and this share marginally declined during the referred 
period (Table 3.29). The decline was mainly due to cutbacks in capital 
expenditure. The analysis of government expenditure on economic services 
reveals that major sources of high growth of current expenditures on economic 
services were subsidies and other transfers. 
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Table 3.29 
Central Government Expenditure by Functional Categories 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Social 
Services (Rs. 
crores) 
1496 
2161 
2369 
2769 
3061 
3274 
3569 
4009 
4830 
5873 
7655 
9672 
11845 
14656 
17221 
17679 
15130 
18973 
as 
percentage 
of Total 
Expenditure 
2.78 
3.33 
3.36 
3.39 
3.21 
3.03 
3.11 
3.18 
3.30 
3.55 
4.18 
4.68 
4.95 
5.09 
5.60 
5.24 
4.03 
4.43 
Economic 
Services (Rs. 
crore) 
14014 
16275 
15722 
18022 
25602 
24588 
23681 
26248 
27571 
33897 
35029 
37253 
44246 
54375 
60956 
71731 
80868 
106625 
as percentage 
of Total 
Expenditure 
26.04 
25.12 
22.31 
22.10 
22.88 
22.76 
20.68 
20.82 
18.87 
20.51 
19.13 
18.04 
18.52 
18.90 
19.85 
21.29 
21.57 
24.93 
Source ; Handbook of Statistics on the India Economy, RBI- 2002-03. 
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3.5.5 Trends and Adjustment in Grants to States and Union Territories 
The Finance Commission decides grants to States and Union 
territories. In 1985-86 it share in revenue expenditure was 20.3 percent. It 
decreased to 18.4 percent of revenue expenditure in 1986-87. Between 
1986-87 to 1989-90 was approximately 18 percent of revenue expenditure 
(Table 3.30 and Figure 3.24). 
Table 3.30 
Grants to States and Union Territories as Percentage of Revenue 
Expenditure 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
as per cent of Revenue Expenditure 
20.3 
18.4 
19.4 
18.1 
13.2 
17.5 
19.2 
19.4 
19.5 
16.6 
15.4 
14.8 
12.7 
11.9 
12.0 
13.6 
14.1 
12.7 
Source ; calculated. 
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During 1990-91 to 1993-94 it was between 18 percent to 20 percent of 
revenue expenditure. Further it has declined continuously from 17 per cent to 
12 per cent approximately during 1994-95 to 1999-2000. It reached to 13.6 
percent of Revenue expenditure in 2000-01. It reached to 12.7 percent of 
revenue expenditure in 2002-03. 
3.6 TRENDS AND ADJUSTMENT IN CAPITAL EXPENDITURE 
Since 1986-87 the classification of expenditures in the Central 
government budget has been under plan and non-plan heads. Plan heads 
include those programs and projects financed by the Central government on the 
recommendations of the Planning Commission whereas the Finance 
Commission considers 'non-plan' heads to recommend financial assistance to 
the states. After the completion of the projects financed under the plan, the 
maintenance is brought under the non-plan head during the next plan period. 
Therefore, as per budged classification, 
Total expenditure = plan expenditure + non-plan expenditures. 
The Central Government expenditure, classified under plan and non-plan 
expenditures are further disaggregated into revenue and capital account 
separately. 
Or Total expenditure = Plan-revenue expenditure + Plan-capital 
expenditures + non plan revenue expenditures + non-plan capital expenditures. 
Further, plan expenditures on revenue and capital account consist of 
i) expenditures on services 
ii) Central assistance to states and Union territories. 
Expenditures on non-plan revenue account are available for the 
following items. 
(i) Interest payments 
(ii) Defence expenditures 
176 
(iii) Subsidies and 
(iv) Grants to states and union territories 
Non-plan expenditures on capital account are sub-divided under the 
following heads 
(a) expenditures on defence 
(b) expenditure on services 
(c) loans and advances to state and UTS and 
(d) other loans. 
Table 3.31 
Capital Expenditure of the Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Capital 
Expenditure (Rs. 
crore) 
18742 
22056 
22087 
25005 
28698 
31782 
29122 
29916 
33684 
38627 
38414 
42074 
51718 
62879 
48975 
47753 
60842 
62365 
Percentage 
change 
-
17.6 
0.1 
13.2 
14.7 
10.7 
-8.3 
2.7 
12.5 
14.6 
-0.5 
9.5 
22.9 
21.5 
-22.1 
-2.4 
27.4 
2.5 
as per cent of 
GDP 
7.2 
7.6 
6.6 
6.3 
6.3 
4.4 
4.7 
4.3 
4.3 
4.1 
2.4 
2.3 
2.4 
2.2 
2.5 
2.3 
2.7 
2.5 
Source : Economic Survey, Various issues. 
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From the above Table 3.31 and Figures 3.25 & 3.26, it is clear that 
percentage change in capital expenditure over the period of study is very 
erractic. If we observe capital expenditure as percent of GDP, it has a declining 
trend. This shows that, in the name of fiscal adjustment programmes, 
government has throtlled (suppressed) the growth of capital expenditure just to 
show that in aggregate government expenditure has declined. It seems that the 
ideology of economic liberalization is working as a powerful drug that nums 
the senses of our policy makers. Policy makers are busy rolling back the state 
from those very essential spheres that determine the quality of life for the poor-
health, education, water and sanitation, rural livelihood and so on. The 
countryside is suffering acutely from this withdrawl syndrome of the state. 
During 1986-87, percentage change in capital expenditure was 17.6 percent 
which reached to near zero in the next period, there was no increase in capital 
expenditure in that period. From 1988-89 to 1990-91, there as positive change 
in the capital expenditure. If the capital expenditure is visualised in terms of 
GDP it has a declining trend. In 1985-86, capital expenditure was of 7.2 per 
cent of GDP which reached to 4.4 per cent of GDP in 1990-91. In the period 
1991-92 their was reduction in capital expenditure in absolute terms equal to 
-8.3. During this period, government emphasis was to reduced fiscal deficit in 
the name of fiscal adjustment programmes. The axe of cutting expenditure fell 
on capital expenditure since it was an easy option to the government as 
compared to revenue expenditure. From 1992-93 to 1994-95, there was positive 
increase in capital expenditure. Further 1995-96, there was reduction in capital 
expenditure in absolute term. In two consecutive period 1999-2000 and 2000-
01, there was no increase in capital expenditure in absolute term. In terms of 
percentage of GDP, the capital expenditure has a declining trend. 
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From the Table 3.32 and Figure 3.27 it is clear that capital expenditure 
as percent of total expenditure on an average, has declining trend in 1985-86 it 
was 35.5 percent. In 2002-03 it is 16 percent. This trend substantiates the 
argument that fiscal adjustment programme of the Government of India is 
based on the reduction of capital expenditure instead of revenue expenditure. 
To know the growth in capital expenditure in Rs. crores, we have a 
growth model which is as follows : 
LnCE = 9.845 + 0.0683 Xt 
R^  = 0.938 
CAGR - 7.07% 
where, LnCE = log value of capital expenditure 
The capital expenditure in Rs. crore increased at compound rate of 7.07 per 
cent over the whole period of time. 
Table 3.32 
Capital Expenditure as percent of Total Expenditure 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Capital Expenditure as per cent of Total 
Expenditure 
35.5 
30.0 
32.3 
31.6 
30.8 
30.1 
26.1 
24.3 
23.7 
24.0 
21.5 
20.9 
22.2 
22.5 
16.4 
14.6 
16.7 
15.4 
Source : Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, RBI 2002-03. 
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Table 3.33 
Percentage Change and Composition of Capital Expenditure 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-99 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Loan and 
Advances 
(Rs. Crore) 
11087 
12797 
12793 
14750 
16890 
19652 
17723 
16297 
20454 
23736 
24316 
27878 
34193 
44037 
24938 
23008 
34284 
32020 
Percentage 
change of 
loans and 
advances 
-
15.4 
-0.03 
15.2 
14.5 
16.3 
-9.8 
-8.04 
25.5 
16.0 
2.4 
14.6 
22.6 
28.7 
-43.3 
-7.7 
49.0 
-6.6 
Capital 
outlay (Rs. 
crore) 
7655 
9259 
9294 
10255 
11808 
12130 
11399 
13619 
13230 
14891 
14099 
14196 
17526 
18841 
24037 
24745 
26558 
30345 
Percentage 
change in 
capital outlay 
-
20.9 
0.3 
10.3 
15.1 
2.7 
•6.0 
19.4 
-2.8 
12.5 
-5.3 
-0.02 
23.4 
7.5 
27.5 
2.9 
7.3 
14.2 
Source : Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, RBI-2002-03. 
Percentage change in loans and advances and capital outlay is very 
erratic (Table 3.33) In 1991-92 there was no increase in composition of capital 
expenditure. 
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Chapter - 4 
FISCAL ADJUSTMENT AND REVENUE 
MOBILIZATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Taxation in the developing countries traditionally has two 
objectives. The first aim provides the tax concessions and incentives to 
stimulate private enterprises. The second purpose is to the mobilization of 
resources to finance public expenditure. The political and economic 
ideology of the developing countries and its socio-economic progress 
depends largely on its government's ability to generate sufficient revenues 
to spend on essential and basic public services - health, education, 
transportation, communications, and components of the economic and social 
infrastructure. Most of the governments in the developing countries are 
directly involved in economic activities through their ownership, control of 
public operations and state trading corporations. Tax levies on public 
corporations and private individuals to enable the government to finance the 
capital and recurrent expenditure. In recent years the problems of fiscal 
deficit and public expenditure are rising greatly in excess of public revenue, 
resulting from a developmental programmes, external shocks, debt burdens, 
falling inflation, growing trade balance and declining investment rate. 
Consequently cutting government expenditure mostly on social services and 
raising revenues through efficient tax collection for developmental activities 
of the nation. Development of social services is also important to achieve 
higher productivity. There is no government or state without welfare 
package for the welfare of the society. 
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The need for fiscal adjustment may be seen in the context of the 
impact of fiscal policy on stabilization and growth objectives, the 
sustainability of fiscal policy stance and the linkages between fiscal and 
other policy instruments. 
Undertaking fiscal adjustment often requires difficult decisions 
involving increasing government revenue and reducing spending. 
Expenditure reductions often tend to be stressed in the initial stages of 
adjustment. Cuts in productive capital spending and essential operations and 
maintenance spending are liable to be damaging to growth. Consequently, 
countries need to move quickly on structural reforms affecting expenditure, 
revenue, and public enterprises in order to allow a more balanced approach 
to fiscal adjustment and to generate the resources necessary to support 
spending that addresses social and productive needs. 
Measures to Improve Tax System and Increase Revenue - in 
some cases, raising rates within an existing system can increase revenue. 
However, the ability to generate increased revenue in this manner may be 
limited. This is particularly likely when an economy is undergoing 
substantial structural change. Consequently, programmes of fiscal 
adjustment are often accompanied by an effort to improve or even 
restructuring the tax system. The improvements in tax policy are more likely 
to be successful when they are accompanied by measures to strengthen tax 
administration. 
The characteristic of a desirable tax system is a blend of both 
macroeconomic and microeconomic considerations. In the former case, a tax 
system's responsiveness to GDP growth and its revenue-generating capacity 
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are paramount. But since overall the microeconomic allocative effects of a 
tax system and the post-tax distribution of income and wealth may affect 
economic growth, the system's efficiency and transparency, for example, are 
also critical. 
A central objective of the tax system is to raise revenue to finance 
government spending, without resort to inflationary financing. This suggests 
the importance of a tax system that can generate revenue increases - at least in 
line with the growth in nominal income - without frequent changes in tax rates 
or introduction of new taxes. 
4.2 TRENDS IN REVENUE RECEIPTS 
The objectives of the fiscal policy and tax structure should be based on 
the foundation of "equality, certainty, convenience and economy". These old 
maxims of taxation are well-accepted standards for a tax system. If a tax 
system is not properly structured and administered on the above standards it 
either causes undue hardship to the public or discrimination in the tax burdens 
or uncertainty in the revenue receipts.' 
Various budget announcement of the central government since 1990-
91 expressed a firm determination to limit the overall deficit within the 
budgeted level through strict fiscal discipline, through containment of 
expenditure growth and improved tax compliance. Stress was also given to 
improve tax-GDP ratio, promoting savings and investment and rationalizing the 
tax system to render it more equitable. 
From table 4.1 it is clear that revenue receipts has increased during the 
period 1985 to 2003, total revenue receipts has increased from minimum of Rs. 
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28035 crores to maximum of Rs. 236936 crores at an average rate of Rs. 
104797.56 crores per year. 
4.1.1 Revenue Receipts as Percentage of GDP 
The log value of revenue receipts of the Central Government is 
regressed on time to calculate the compound (over the period of time) rate of 
growth. 
The regression result of the growth model is as follows : 
LnRR = 10.1727 + 0.1250 X^  
Se = (0.04661) (0.002117) 
R2 = 0.995 
CAGR = 13.32% 
Where, LnRR = Log value of revenue receipt 
Xt = time period 
The revenue receipts of Central Government in Rs. crores increased at the 
compound rate of growth 13.32 per cent over the period of time. 
To know the growth of revenue receipts as percent of GDP, the model 
is : 
LnRRDP = 2.3467 - 0.00953 Xt 
Se = (0.0447) (0.002034) 
CAGR = -0.95% 
Where, LnRRDP = Log value of revenue receipt as percent of GDP 
Xt = time period 
The revenue receipts as percent of GDP has declined at compound rate 
of growth of 0.95 per cent. 
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Table 4.2 
Revenue Receipts of Central Government as per cent of GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Revenue Receipts as percent of GDP 
10.08 
10.63 
10.45 
10.34 
10.28 
9.66 
10.11 
9.91 
8.86 
8.99 
9.27 
9.23 
8.79 
8.59 
9.37 
9.15 
8.87 
9.62 
Source : Economic Survey (vai'ious issues) 
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Revenue receipts as percent of GDP from 1985-86 to 1989-90 is based 
on different series of National Account Statistics (NAS) with base year 1980-
81. But revenue receipts as percent of GDP from 1990-91 onward are based on 
new series of NAS with 1993-94 as base year released by Central Statistical 
Organization (CSO). From this table 4.2 it is clear that revenue receipts as per 
cent of GDP was 10.08 in 1985-86 per cent which reached to 10.28 per cent in 
1989-90. From 1990-91 onwards revenue receipts as percent of GDP has not 
grown much. It is here more or less stagnant (Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1). 
If we go through the fiscal and budgetary developments in 1992-93 of 
Central Government we find that reform programme introduced in 1991-92 for 
the restoration of fiscal balance was continued in 1992-93. The fiscal deficit 
was reduced as per revised estimates during 1991-92 and 1992-93. One of the 
factors in the reduction of fiscal deficit was the increase in revenues. The 
current receipts of the Centre increased by 19.1 per cent in 1992-93 (RE) from 
1991-92. The increase came on top of a 20.0 per cent increase in 1991-92. As a 
result, over the two years of adjustment, revenues increased from 10.7 percent 
of GDP to 11.5 percent of GDP showing an improvement of 0.8 percent of 
GDP. This improvement is primarily due to an improvement in non-tax 
revenue. Non-tax revenue increased from 2.6 percent of GDP to 2.8 percent 
during 1992-93 (Table 4.3 and Figure 4.2) showing a total improvement of 0.7 
per cent of GDP over the two years. Tax revenues have increased only 
gradually over the two years. Revenue receipts declined from 11.5 per cent of 
GDP in 1992-93 to 9.7 per cent, as per revised estimates of 1993-94. This was 
due to lower realizafion of receipts which was 0.8 per cent (of GDP) decline in 
revenue collection. Government continued consolidafion of fiscal balance tax 
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reform etc. The fiscal setback of last years was fully recovered in 1995-96. 
Revenue receipts was 9.0 per cent of GDP in 1995-96. This was due to tax 
reform system, which has encompassed both direct, and indirect taxes and have 
moved towards a tax structure which is simple, relies on moderate tax rates 
with a wider base and better enforcement and serves the objectives of equity 
and efficiency. ''In 1997-98 and 1998-99, there was slippage on the fiscal front 
largely on account of major shortfall in tax revenues and non-debt capital 
receipts from disinvestments, in particular, net tax revenues to Centre. The 
shortfall in tax collections is mainly attributed to revenues from excise and 
customs, which were adversely affected by a slower growth in both industrial 
output and imports". 
Revenue receipt has two components, one is tax revenue and another is 
non-tax revenue. Revenue receipt can be regressed on tax and non-tax revenue 
to know the contribution of these taxes on total revenue receipts. 
TRR=P, + P2TR+P3NTR 
Where TRR = Total revenue receipt 
TR = Tax revenue 
NTR = Non-tax revenue 
TRR = -334.051 + 0.978TR + 1.075NTR 
T-value- (23.803) (12.804) 
S.E. (0.041) (0.084) 
R^=1.00 R^=1.00 
D-W = 1.513, F = 22408.135 
Above equation shows that contribution in revenue receipt by non-tax 
revenue is greater than tax revenue. If there is one per cent increase in non-tax 
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revenue which contributes 1.075 per cent in revenue receipts which is 0.978 per 
cent in case of tax revenue. 
Table 4.3 
Tax Revenue and Non-tax Revenue as Percentage of GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Tax-Revenue 
8.1 
8.3 
8.4 
8.5 
8.5 
7.4 
8.1 
7.7 
6.7 
6.5 
6.7 
6.6 
6.3 
6.0 
6.6 
6.5 
5.9 
6.5 
Non-tax revenue 
3.1 
3.4 
3.1 
2.8 
3.4 
2.1 
2.6 
2.8 
2.7 
2.3 
2.3 
2.3 
2.5 
2.6 
2.8 
2.7 
3.0 
2.9 
Source : Economic Survey (various issues) 
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Log value of tax revenue (net to centre) (Rs. in crores) or actual value 
is regressed on time to know the growth in tax revenue over the period of 
study. The regression result of the model is following : 
LnTR(NC) - 9.92645 + 0.117964Xt 
Se - (0.06881) (0.003126) 
R^  = 0.98 
CAGR = 12.52% 
Where, LnTR(NC) = Log value of tax revenue (net to centre) 
Xt = time period 
The tax revenue (net to centre) increased at 12.52 per cent 
compounded annually over the period of time. 
4.3 TRENDS OF TAX REVENUE 
The easiest way to know the tax burden is to find out tax-income ratio. 
When the process of economic planning began in India in 1950-51, the tax-
GDP ratio was as low as 5.9 per cent. Since then it rose steadily upto 1990-91 
and thereafter declined. Against 9.0 per cent in 1960-61, it was 11.5 per cent in 
1970-71, 14.9 per cent in 1980-81, 16.4 per cent in 1990-91 and 14.9 per cent 
in 2002-03. Until 1970-71, the tax burden in this country was not higher than 
that in other developing countries. However, during 1980s tax burden increased 
substantially. The reason for the immense increase in tax burden in India 
during the 1980s were mainly three; spectacular rise in expenditure on interest 
payments, subsidies and defence, inability of public enterprises to generate the 
required resources; and violation of the canon of economy. During the 1990s 
the tax-GDP ratio declined by 1 percentage point, particularly due to reduction 
in tax rates. 
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The Central Government levies four main taxes viz., personal income 
tax, corporation tax, customs duties and Union excise duties. These taxes 
account for almost total tax proceeds of the Central Government. Customs 
duties had remained the major source of the revenues of the Central 
Government for a long time. During the early 1970s the Union excise duties 
had become the major source of Central Government revenue. In fact, from the 
time the government decided to give protection to industries during the fourth 
decade of the twentieth century, the importance of customs duties as a source 
of revenue started declining during World War II and the post-war period, 
restrictions were imposed on imports of various consumer goods. This policy 
made it difficult to collect large proceeds from customs duties. When the 
process of economic planning begin, imports increased, but their heavy 
taxation was ruled out due to their strategic importance in the country's 
development, in the whole of the planning period capital equipment necessary 
raw materials, foodgrains and petroleum constituted more than ninety percent 
of the country''s imports and the government could not impose heavy duties on 
them. With some progress in the industrial sector, the Central Government 
attempted to expand the base of excise duties, and as a consequence some time 
back it became the major source of its revenue. 
To test the trends of tax revenue (net to centre) a linear trend line is 
fitted with the help of method of least squares. 
TR= P1 + P2X, 
Where, TR = Tax revenue (net to centre) 
(31 = Intercept 
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^2 = Slope ofthe trend line 
Xt = time period 
From the fitted line the equation for tax revenue is : 
T R - -682.752 + 7952.635 Xt 
The value of actuals and trend values of tax revenue are given in table 
4.4 and trend line in the figure 4.3. 
Growth model for tax revenue as percent of GDP is : 
LnTRGDP = 2.1670 - 0.0214 X, (1) 
Se - (0.0595) (0.0027) 
R2 - 0.80 
CAGR = -2.13% 
Growth model for non-tax revenue as percent of GDP is -
LnNTRGDP= 1.073 - 0.0076 Xt ....(2) 
Se = (0.1334) (0.0061) 
CAGR = -0.76% 
Where, LnTRGDP = Log value of tax revenue as percent of GDP 
LnNTRGDP = Log value of non-tax revenue as percent of GDP 
Xt = Time period 
If we compare the growth model (1) and model (2) we find that 
decline in tax revenue as percent of GDP is greater than the decline in non tax 
revenue as percent of GDP. 
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Table 4.4 
Trends in Tax-Revenue of Central Government (1985 to 2003) 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Actual values 
21140 
24319 
28015 
33751 
38399 
42978 
50069 
54044 
54473 
67454 
81939 
93701 
95672 
104652 
128271 
136658 
133532 
158544 
Trend values 
7269.88 
15222.52 
23175.15 
31127.79 
39080.42 
47033.06 
54985.69 
62938.23 
70890.96 
78843.60 
86796.23 
94748.86 
102701.50 
110654.13 
118606.77 
126559.40 
134512.04 
142464.67 
Source : Economic Survey (various issues) for actual value. 
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Table 4.5 
Tax Revenue as a Percentage of Revenue Receipts (1985-86 to 2002-03) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Average 
Percentage 
75.40 
73.50 
75.64 
77.42 
76.80 
78.20 
75.82 
72.90 
71.51 
74.05 
74.40 
74.20 
71.45 
70.00 
70.67 
70.95 
66.28 
66.91 
66.28 
78.20 
73.11 
Source : Calculated 
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There is gradual decrease in the percentage of tax-revenue to revenue 
receipts, over the period of study. It has declined at the compound rate of 
growth of 0.71%. In 1985-86 it was approximately 75 per cent of revenue 
receipts. Tax revenue as percent of revenue receipt was highest in 1990-91 
(Table 4.5 and Figure 4.4). The budget for 1990-91 expressed a firm 
determination for improved tax compliance. Besides, it stressed the importance 
of improving tax-GDP ratio, promoting savings and investment and 
rationalizing the tax system to render it more equitable. There was 
rationalization of customs and excise tariff, abolition of Gold Control Act, 
personal and corporate tax reforms were other important measures proposed in 
the budget 1990-91. 
The government had setup a Tax Reforms Committee in August 1991. 
Based on the recommendations made by the committee in its Interim Report, 
personal income tax was restructured with lower tax rates, fewer slabs and a 
higher exemption limit in the 1992-93 budget. 
Growth model of gross tax revenue in Rs. crores is given by : 
Ln GTR = 10.21673 + 0.120111 Xt 
Se = (0.065871) (0.002993) 
CAGR = 12.7% 
Where, LnGTR = Log value of gross tax revenues in Rs.crores 
Xt = Time period 
The gross tax revenue in Rs. crores has increased at the compound rate of 
growth of 12.7 per cent over the whole period of time. 
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Table 4.6 
Gross Tax Revenue as Percentage of GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
10.3 
10.5 
10.6 
10.5 
10.6 
10.1 
10.3 
10.0 
8.8 
9.1 
9.4 
9.4 
9.1 
8.3 
8.9 
9.0 
8.2 
8.8 
Source : Calculated 
From table 4.6 and Figure 4.5 it is clear that gross tax revenue as 
percent of GDP has declined over the period. It was 10.3 per cent of GDP in 
1985-86 which was maintained upto 1992-93. It declined to 8.8 per cent in 
1993-94 and further bounced back to 9.1 per cent in 1994-95 and reached to 8.8 
percent in 2002-03. 
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4.3.1 Trends of Tax-GDP Ratio : 
Tax-revenue as percentage of GDP during the period 1985 to 2003 has 
increased from a minimum 5.9 to maximum 8.5 per cent of GDP at an average 
rate of 7.32 per cent of GDP. Tax revenue has declined over this period of 
study. Annual growth rate of tax revenue shows negative growth of 2.10 per 
cent per annum. We can say that tax-revenue as per cent of GDP is declining at 
the rate of 2.10 per cent per annum. The compound annual growth rate of tax 
revenue is -2.085. 
Table 4.7 
Tax Revenue (Net to Centre) as Percentage of GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Average 
CAGR 
Percentage 
7.6 
7.8 
7.9 
8.0 
7.9 
7.6 
7.7 
7.2 
6.3 
6.7 
6.9 
6.8 
6.3 
6.0 
6.6 
6.5 
5.9 
6.4 
5.90 
8.50 
7.32 
-2.085 
Source : Calculated 
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If we go through the Table 4.8 and Figure 4.6 we see the same trend in 
gross tax revenue and tax revenue net to States share. Minimum change was 
noticed in 2001-02 in both the cases which were 0.8 and -2.2 respectively. 
Highest change was witnessed in 1985-86 in case of gross tax revenue. In case 
of net of States share it was 23.8 per cent in 1994-95. 
Table 4.8 
Percentage Change in the Tax Revenue of the Central Government 
(1985-86 to 2002-03) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Total Tax Revenue 
Gross 
20.8 
15.1 
15.2 
18.0 
15.7 
11.1 
16.9 
11.5 
3.0 
20.1 
20.1 
15.9 
5.7 
5.8 
19.6 
8.7 
0.8 
16.9 
Net of states share 
19.7 
15.0 
15.1 
20.4 
13.7 
11.9 
16.4 
7.9 
0.7 
23.8 
21.4 
14.3 
2.1 
9.3 
22.5 
6.5 
-2.2 
18.7 
Source : Indian Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance, various issues. 
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4.3.2 Tax Structure and Revenue Productivity 
A brief review of the Indian fiscal policy during the past 5 decades 
clearly indicates the attempts for obtaining more tax revenue to the exchequer. 
By a process of both widening and deepening of the tax base the combined tax 
revenue of the Centre, states and union territories increased during this period. 
The tax revenue/GDP ratio went up. 
But with this impressive increase in tax and non-tax revenues, some 
important features accompanying this rise should also be noted which are 
rather disconcerting : 
(1) There has been a continuous decline in the share of direct taxes in the total 
tax revenue till mid nineties. It is certainly a very unhealthy development. 
This suggests how inequitable our tax system has become over the years. 
(2) Our tax system, particularly, indirect tax system has led to large scale 
distortionary effects. The share of indirect taxes in the total tax revenue is 
much higher then that of industrialized countries and also appreciably 
higher than the average share for most developing countries. Our indirect 
tax system has not evolved as an integrated system as in developed 
countries. 
(3) There is rampant tax evasion of both direct and indirect taxes leading to 
the generation of black money. It is often said that tax evasion in neither a 
new phenomenon nor a peculiar Indian problem. The Taxation Enquiry 
Committee, the Kaldor Report on Indian Tax Reform, the Wanchoo 
Committee and the NIPFP have attempted to quantify the extent of 
evasion and the magnitude of black money. The Wanchoo Committee 
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states that the high rates of taxation under direct tax laws are the first and 
foremost reason for tax evasion in India. In the words of the committee: 
"An overwhelming majority of persons have voiced the opinion that tax 
evasion is dependent on the rates of taxation and rises with increase in the 
tax rates. Most of the economists have also subscribed to this view. Even 
those who did not concede that high rates led to evasion admitted .... that 
high rates did make tax evasion much more attractive and profitable".^ 
Gupta and Gupta also come to a similar conclusion. They state that, 
"rising average tax rates are associated with an increasing relative size of 
the underground economy. For instance, when average tax rates, ... 
increase by 1 per cent, the size of the unofficial economy relative to 
official economy increased by 3.16 per cent".'' 
(4) It is important to note that the growth of revenue from any tax may be 
viewed in two ways. One is the increase in tax receipts as a result of every 
increase in national income without any change either in the tax rates or in 
its coverage. It is known as the built-in-flexibility of the tax or simply the 
income elasticity of the tax. In the second case changes in rates and the 
coverage of the tax are also taken into account. In this case the growth in 
tax revenue is the result of a process of both widening and deepening of 
the tax. The two together accounts for the total increase in the tax yield 
and is known as the buoyancy of the tax. 
The overall elasficity of the Indian tax system was 0.833 recorded by 
Sahota^ for the period 1950-51 to 1957-58. It was 0.827 according to the 
estimates of V.G. Rao^ during 1960-61 to 1973-74. These figures suggest that 
the income elasticity of Indian taxation has remained almost constant from 
213 
1950-51 to 1973-74. There are some indications to suggest that there has been a 
further decline in the responsiveness of our tax system. One such indicator is 
the estimates of buoyancy and elasticity of major indirect taxes recorded by 
M.M. Sury.' According to Sury, the buoyancy coefficient of Union excise 
revenue was 3.02 during 1950-51 to 1964-65. It declined to 1.31 during 1963-
64 to 1974-75. The elasticity coefficient reflects a lack of inherent response of 
excise revenue to changes in national income. If this is the case with the fastest 
growing Central tax, it can very well be imagined what must have happened 
with other taxes, particularly, the direct taxes whose elasticity has always been 
the lowest. 
The revenue yielding capacity of a tax structure is measured in terms 
of tax buoyancy and built in revenue flexibility. Tax buoyancy measures the 
total increase in tax revenue with respect to national income as a result of 
discretionary measures like increase in tax rates, introducing new taxes or 
increasing coverage of a particular tax etc. Tax buoyancy is also indicated by 
tax income ratio the part of national income which is taken by taxes. 
Tax buoyancy, which is measured by tax-income ratio, depends upon 
so many factors but the per capita income of the country is its main 
determinants. Tax-income ratio in India is much lower than in the economically 
advanced countries like USA, UK and Denmark etc. where it ranges from 
about 25 per cent to 45 per cent considering the fact that per capita income in 
India is much lower in comparison to those countries but such a high tax-
income ratio may not be expected in India. In view of the increasing financial 
requirements for the planned economic development in the country tax-income 
ratio should atleast range between 20-25 per cent of national income. 
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Tax reforms have generally led to a rise in tax revenue to GDP ratio 
across countries (Shome, 1992; Shame, 1995).^ In the Indian context, the 
expected increase in tax buoyancy a La 'Laffer curve effect' did not occur. 
Since the onset of tax reforms, the tax-GDP ratio of the Central Government 
has suffered a persistent decline. This has been a major drag on the reform 
process. The tax-GDP ratio declined during 1980s and first half of the 1990s 
and even the second half of the 1990s. The pattern is however, not the same 
across different types of taxes. 
Table 4.9 
Buoyancies of Central Taxes 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Tax 
Total tax to GDP 
Direct tax to GDP 
Corporate tax to GDP 
Personal tax to GDP 
Indirect tax to GDP 
Excise Tax to manufacturing 
Excise tax to GDP 
Customs tax to imports 
Customs tax to GDP 
1981 to 1993 
1.07 
1.07 
1.02 
0.92 
1.07 
0.96 
0.97 
1.20 
1.24 
1981 to 2001 
0.96 
1.19 
1.13 
1.23 
0.88 
0.83 
0.84 
0.77 
0.93 
Note : Separate estimates for 1994-2001 were not attempted to ensure that adequate 
degree of freedom are available. 
Source : Report on currency and Finance 2001-02, RBI. 
Note : (i) All important tax reform measures were initiated since 1992-93, 
therefore, separate estimates have been made for period from 1980-
81 to 2000-01. 
(ii) Tax buoyancy is defined as percentage change in tax collection as a 
ratio to percentage change in tax base i.e. (DX/X)/(DY/Y) where X 
is the tax collection and Y is the tax base. 
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The decline in the tax to GDP ratio is explained by a combination of 
factors that led to a sharp fall in total tax buoyancy from 1.07 for the period 
1981-93 to 0.96 for 1981-2001, implying buoyancy could be less than unity 
during the post-tax reform period 1994-2001. While the buoyancy of direct 
taxes is estimated to be higher at 1.19 for the period 1981-2001 as compared 
with 1.07 for the pre-tax reforms period (1981-1993) the buoyancy of indirect 
taxes dipped considerably to 0.88 from 1.07 in the corresponding period (Table 
4.9). 
4.4 TRENDS OF DIRECT TAXES 
The Government setup a Tax Reforms Committee under the 
Chairmanship of Dr. Raja J. Chelliah in August 1991 to recommend a 
comprehensive reform of both the direct and indirect tax system. The 
committee submitted its Interim Report in February 1992 in which it stressed 
the importance of lower rates of taxation, a narrower spread between the entry 
rate and the maximum marginal rate, and the fewest special exemptions and 
deductions. The basic philosophy underlying these recommendations, with 
which the Government is in consonance, is to cut through the welter of detailed 
changes which have been made over the past 40 years to serve narrow 
objectives and restore the tax system to its primary function of generating 
revenues in an efficient and equitable manner. 
On the basis of international experience, the Chelliah Committee 
recommended that moderate taxes combined with fewer deductions and 
exemptions and effective enforcement would encourage voluntary tax 
compliance and increase revenue. Accordingly, personal income tax was 
restructured, with lower taxes, fewer slabs and a higher exemption limit. From 
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the given (Table 4.10 and Figure 4.7) it is clear that in 1985-86, and 1986-87 
trend growth rate of direct taxes are negative. After that trend line shows the 
positive growth. 
Table 4.10 
Trends in Direct Tax of the Central Government 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Actual values 
5563 
6236 
6742 
8783 
9924 
11030 
15207 
18132 
20298 
26966 
33563 
38891 
48274 
46595 
57958 
68306 
69197 
83080 
Trend values 
-6364.36 
-1858.11 
2646.14 
7151.39 
11656.64 
16161.89 
20667.15 
25172.40 
29677.65 
34182.90 
38688.16 
43193.40 
47698.66 
52203.91 
56709.16 
61214.41 
65719.67 
70224.92 
Deviation from 
trend value 
11927.36 
8095.11 
4095.86 
1631.61 
-1732.64 
-5131.89 
-5460.15 
-7040.4 
-9379.65 
-7216.9 
-5125.16 
-4302.4 
575.34 
-5608.91 
1248.84 
7091.59 
3477.33 
12855.08 
Source : Calculated 
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The long value of direct tax in Rs. crore is regressed over time. The regression 
result of the above growth model is : 
LnDT = 8.415513 + 0.169247 X, 
Se = (0.096513) (0.004385) 
CAGR = 18.44% 
The actual value of direct taxes in Rs. crores has increased at 18.44 percent 
over the whole period compounded annually. 
Where LnDT = Log value of direct taxes in Rs. crores 
Xt = Time period 
Direct taxes as percentage of GDP was 2 percent in 1985-86 and 1986-
87, further it declined in 1987-88. From 1991-92 to 1996-97 it was 3 percent of 
GDP. Afterwards of 1997-98 to 2002-03 it is above 3 percent of GDP (Table 
4.11, Figure 4.8). 
This change is due to changes in tax policies of the Government. The 
1993-94 budget continued the process of reducing the high level of protection 
to domestic industry and stimulating competition. 
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Table 4.11 
Trends of Direct Taxes 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage of 
GDP 
2.00 
2.00 
1.90 
2.08 
2.04 
1.94 
2.33 
2.42 
2.36 
2.66 
2.83 
2.84 
3.17 
2.68 
2.99 
3.25 
3.05 
3.37 
as Percentage of GDP 
Trend values 
1.80 
1.89 
1.98 
2.07 
2.16 
2.24 
2.33 
2.42 
2.51 
2.59 
2.68 
2.77 
2.86 
2.95 
3.03 
3.12 
3.21 
3.30 
Deviation from 
trend value 
0.20 
0.11 
-0.08 
0.01 
-0.12 
-0.30 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.15 
0.07 
0.17 
0.07 
0.31 
-0.27 
-0.04 
0.13 
-0.16 
0.07 
Source : Calculated 
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The process of moderation of personal income tax was continued in 
the budget of 1994-95. The personal tax exemption limit was raised from Rs. 
30,000 to Rs. 35,000. Besides, the surcharge of 12 per cent on non-corporate 
incomes was withdrawn. Personal tax rates were not changed, but there was a 
widening of tax slabs, as indicated in Table 4.12. 
Table 4.12 
Tax Slabs of Central Government 
Tax rate 
Nil 
20 
30 
40 
Income range in Rupees 
Old Slab 
0 - 30,000 
30,001-50,000 
50,001-100,000 
Above 100,00 
New Slab 
0-35,000 
35,001-60,000 
60,001-120,000 
Above 120,000 
Source : Economic Survey, Government of India 1994-95. 
The personal income tax rates were not ahered in the budget for 1995-
96 so that the full effect of earlier rate reductions into higher revenue 
realizations. The exemption limit was, however, raised from Rs. 35,000 to Rs. 
40,000. 
Over the last six years Government of India has simplified and 
rationalized the complex and opaque tax structure in a calibrated way with the 
objective of moderating rates, reducing number of exemptions, simplifying 
procedural rules and regulations, achieving better compliance and widening the 
tax base. The budget for 1997-98 continued the emphasis on simplification, 
lower rates and greater buoyancy.^ 
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Government has carried out a number of amendments in the Income 
Tax Act, 1961 through the Finance Bill, 1997-98 and an ordinance dated 
September 16, 1997, with a view to promoting welfare, providing incentives 
for infrastructure development, industrialization, rationalization of taxes and 
duties, checking tax evasions and avoidance and expanding the tax base 
through obligatory filing of return based on certain economic criteria. The tax 
rate structure has been made comparable to those prevailing in other Asian 
countries, especially ASEAN countries. The tax measures have resulted in 
substantial growth in the tax revenue and induced structural shift in the 
composition of tax revenue. They have enhanced buoyancy and elasticity of 
taxes.'° 
The share of direct taxes in the gross tax revenue has increased from 
26 per cent in 1985-86 to 30 per cent in 1991-92 and further to 41 per cent 
in 1995-96. It reached to more than 52 per cent in 2002-03 (Table 4.13, 
Figure 4.9). 
The budget for 1998-99 carried the process of tax reforms ftirther by 
widening the tax base in the case of personal income tax and by introducing 
major procedural simplifications. Using two additional presumptive indicators 
and extending its coverage from 12 cities to 35 cities expanded the base of 
personal income tax further. This has been accompanied by making it 
obligatory for assesses to quote their permanent Account Number (PAN) or 
General Index Register (GIR) number in respect of certain high value 
transactions. With a view to simplify the tax return, a one-page tax return 
called "Saral" was introduced for all non-corporate tax payers. 
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Table 4.13 
Direct Taxes as Percentage of Total Tax Revenue 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
26.32 
25.64 
24.07 
26.02 
25.84 
25.66 
30.37 
33.55 
37.26 
39.98 
40.96 
41.51 
50.46 
44.52 
45.18 
49.98 
51.82 
52.40 
Source : Calculated. 
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To strengthen the direct tax structure, Government continued the 
policy of reform of direct taxes. The Venture Capital Funds (VCFs) providing 
finance to venture capital undertakings (VCUs) have been accorded complete 
pass through status. Provisions relating to amalgamations, demergers and 
slump sales have been further rationalized to provide tax neutrality of corporate 
restructuring. All taxes concessions relating to earning in foreign exchange are 
being phased out in a five year period, "one by six" scheme criterion 
identifying potential tax-payers has been extended to 79 more cities. In the 
budget 2001-2002, one-by-six scheme for identifying the potential tax payers 
was extended to all urban areas in the country as defined by the 1991 census. 
The data of direct taxes in log value of the study period were regressed 
on income tax and corporation tax. 
DT = f(CorT,IT) 
LnDT = p I + p zLnCT + p 3LnIT 
LnDT = 0.710 +0.614 LnCT +0.388 LnIT 
R^  = 0.996 'B? = 0.996, F = 1947.528 
SE (0.165) SE (0.226) SE (0.236) 
Stepwise method 
LnDT = p 1 + p 2LnCT 
LnDT = 0.829 + 0.985 LnCT 
SE (0.156) (0.017) 
t-value 5.323 59.302 
R" = 0.995, R^ = 0.999 
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The corporation tax has more influence on direct taxes than income 
tax. One percent increase in income tax as percent of GDP shows 38 percent 
increase in direct taxes, but in case of corporation tax it is 61 percent increase 
in direct taxes. 
The highest growth in direct taxes was found in the year 1991-92 
which was 38 percent. In 1998-99, there was a negative growth in direct taxes 
in 1998-99 (Table 4.14, Figure 4.10). 
Table 4.14 
Percentage change in the Direct Taxes of the Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage change 
17.13 
12.1 
8.1 
30.3 
13.0 
11.1 
37.9 
19.2 
11.9 
32.9 
24.5 
15.9 
24.1 
-3.5 
24.4 
17.9 
1.3 
20.1 
Source : Calculated 
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4.4.1 Trends and Adjustments in Personal Income Tax 
In India, taxes levied on income and wealth by the Central 
Government alone is important. Though the state governments have the power 
to levy a tax on agricultural incomes yet in practice this tax has not developed 
as a major source of revenue of the states. The Central Government levies a 
number of taxes on income and wealth of which (from the point of view of the 
revenue proceeds) only personal income tax and corporation tax are important. 
Personal income tax is levied on the incomes of individuals, Hindu 
families, unregistered firms and other associations of people. For taxation 
purpose income from all sources is added. However, apart from the deduction 
of necessary professional expenditures, rebate on account of life insurance 
premium, provident fund, etc. is allowed. 
Like all other countries India has a progressive income tax. Before 
1974-75, the marginal rate for income tax in this country was 97.75 per cent, 
which was the highest in the world. One negative ramification of such a high 
marginal tax rate was that income tax became replete with exemptions, 
allowances, deductions and incentives. On the basis of international experience, 
ihe Chclliah Committee recommended that moderate taxes combined with 
fewer deductions and exemptions and effective enforcement would encourage 
voluntary tax compliances and increase revenue. Accordingly, personal income 
tax was restructured, with lower taxes, fewer slabs and a higher exemption 
limit. 
In the Table 4.15 and Figure 4.11 trend of personal income tax has 
been shown. For the period 1985-86 to 1988-89 deviafion from the trend values 
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is greater. For the period 1989-90 to 1998-99, the actual values are lower than 
the trend values. From 1999 onwards, actual values started to rising above the 
trend values. 
If we compare the personal income tax (gross) with Centre's gross tax 
revenues, it has a rising trend. It was 9 per cent of gross tax revenue during 
1985-86 reached to 17 percent, in 2002-03 (Table 4.16 Figure 4.12). 
Income tax (net) as percentage of tax revenue (net to state shares) was 
3 percent in 1985-86, which reached to 18 percent in 2002-03. This is due to 
Government commitment of tax-reform to raise the revenue (Table 4.17 and 
Figure 4.13). 
When log of actual value of PIT (Gross) is regressed on time we have 
the following regression result of the growth model 
LnPITG = 7.667709 + 0.164549 Xt 
Se = (0.085051) (0.003864) 
CAGR - 17.88% 
Where, LnPITG = Log value of personal income 
Xt = Time period 
Personal income tax (gross) in Rs. crores increased at the compound rate 
of growth of 17.88 per cent over the whole period of time. 
230 
Table 4.15 
Trends in Personal Income Tax (Gross Collection) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Source : Actual valu 
Actual Value 
2511 
2879 
3192 
4241 
5004 
5371 
6731 
7888 
9123 
12025 
15592 
18231 
17097 
20240 
25654 
31764 
32004 
36858 
e from Indian Public 
Trend Value 
-2689.25 
-697.02 
1295.21 
3287.45 
5279.68 
7271.91 
9264.14 
11256.37 
13248.61 
15240.84 
17233.07 
19225.30 
21217.53 
23209.77 
25201.99 
27194.23 
29186.46 
31178.69 
"inance Statistics, Vai 
Deviation from 
trend value 
5200.25 
3576.02 
1896.79 
953.55 
-275.69 
-1900.91 
-2533.14 
-3368.37 
-4125.61 
-3215.54 
-1641.07 
-994.3 
-4120.53 
-2969.97 
452.01 
4569.77 
2817.54 
5679.31 
•ious issues, Ministry 
of Finance. 
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Personal income tax (Gross) as per cent of Centre's Gross tax revenue is 
regressed on time to know the GAGR. The regression result -
LnPITG = 2.061158 + 0.043895 Xt 
Se = (0.061203) (0.002781) 
CAGR = 4.48% 
Table 4.16 
Personal Income Tax (Gross) as Percentage of Centre's Gross Tax 
Revenues 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
8.8 
8.8 
8.5 
9.5 
9.7 
9.4 
10.1 
10.6 
11.9 
13.0 
14.0 
14.2 
12.6 
14.0 
14.9 
17.0 
16.9 
16.7 
Source : Calculated. 
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Table 4.17 
Income Tax (Net) as Percent of Tax Revenue (Net to State Shares) of 
Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Income tax (net to 
centre) 
(Rs. crore) 
665 
719 
603 
1492 
1088 
1250 
1627 
1831 
1355 
3468 
4318 
4715 
3589 
5755 
9124 
23036 
22588 
28193 
Total Revenue (net to 
state shares) 
(Rs. crore) 
21140 
24319 
28015 
33751 
38399 
42978 
50069 
54044 
54473 
67454 
81939 
93701 
95672 
104652 
128271 
136658 
133532 
158544 
Percentage 
3.1 
3.0 
2.2 
4.4 
2.8 
2.9 
3.2 
3.4 
2.5 
5.1 
5.3 
5.0 
3.8 
5.7 
7.1 
16.9 
16.9 
17.8 
Source : (Actual values) Indian Public Finance Statistics, Various issues, Ministry of 
Finance. 
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If we compare income tax (gross collection) and income tax (net to 
state shares) as percent of direct taxes, there is not much change in former than 
the later. Growth in income tax (net) is faster than income tax (gross). 
Table 4.18 
Performance of Personal Income Tax since 1985-86 
(as percent of GDP) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Income Tax 
0.90 
0.93 
0.90 
1.01 
1.03 
0.94 
1.03 
1.05 
1.06 
1.19 
1.31 
1.33 
1.12 
1.16 
1.32 
1.51 
1.40 
1.49 
Source : Calculated. 
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Personal income tax shows the upward trend as percentage of GDP 
(Table 4.18 and Figure 4.14). 
Table 4.19 
Percentage Change in Personal Income Tax 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Income Tax (Rs. 
crores) 
2511 
2879 
3192 
4241 
5004 
5371 
6731 
7888 
9123 
12025 
15592 
18231 
17097 
20240 
25654 
31764 
32004 
36858 
Percentage change 
30.2 
14.7 
10.9 
32.9 
18.0 
7.3 
25.3 
17.2 
15.7 
31.8 
29.7 
16.9 
-6.2 
18.4 
26.7 
23.8 
0.8 
15.2 
Source : Economic Survey (various issues) 
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If we analyse the growth rate of personal income tax, much fluctuation 
are there in cyclic order. The periods 1985-86, 1988-89, 1991-92, 1994-95, 
1995-96, 1999-2000, 2001-02, 2002-03 shows greater change in income tax 
revenues, which are above the trend values. The period 1997-98 shows the 
negative change in income tax revenue (Table 4.19 and Figure 4.15). 
Personal income tax (gross) as per cent of direct taxes has increase 
from 45.1 per cent in 1985-86 to 5.4 per cent in 1989-90. Further it declined to 
35.4 per cent in 1997-98 which reached to 44.4 per cent in 2002-3 (Table 4.20). 
Table 4.20 
Personal Income Tax as Percent of Direct Taxes of the Central 
Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Gross collection 
income tax, percentage 
45.1 
46.2 
47.3 
48.3 
50.4 
48.7 
44.3 
43.5 
44.9 
44.6 
46.5 
46.9 
35.4 
43.4 
44.3 
46.5 
46.3 
44.4 
Net of state shares 
income tax, percentage 
12.0 
11.5 
8.9 
17.0 
11.0 
11.3 
10.7 
10.1 
6.7 
12.9 
12.9 
12.1 
7.4 
12.4 
15.7 
33.7 
32.6 
33.9 
Source : Calculated 
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4.2,2 Trends and Adjustment in Corporation Tax 
The 1997-98 budget reduced personal and corporation tax rates to 
internationally comparable levels. The budget reduced corporate tax rates for 
domestic companies to 35 per cent (from 40 per cent) and on foreign firms to 
48 per cent (from 55 per cent) along with the abolition of surcharge on 
corporation tax. Trends in corporation tax shows that from 1989-90 to 1998-99 
the actual value of corporation tax is below the trend value (Table 4.22 and 
Figure 4.16). 
Using semi-log linear model, corporation tax have been regressed on 
time to know the instantaneous as well as Compound Annual Growth Rate 
(CAGR) over the period of study. 
LnCP = 7.70371 + 0.171655 X, 
SE = (0.0805) (0.003657) 
CAGR = 18.72% 
Where, LnCP = Log value of corporation tax 
The corporation tax has grown annually at the rate of 17.16 per cent 
per annum. CAGR i.e. the rate of growth over the whole period is 18.72 per 
cent. 
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Table 4.21 
Trends in Corporation Tax of the Central Government 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Actual value 
2865 
3160 
3433 
4407 
4729 
5335 
7853 
8899 
10060 
13822 
16487 
18567 
20016 
24529 
30692 
35696 
36609 
46172 
Trend value 
-3945.68 
-1564.29 
817.10 
3198.50 
5579.89 
7961.29 
10342.68 
12724.07 
15105.47 
17486.86 
19868.26 
22249.65 
24631.05 
27012.44 
29393.83 
31775.23 
34156.62 
36538.01 
Deviation from 
trend value 
6810.68 
4724.29 
2615.90 
1208.50 
-850.89 
-2626.29 
-2489.68 
-3825.07 
-5045.47 
-3664.86 
-3381.26 
-3682.65 
-4615.05 
-2483.44 
1298.17 
3920.77 
2452.38 
9633.99 
Source : Indian Public Finance Statistics, Various issues, Ministry of Finance. 
Corporation tax as percent of Centre's gross tax revenue has increased 
continuously. It was 10 per cent in 1985-86. Further it declined and was 9.28 
per cent in 1990-91. After 1991-92, the corporation tax as per cent of gross tax 
revenue has continuously increased and was 21.35 per cent in 2002-2003 
(Table 4.23 and Figure 4.17). 
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When log value of corporation tax as percent of gross tax revenue is 
regressed on time, the equation is 
LnCorp.Tax = 2.0922 + 0.05154 Xt 
CAGR = 5.28% 
The Corporation tax as percent of gross tax revenue has increased on 
an average 5.28 per cent annually over the whole period. 
When actual value of corporation tax in Rs. crores is regressed on 
time, the regression equation is 
Ln Corp.Tax (Actual) = 7.703786 + 0.171 
SC = (0.0805) (0.003657) 
CAGR = 18.72% 
Table 4.22 
Corporation Tax as Percentage of Centre's Gross Tax Revenue 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
10.01 
9.64 
9.13 
9.92 
9.17 
9.28 
11.67 
11.93 
13.29 
14.98 
14.83 
14.42 
14.38 
17.06 
17.87 
18.93 
19.57 
21.35 
Source : Government of India, Ministry of Finance 
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If we analyse the Table 4.23 and Figure 4.18 we find that the highest 
change in corporation tax was seen in the year 1991-92 which was 47.20 over 
the previous period. The lowest change in this area was seen in the year 2001 -
02 which was 2.56 per cent. 
Table 4.23 
Percentage Change in Corporation Tax 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage change 
-
10.30 
8.64 
28.37 
7.31 
12.81 
47.20 
13.32 
13.09 
37.40 
19.28 
12.62 
7.80 
22.55 
25.13 
16.30 
2.56 
26.12 
Source : Calculated. 
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To know the growth of Corporation tax as percent of GDP, the 
corporation tax as GDP is regressed on time. The regression equation is 
Ln Corp.tax GDP - -0.12024 + 0.036848 Xt 
Se = (0.073664) (0.003347) 
Where, Ln Corp.tax GDP ^ Log value of corporation tax as percent of 
GDP 
Xt = Time period 
Compound (over the period of time) rate of growth is 3.75 per cent. This means 
that over the whole period, corporation tax as GDP grow at 3.75 per cent per 
unit change of time. 
Table 4.24 
Performance of Corporation Tax Since 1985-86 
(as percent of GDP) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Corporation tax 
1.03 
1.02 
0.97 
1.05 
0.97 
0.94 
1.20 
1.19 
1.17 
1.36 
1.39 
1.36 
1.31 
1.41 
1.58 
1.70 
1.61 
1.87 
Source : Calculated. 
249 
c 
u 
Q 
O 
o 
« 
c 
0. 
X 
H 
c 
I . 
o 
c 
o 
eo-2003 
30-1003 
10-0003 
0003-6661 
66-8661 
86-^661 
/.6-9661 
96-S661 
?6-t-66I 
t'6-e661 
£6-3661 
36-1661 
16-0661 
06-6861 
68-8861 
88-Z.861 
i8-9861 
98-S861 
—I 1 1 1 1 1 — 
C4 — 00 ^ -rf r 4 O 
—' d o d o 
u 
s 
St 
3§BJU33.13J 
250 
Further Corporation tax as per cent of Direct Taxes of the Central 
Government is regressed on time Xf 
The regression result of the growth model are as follow : 
LnCT = 3.8934 + 0.00241 X, 
Se = (0.063039) (0.002864) 
Compound rate of growth = 0.24% 
Where LnCT = Log value of corporation tax as per cent of direct tax 
X( = Time period 
Corporation tax as percent of direct taxes of the Central Government 
has increased at the compound growth rate of 0.24 per cent. 
From Table 4.25 and Figure 4.20 Corporation tax as per cent of direct 
taxes of the Central Government has increased. In 1985-86 it was 51.56 per 
cent, declined to 48.37 per cent in 1990-91. In 1996-97 it reached to 47.74 per 
cent. In 2002-03 it was 55.58 per cent of direct taxes. 
Table 4.25 
Corporation tax as percent of Direct Taxes of the Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
51.56 
50.67 
50.92 
50.18 
47.65 
48.37 
51.64 
49.08 
49.56 
51.26 
49.12 
47.74 
41.46 
52.64 
52.96 
52.26 
52.91 
55.58 
Source : Calculated. 
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4.5 TRENDS OF INDIRECT TAXES 
Unlike direct taxes, rate cuts have been important factors in reducing 
the indirect tax collection, as there was no commensurate gain in terms of base 
expansion or better compliance (Tables 4.26 & 4.27). It was expected that the 
sharp cut in custom duties from peak rate of more than 300 per cent in the 
period just prior to reforms to about 30 per cent in 2002-03 would lead to a net 
fall in custom duty collections (Table 4.32 and Figure 4.27). Fall in excise duty 
collections (Table 4.38 and Figure 4.32), however, came as a surprise as the 
rate cut's were expected to boost growth in industrial output. The less than 
expected buoyancy in the excise tax (Table 4.9) seems to follow from slower 
than expected growth in industrial output during the major part of the reform 
period. The rising share of services in overall GDP (Table 4.41) which largely 
falls outside the tax net and progressive extension of MODVAT could have 
affected buoyancy estimates." Ideally, credit extended to inputs under VAT 
system needs to be neutralized through increase in tax rates on end-products. 
Instead tax rates have been scaled back leading to a fall in excise tax 
collection.'^ 
To know the growth in actual value of indirect taxes in Rs. crores, a 
growth model is fitted with the regression of actual of indirect taxes over time. 
The regression result of the growth model is 
LnIT = 10.0729 + 0.10088 
Se = (0.07681) (0.00349) 
CAGR = 10.61% 
Compound annual growth of indirect taxes in Rs. crores is 10.61 per cent over 
the whole period of time. 
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Indirect taxes has a rising trend over the period. But if deviation from 
trend value is seen this actual value of indirect taxes is positive upto 1989-90. 
This has a negative value in actual term since 1990-91 to 1995-96. The actual 
value is less than the trend value. It has a negative value in 1997-98, 1998-99 
and 20001 -02 (Table 4.26 and Figure 4.21). 
Table 4.26 
Trends of Indirect Taxes of the Central Government 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Actual value 
23107 
26602 
30924 
35691 
41712 
46546 
52059 
56434 
55392 
65328 
77661 
88918 
89741 
97202 
112450 
118681 
116125 
131284 
Trend value 
15704.94 
22130.87 
28556.81 
34982.75 
41408.68 
47834.62 
54260.55 
60686.49 
67112.42 
73538.36 
79964.29 
86390.23 
92816.16 
99242.09 
105668.03 
112093.97 
118519.90 
124945.84 
Deviation from 
trend value 
7402.06 
4471.13 
2367.19 
708.25 
303.32 
-1288.62 
-2201.55 
-4252.49 
-11720.42 
-8210.36 
-2303.29 
2527.77 
-3075.16 
-2040.09 
6781.97 
6587.03 
-2394.9 
6338.16 
Source: Actual value from Indian 
Ministry of Finance. 
Public Finance Statistics, Various issues, 
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Another important reason for reduced revenue collection from both 
custom and excise duties are that the reduction in rates was not accompanied 
by removal of concessions and exemptions'-" (Table 4.28, Figure 4.24). 
Log value of indirect taxes of the Union Government as percent of 
GDP is regressed on time. The regression results of the growth model is 
LnfTG^P = 2.24744 - 0.03377 Xt 
Se = (0.05167) (0.002361) 
CAGR = -3.32% 
where, LnlTGDP = Log value of indirect taxes as percent of GDP 
Xt = time period 
Indirect taxes as percent of GDP has declined at the rate 3.32 per cent per 
annum over the period of time (Table 4.27 and Figure 4.22). 
Table 4.27 
Indirect Taxes of the Union Government as Per cent of GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Per cent of GDP 
8.31 
8.55 
8.73 
8.47 
8.58 
8.19 
7.97 
7.54 
6.45 
6.45 
6.54 
6.50 
5.89 
5.58 
5.81 
5.64 
5.11 
5.33 
Source : Government of India, Ministry of Finance. 
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A comparison of alternative buoyancy estimates with respect to GDP 
and actual base indicates that though there was a marked decline in buoyancy 
in case of both customs and excise during the reform period, the fall was partly 
made up by the pick up in imports in case of customs and some base expansion 
or better compliance in respect of excise. In the case of custom duties, the 
decline in buoyancy in terms of imports was much more than in terms of GDP. 
On the other hand, in case of excise there was hardly any divergence between 
its buoyancy in terms of manufacturing output (which is the base for excise 
tax) and that in terms of GDP (Table 4.9). 
Reforms also entailed reduction in the rate categories and exemption 
regimes. In the case of Union excise duties, the principle of taxing the value 
added was adopted, first in the form of modified VAT (MODVAT) and later as 
central VAT (CENVAT). The impact of these reforms on direct and indirect 
taxes was diametrically opposite (Table 4.30 and Figure 4.25). While the direct 
taxes showed, even with the lower rates, a rising tax-GDP ratio (Table 4.11 and 
Figure 4.8), this ratio of the indirect taxes kept sliding down (Table 4.27 and 
Figure 4.22). The indirect taxes had a larger share in the total tax revenues of 
the centre (Table 4.28) and the fall in the indirect tax to GDP ratio could not be 
compensated by a rise in the direct taxes (Table 4.13). As a result, the overall 
central tax-GDP ratio fell (Table 4.6). 
The regression result of growth model of indirect taxes as percent of 
gross tax revenue is as follows 
LnlTGTR = 4.461333 - 0.01923 Xi 
Se = (0.025331) (0.001151) 
R- = 0.9458 
Compound rate of growth = -1.904% 
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where, LnlTGTR = Log value of indirect taxes as percent of gross tax 
revenue 
X, time period 
Indirect taxes as percent of gross tax revenue has declined at 1.904 per cent per 
over a period of time (Table 4.28 and Figure 4.23). 
Table 4.28 
Indirect Taxes as Percentage of Gross Tax Revenue 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
80.71 
81.12 
82.22 
80.35 
80.87 
80.93 
77.39 
75.68 
73.18 
70.78 
69.82 
69.06 
64.46 
67.60 
65.47 
62.93 
62.08 
60.70 
Source : Calculated. 
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Table 4.29 and Figure 4.24 shows the annual growth rate of indirect 
taxes of the Central Government. It has a declining trend over the period. The 
year 1993-94 and 2001-02 shows negative growth in indirect taxes. The highest 
growth was witnessed in 1995-96 which was 18.88 per cent over the previous 
period. 
Table 4.29 
Percentage Change in the Indirect Taxes of the Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage change 
-
15.13 
16.25 
15.42 
16.87 
11.59 
11.84 
8.40 
-1.85 
17.94 
18.88 
14.50 
0.93 
8.31 
15.69 
5.54 
-2.15 
13.05 
Source : Calculated. 
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Table 4.30 
Direct Taxes as Percentage of Indirect Taxes 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
24.07 
23.44 
21.80 
24.61 
23.79 
23.70 
29.21 
32.13 
36.64 
41.28 
43.22 
43.74 
53.79 
47.94 
51.54 
57.55 
59.59 
63.28 
Source : Calculated. 
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4.5.1 Trends and Adjustment in Custom Duties 
The regression result of the growth model of custom duties as per cent 
of Centre's gross tax revenue is as follows 
LnCDGTR= 3.667571- 0.02689 X, 
Se = (0.086695) (0.003939) 
R^ = 0.74 
CAGR = -2.65% 
where, LnCDGTR = Log value of custom duties as percent of Centre's gross 
tax revenue 
Xi = time period 
Custom Duties of Gross Tax Revenue (CDGTR) has decline over the period of 
time as the rate of 2.65 per cent annually (Table 4.32 and Figure 4.26). 
Table 4.31 
Trends in Custom Duties of the Central Government 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Actual value 
9526 
11475 
13702 
15805 
18036 
20644 
22257 
23776 
22193 
26789 
35757 
42851 
40193 
40668 
48420 
47542 
40268 
44852 
Trend value 
8844.56 
1123.79 
13623.02 
16012.25 
18401.47 
20790.70 
23179.93 
25569.16 
2795839 
30347.61 
32736.84 
35126.07 
37515.29 
39904.53 
42293.75 
44682.98 
47072.21 
49461.44 
Deviation from 
trend value 
681.44 
10351.21 
78.97 
-207.25 
-365.47 
-146.70 
-5765.39 
-1793.16 
-5765.39 
-3558.61 
3220.16 
7724.93 
2677.71 
763.47 
6126.25 
2859.02 
-6804.21 
-4609.44 
Source: Actual value from Indian 
Ministry of Finance. 
Public Finance Statistics, Various issues, 
265 
Table 4.32 
Custom Duties as Percentage of Centre's Gross Tax Revenue 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
33.27 
34.99 
36.43 
35.58 
34.97 
35.89 
33.09 
31.89 
29.32 
29.03 
32.15 
33.28 
28.87 
28.28 
28.19 
25.21 
21.53 
20.74 
Source : Calculated. 
The regression result of growth model of custom duties as percent of 
GDP is as follows : 
LnCDGDR = 1.453504 - 0.04142 Xt 
Se = (0.104981) (0.004769) 
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R2 = 0.82 
CGR = -4.05% 
where, LnlTGDP = Log value of custom duties as percent of GDP. 
Xt = time period since 1985-86 to 2002-03. 
Custom duties as percent of GDR have declined over the period of study of the 
rate of 4.05 per cent (Table 4.33 and Figure 4.27). 
Table 4.33 
Performance of Custom Duties Since 1985 
(as percent of GDP) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Custom duties 
3.43 
3.69 
3.87 
3.75 
3.71 
3.63 
3.41 
3.18 
2.58 
2.65 
3.01 
3.13 
2.64 
2.34 
2.50 
2.26 
1.77 
1.82 
Source : Government of India, Ministry of Finance 
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Log value of custom duties as percent of indirect taxes is regressed 
over time to calculate the growth. The regression result of growth model is as 
follows -
= 3.81147 - 0.00767 Xt 
= (0.078601) (0.003571) 
= 0.22 
= -0.76% 
= Log value of custom duties as percent of indirect 
taxes 
Xt = time period since 1985-86 to 2002-03. 
Custom duties as percent of indirect taxes has declined over the period of time 
compounded annually at 0.76 per cent (Table 4.34 and Figure 4.28). 
Table 4.34 
Custom Duties as Percentage of Indirect Taxes of the Central Government 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
41.23 
43.14 
44.31 
44.28 
43.24 
44.35 
42.75 
42.13 
40.07 
41.01 
46.04 
48.19 
44.79 
41.84 
43.06 
40.06 
34.68 
34.16 
Source : Calculated. 
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From Table 4.35 and Figure 4.29, it is clear that annual growth in 
custom duties have declining trend since 1985-86. It was highest in 1986-87 
according to the table mentioned but declined continuously and reached to 
negative in 1993-94. It was highest in 1995-96. 
Table 4.35 
Percentage Change in Custom Duties 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage change 
-
20.46 
19.41 
15.35 
14.12 
14.46 
7.81 
6.83 
-6.66 
20.71 
33.48 
19.84 
-6.20 
1.18 
19.06 
-1.81 
-15.30 
11.38 
Source : Calculated. 
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4.5.2 Trends and Adjustment in Union Excise Duties 
Union excise duties in actual term have a rising trend. But its value is 
below trend line from 1990-91 to 1998-99. This is clear from Table 4.36 and 
Figure 4.30. 
Table 4.36 
Trends in Union Excise Duties 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Actual value 
12956 
14470 
16426 
18841 
22406 
24514 
28110 
30832 
31697 
37347 
40187 
45008 
47962 
53246 
61902 
68525 
72556 
82310 
Trend value 
6412.66 
10294.14 
14175.63 
18057.09 
21938.57 
25820.05 
29701.53 
33583.00 
37464.48 
41345.96 
45227.44 
49108.92 
52990.39 
56871.87 
60753.35 
64634.83 
68516.31 
72397.78 
Deviation from 
trend value 
6543.34 
4175.86 
2250.38 
783.91 
467.43 
-1306.05 
-1591.53 
-2751.00 
-4767.48 
-3998.96 
-5040.44 
-4100.92 
-5028.37 
-3625.87 
1148.65 
3890.17 
4038.69 
9912.22 
Source: Actual value from Indian 
Ministry of Finance. 
Public Finance Statistics, Various issues, 
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The log value of union excise duties as percent of Centre's gross tax 
revenue is regressed to know the rate of growth in this value. The regression 
result of the model is -
L n { ^ G T R = 3.814124 - 0.0.1374 Xt 
Se = (0.050231) (0.002282) 
R2 = 0.69 
CGR = -1.36% 
where, LnUEDGTR = Log value of union excise duties as percent of 
Centre's gross tax revenue. 
Xt = time period 
The said value has declined over the period at the rate of 1.36 per cent 
compound over the period of time (Table 4.37 and Figure 4.31). 
Table 4.37 
Union Excise Duties as Percentage of Centre's Gross Tax Revenue 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
45.25 
44.12 
43.67 
42.42 
43.44 
42.62 
41.79 
41.35 
41.88 
40.47 
36.13 
34.95 
34.45 
37.03 
36.04 
36.33 
38.79 
38.06 
Source : Calculated. 
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When log value of union excise duties as percent of indirect tax are 
regressed on time, then the growth model has the following regression result. 
L n f c T r = 3.9579 + 0.005486 X, 
= (0.051096) (0.002321) 
= 0.55% 
= Log value of union excise as percent of indirect 
taxes. 
= Time period 
Union excise duties as percent of indirect taxes in fact has increased at the rate 
of 0.55 per cent per annum compounded over the period of time (Table 4.38 
and Figure 4.32). 
Table 4.38 
Se 
CAGR 
where, LnUEIT 
X, 
Union Excise duties as percentage of indirect taxes 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
56.07 
54.39 
53.12 
52.79 
53.72 
52.67 
54.00 
54.63 
57.22 
57.17 
51.75 
50.62 
53.44 
54.78 
55.05 
57.74 
62.48 
62.70 
Source : Calculated. 
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The regression result of the growth model of union excise duties as 
percent of GDP is as follows : 
Ln{jEGt5P = 1.600157 - 0.02827 Xt 
Se = (0.05851) (0.002658) 
CGR = -2.78% 
where, LnUEGDP = Log value of union excise duties as percent of GDP. 
Xt = time period 
The union excise duties as percent of GDP declined over the period of time at 
the compound rate of growth of 2.78 per cent (Table 4.39 and Figure 4.33). 
Table 4.39 
Performance of Union Excise Duties Since 1985 
(aspercent of GDP) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Union Excise duties 
4.66 
4.65 
4.64 
4.47 
4.61 
4.31 
4.30 
4.12 
3.69 
3.69 
3.38 
3.29 
3.15 
3.06 
3.20 
3.26 
3.19 
3.34 
Source : Calculated. 
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From Table 4.4 and Figure 4.34, it is clear that annual growth of union 
excise duties have a declining trend over the period since 1985-86 to 2002-03. 
Highest growth in excise duties was seen in 1989-90 and lowest was observed 
in the year 1993-94. 
Table 4.40 
Percentage Change in Union Excise Duties 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage change 
-
11.69 
13.52 
14.70 
18.92 
9.41 
14.67 
9.68 
2.81 
17.83 
7.60 
12.00 
6.56 
11.02 
16.26 
10.70 
5.88 
13.44 
Source : Calculated 
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4.5.3 Trends in Service Tax 
Taxation of services in India was introduced in 1994-95 when it was 
levied on stock brokers, general insurance and telephone services. 
As the services sector continues to expand faster than the other sectors, 
it is necessary to expand the ambit of tax on domestic goods to include the 
services sector also. The reasons for doing so are many. First, as the share of 
industry in GDP decreases while that of services expands, the tax bases shrinks, 
aggregate buoyancy of excise tax revenue declined and the excise tax/GDP 
ratio fall. Second, failure to tax services distorts consumer choices, 
encouraging spending on services at the expense of goods and savings. Third, 
untaxed services means traders are unable to claim VAT on their service 
inputs. This causes cascading, distorts choice and encourages business to 
develop in house services creating further distortions. Fourth, as most of the 
services that are likely to become taxable are positively correlated with 
expenditure of high-income households, subjecting them to taxation will 
improve equity. The prevailing rate of the Centre's service tax at 5 per cent is 
low because it is based on turnover without input tax credit.''* 
The power to levy a tax on services is not mentioned either in the state 
list or concurrent list of the VII schedule to the constitution. However, by 
virtue of entry 97 in the Union list, which gives power to the Centre for levy 
and collection of "any tax not mentioned in either of these lists" (that is state 
list or the concurrent list), the Union legislature is competent to levy a tax on 
services. Further under Article 248 of the constitution, the Parliament has 
exclusion power in this regard. 
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Table 4.41 
Trends in Service Tax 
No. of tax payees 
Revenues (Rs. 
crore) 
Service tax as per 
cent of service 
sector GDP* 
No. of tax payees 
Revenues (Rs. 
crore) 
Service tax as per 
cent of service 
sector GDP* 
1994-95 
3942 
407 
0.12 
1999-
2000 
114358 
2128 
0.29 
1995-96 
4865 
862 
0.21 
2000-01 
NA 
2613 
0.33 
1996-97 
13981 
1059 
0.22 
2001-02 
NA 
3302 
0.41 
1997-98 
45991 
1586 
0.29 
2002-03 
NA 
4122 
NA 
1998-99 
90455 
1957 
0.31 
Note : * Service Sector GDP (at factor cost) at current prices comprises of trade, hotels 
and restaurant, transport, storage and communication, etc. excluding public 
administration, defence and quasi government bodies. 
Source : Economic Survey 2001-2002. 
While the revenue realised from service tax was initially Rs. 407 crore 
when it was first introduced in 1994-95, it has registered substantial growth 
over the years. Between 1994-95, and 2000-01, service tax has shown more 
than six fold increase while the number of service tax payees increased by 
about twenty nine times between 1994-95 and 1999-2000. Service tax as a 
proportion of GDP originating in the service sector (excluding public 
administration and defence) has remained a minuscule fraction all the years 
(Table 4.41). 
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The rate of service tax was increased from 5 per cent in 1994-95 to 8 
per cent on all the taxable services from May 14, 2003. As a major step 
towards integrating the tax on goods and services, Budget for 2004-05 
extended the credit of service tax and excise duty across goods and sen/ices. To 
offset the negative revenue impact on account of such a more, the service tax 
rate was increased from 8 per cent to 10 per cent. 
4.6 TRENDS IN NON-TAX REVENUE 
A key objective of the reform process was the augmentation of non-tax 
revenue by way of enhancement of user charges and returns on Government 
investments through restructuring PSUs. The intention of restructuring PSUs 
was to improve their efficiency and thereby enhance the capacity to generate 
returns on Government investments. Non-tax revenue of the Central 
government as a proportion to GDP recorded on improvement from 2.48 in 
1985-86 to 2.68 in 1992-93 and then to 2.95 in 2002-03 (Table 4.42 and Figure 
4,35). The trends in components of non-tax revenue reveal that increase in 
dividend and profits, and economic services, fully account for the improvement 
in Centre's collection of non-tax revenue, as growth in other components 
continued to be stagnant during the reform period. Surplus transfers from the 
Reserve Bank, which is a major component of dividend and profits, increased 
from Rs. 210 crores in 1990-91 to Rs. 10,320 crore in 2001-02, thereby raising 
its share in the total from 1.8 per cent to 15.2 per cent (Table 4.43). The size of 
the transfer from the Reserve Bank, inter alia, grew on account of earnings 
from the deployment of foreign currency assets, conversion of 4.6 per cent 
treasury Bills into marketable securities and discontinuation of the practice of 
crediting large sums to the National Industrial Credit (LTO) Fund. 
Non-tax revenue in Rs. crores increased at the rate of 15 per cent per 
annum over the period of time compounded (CRG) annually. 
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The regression result of the growth model of non-tax revenue as per 
cent of GDP is as follows -
LntfrRG-DP= 0.857698 + 0.007881 Xt 
Se = (0.080764) (0.003669) 
CGR = 0.79% 
where, LnNTRGDP = Log value of non-tax revenues as percent of GDP. 
Xt = time period since 1985-86 to 2002-03. 
The non-tax revenue as per cent of GDP has increased at the 
compound rate of growth of 0.79 per cent over the period of time (Table 4.42 
and Figure 4.35). 
Table 4.42 
Performance of Non-Tax Revenue Since 1985 
(as percent of GDP) 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 • 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
2.48 
2.82 
2.55 
2.33 
2.40 
2.11 
2.44 
2.68 
2.52 
2.33 
2.37 
2.38 
2.58 
2.50 
2.75 
2.66 
2.98 
2.95 
Source : Calculated. 
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Apart from low user charges on the services rendered by the 
government, the sluggishness in non-tax revenue also follows from continuing 
inadequate returns on public investment. The outstanding investment in Central 
PSUs amounted to Rs. 3,03,400 crore as at end-March 2000. In the case of 
Central PSUs although returns on capital employed have improved from a low 
level of 2.5 per cent in the 1980s to 2.8 per cent in the early 1990s and further 
to around 5.0 per cent in the latter half of the 1990s, dividends from PSUs 
remain inadequate to finance future investment opportunities through internal 
finance. Beside operational inefficiency, the poor returns on investments in, 
both, Central and state PSUs also reflect the limitations of pricing policies as 
well as heavy implicit and explicit subsidies. 
Table 4.43 
Composition of Non-Tax Revenue of the Central Government 
(Per cent) 
S.No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Item 
Interest Receipts 
Dividends and profits 
of which 
Reserve Bank profit 
General services 
Social services 
Economic services 
Fiscal services 
1980s 
68.5 
8.2 
4.1 
3.5 
3.2 
9.0 
5.5 
1990-91 
72.9 
6.5 
1.8 
4.2 
0.5 
7.2 
2.6 
1996-97 
67.9 
11.8 
4.6 
4.0 
0.4 
10.2 
1.3 
2001-02 
52.4 
25.5 
15.2 
4.2 
0.4 
13.7 
0.5 
Source : Union Government Budgets. 
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4.7 TRENDS OF CAPITAL RECEIPTS 
To know the growth rate of the capital receipt as per cent of GDP. The 
regression result of growth model is as follows : 
LnCRGDP = 1.8759 - 0.0035 Xt 
Se = (0.74) (0.007) 
T = (25.439) (-0.513) 
CAGR = -0.35% 
The capital receipt as percent of GDP has declined at the compound rate of 
0.35 per cent (Table 4.44 and Figure 4.36). 
Table 4.44 
Capital Receipts of the Central Government as Per cent of GDP 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
6.95 
6.93 
7.17 
7.09 
6.17 
6.86 
5.90 
4.83 
6.45 
6.78 
4.91 
4.50 
6.51 
7.47 
5.97 
6.38 
7.09 
6.78 
Source : Union Government's Budget. 
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Market borrowing and revenues of loans are major portion of capital 
receipts. There is marked shift towards market borrowings due to structural 
change during reform period. 
Table 4.45 
Market Borrowings as Percentage of Capital Receipts 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
25.29 
25.64 
23.07 
28.17 
24.66 
20.52 
19.49 
10.16 
52.18 
29.59 
56.72 
32.52 
32.80 
53.04 
60.74 
54.35 
54.49 
67.55 
Source : Union Government's Budget. 
292 
The share of market borrowings, which constituted 26.9 per cent of 
gross fiscal deficit (GFD) in the 1980s rose sharply to 59.1 per cent in the later 
half of the 1990s and financed about 70 per cent of the GFD by 2001-02. 
Capital receipts as percent of GDP is more or less constant through out 
the period (Table 4.44). But market borrowing as percent of capital receipts 
increased from 25 per cent in 1985-86 to 68 per cent in 2002-03 (Table 4.45). 
At the same time Recoveries of loans as percent of capital receipts declined 
from 14 percent in 1985-86 to 11 percent in 2002-03 (Table 4.46 and Figure 
4.37). 
Table 4.46 
Recoveries of Loan as Percentage of Capital Receipts 
Year 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
14.36 
16.18 
16.45 
15.39 
16.59 
14.65 
15.63 
17.57 
11.17 
9.24 
11.15 
12.25 
8.40 
8.18 
8.76 
8.98 
10.19 
10.92 
Source : Union Government's Budget. 
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Small Savings 
The Central Government has played the role of financial intermediary 
in collection of small savings and their sharing with the State Governments. 
The amount mobilized through the small saving schemes is accounted under 
the public account of the Central Government. The net amount (gross 
collections minus repayments) is shared between the Centre and States and 
forms part of the borrowed funds for partially financing the fiscal deficit of 
both Centre and States. 
Until 1998-99, the states share in net small savings collection was 
passed on to the States by the Centre in the form of non-plan loans at interest 
rates prescribed by the Central Government. Under these arrangements loans 
against small savings provided to states by the Centre represented Centre's 
expenditure and formed part of Centre's gross fiscal deficit (GFD). With effect 
from fiscal year 1999-2000, a salient change in the accounting system was 
brought about by creating a National Small Savings Fund (NSSF) in the public 
Account of the Central Government under the changed accounting system, all 
small savings collections are credited to this fund and net amount is invested in 
the special securities of Central and State Government according to the norms 
decided by the Central Government from time to time. The debt servicing of 
these government securities is an income of the fiind, while the expenditure of 
the fund comprises the interest payments to the subscribers of the small savings 
schemes and cost of management of small savings. The amount released to 
states is treated as investment in special securities to be redeemed from the 
sixth year over a period of 20 years. The investment of net small savings 
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collection in Central Government securities constitutes part of the internal debt 
of the Central Government. 
Table 4.47 
Trends in Small Savings 
Year 
1990-91 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-01 
(P) 
2001-02 
(BE) 
Rs. gross 
collection 
Rs. 
crore 
18920 
36679 
38111 
51889 
62157 
75542 
88648 
93750 
As per 
cent of 
GDP 
3.3 
3.1 
2.8 
3.4 
3.6 
3.9 
4.2 
4.1 
Repayments 
(Rs. crores) 
9816 
23930 
22865 
27486 
29113 
36889 
43291 
46550 
Net 
Rs. 
crores 
9104 
12749 
15246 
24403 
33044 
38653 
45357 
47200 
As per 
cent of 
GDP 
1.6 
1.1 
1.1 
1.6 
1.9 
2.0 
2.2 
2.1 
(4) as 
percentages 
(2) 
51.9 
65.2 
60.0 
53.0 
46.8 
48.8 
48.8 
49,7 
Transfer 
to 
States/UTs 
7026 
9990 
10671 
15732 
23788 
26937 
33265 
36000 
P - Provisional; BE - Budget Estimated 
Source : Economic Survey 2001-2002. 
4.8 PROFITABILITY OF THE CENTRAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
UNDERTAKINGS 
Public sector undertakings (PSUs), wholly or partially owned by the 
Government, affect the fiscal poshion of the Government through their 
operations. While PSUs contribute to the exchequer by way of dividend 
payments, interest payments and through indirect taxes and other duties, there 
are also transfers of funds from the exchequer to the PSUs in the form of 
budgetary support. These modes of transfer reflect explicit impact of PSUs 
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operations on the fiscal position of the government. There are also other 
implicit transfers through tax and subsidies embedded in the policies of the 
government. For instance, a PSU enjoying monopoly status due to entry 
restrictions and pricing its products on cost plus basis generally amounts to an 
implicit tax on the public and subsidy to the PSU. On the other hand provision 
of commodities to a select clientele or segment of the population at a price less 
than the cost would amount to a implicit subsidy to the public and a tax on the 
PSUs. The fiscal impact of PSU operations depend upon, both, the efficiency 
levels and government policies. An efficient PSU may not only generate 
internal resource to finance its capital needs, but may also generate surpluses 
for the exchequer. On the other hand, a poor performer may be a drag on the 
finances of the Government. Besides efficiency, ability of the enterprise to 
generate surpluses/internal resources is also intimately linked with the policies 
of the Government. Implicit tax or subsidies can constrain or enhance the 
ability of the enterprise to generate additional resources. Owing to implicit 
subsidies to the public, an enterprise efficient otherwise can turn into a 
financial drag in explicit terms whereas an inefficient enterprise owing to 
implicit tax on the public can generate surpluses for the exchequer. Therefore, 
any valid assessment of the fiscal impact of the operations of the PSUs should 
essentially take into account both the explicit and implicit aspects of the 
transactions/ transfers between the government and the PSUs. 
A major source of revenue imbalances, reflected in dissaving of the 
public sector is rooted in the poor profitability of the PSUs. The operations of 
PSUs have been on non-commercial lines. The returns on capital invested by 
the Government have been low. As a result, adequate resources in the form of 
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profit and dividends are not forthcoming with poor internal resource 
generation, PSUs had to depend on external financing from budgetary and non-
budgetary sources. 
Against this backdrop, public sector restructuring had two-fold 
objectives - to provide fiscal support to the Government in terms of additional 
resources and to improve the efficiency of these enterprises. Given the need to 
expand activities such as education, health and medicine, it was envisaged that 
substantial additional resources could be generated through a programmed 
disinvestments of some PSUs. With disinvestments, private shareholders are 
expected to enhance discipline by their monitoring. Managers, who act as 
agents of the shareholders, are forced to act in their interests by increasing the 
value of the firm. This would transform the PSUs on more efficient lines. 
During the 1990s, there was a significant decline in the budgetary 
support available to the PSUs. Budgetary support to the total capital 
expenditure of Central Government PSUs declined sharply from 39.7 per cent 
during seventh plan period to 12.7 per cent during the freight plan period and 
further to 11.9 per cent by 1998-99 (Table 4.48). Furthermore, allocation of 
SLR bonds was completely phased out and the issue of tax-free and 
Government guaranteed bonds were also considerably reduced. 
Although there is a considerable improvement as regards the direct 
impact of PSU operations on the budget, they continue to be a drag on the fisc. 
As stated earlier, the returns on the investment in these units do not cover even 
the cost of borrowed funds invested by the Government in these units. The 
profits after tax earned by PSU on their capital are far lower than the implied 
average interest rate paid by the Central Government on its outstanding 
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domestic liabilities (Table 4.49). Moreover, aggregate profitability measure is a 
bit misleading since it includes state oil and petroleum monopolies. Even for 
PSUs which compete with the private enterprises, the returns have been 
generally lower than that of the competing firms in the private sector. 
Table 4.48 
Explicit Fiscal Impact of Operations of Public Sector Undertakings 
(Rs. in crores) 
Item 
Net Internal Resources 
Extra Budgetary Resources 
Budgetary Support 
Seventh plan 
20,755 
(32.3) 
18,054 
(28.1) 
25,537 
(39.7) 
Eighth plan 
64,761 
(42.3) 
68,766 
(45.0) 
19,455 
(12.7) 
1998-99 
19,295 
(53.9) 
12,281 
(34.2) 
4,250 
(11.9) 
Note : Figures in parentheses are percentage to the total. 
Source : Public Sector Enterprises Survey, various issues. 
Table 4.49 
Performance Indicators of Public Sector Undertaking 
Year 
1 
1980s 
1990-91 to 
1995-96 
1996-97 to 
2001-02 
Capital 
employed 
(Rs. crores) 
2 
43,575 
1,36,439 
2,62,400 
Profit after 
tax (Rs. 
crores) 
3 
1,379 
3,974 
12,925 
Return on 
capital (per 
cent) 
4 
2.5 
2.8 
4.9 
Average interest paid 
by Government (per 
cent) 
5 
7.0 
8.8 
10.2 
Source : Economic Survey Government of India, various issues. 
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4.9 DISINVESTMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR UNDERTAKINGS 
During the reform period, there has been a distinct change in the 
public perception in favour of reducing the size of public sector and improving 
private participation. With these underlying objectives, a two pronged strategy 
was adopted by the Central Government - reduction in budgetary support to the 
PSUs and privatization of existing PSUs. 
The programme of disinvestments in PSUs had slippages due to 
pricing problems and sluggishness of the capital market in the late 1990s. 
Targets set for disinvestments could not be achieved in most of the years 
(barring 1991-92, 1994-95 and 1998-99) during the decades of the 1990s 
(Table 4.50 and Figure 4.38). Since 1991-92, Government equity has been 
diverted in 48 units and strategic sale was undertaken in another 16 units of the 
total amount of Rs. 78,300 crore targeted to be mobilized through 
disinvestments/strategic sale, Rs. 3,0971 crore could be realised upto March 31, 
2002. Initially the Government (with the exception of modem foods) sold only 
minority stakes in different PSUs. However, since 2000, the Government began 
strategic sales as these were judged to be revenue enhancing and signaled 
commitment to enhance efficiency that transfer of management could bring 
about. To establish a systematic policy approach to disinvestments and 
privatization and give fresh impetus to strategic sales of identified PSUs, the 
Government has established a new Department for disinvestment. 
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Table 4.50 
Dis-investment in Public Sector Undertakings 
(Rs. in crores) 
Year 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-00 
2000-01 
2001-02 
2002-03 
Target 
2,500 
2,500 
3,500 
4,000 
7,000 
5,000 
4,800 
5,000 
10,000 
10,000 
12,000 
12,000 
Achievements 
3,038 
1,913 
-48 
4,843 
362 
380 
902 
5,371 
1,829 
1,869 
5,632# 
3,342@ 
#Figures inclusive of amount realized by was of Central premium dividend/dividend 
tax and transfer of surplus cash reserves prior to disinvestments etc. 
@ Till 31.1.2003 
Source : Ministry of Disinvestment 
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Table 4.51 
Disinvestment receipts as percentage of GDP since 1991 
Year 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-01 
20001-02 
2002-03 
Percentage 
0.47 
0.26 
-0.01 
0.50 
0.03 
0.03 
0.06 
0.34 
0.09 
0.10 
0.16 
0.13 
Source : Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, 2002-03,RBI. 
Performance of disinvestment was good during 1991-92, 1995-96 and 
1998-99 since disinvestments as percentage of GDP was good during these 
period (Table 4.51 and Figure 4.39). 
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Chapter - 5 
EFFECTIVENESS AND DETERMINANTS OF 
EFFECTIVE FISCAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME IN 
INDIA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The external payments crisis of 1991 was, to a large extent, an 
inevitable consequence of the deteriorating fiscal situation during the 1980s. 
The 1980s, especially the second half, was marked by high and persistent 
fiscal deficits, accompanied by large revenue deficits. This had led to a 
significant enlargement of the debt-servicing obligations. In order to contain 
the burgeoning debt-service obligations, Government tapped financial 
surpluses of the household sector through statutory pre-emptions from 
financial intermediaries at below market clearing interest rate. This gave rise 
to a degree of financial repression. At the same time, increased financing of 
the Government deficit through automatic monetisation compromised the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and fuelled inflation. Against this 
background, when the Indian economy faced an unprecedented 
macroeconomic crisis in 1991 not surprisingly, fiscal consolidation 
constituted a major plank of the policy response. 
The primary objective of the fiscal reforms as announced in the 
Union Budget 1991-92, was essentially to achieve a reduction in the size of 
deficit and debt in relation to GDP. It was envisaged that this would be 
achieved through revenue enhancement and curtailment in current 
expenditure growth while enlarging spending on investments and 
infrastructure so as to provide momentum to the growth process. These 
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measures were also intended to curb the pre-emption of institutional 
resources by the Government and simultaneously to provide a level-playing 
field to the private investors. Accordingly, fiscal reforms in India were 
initiated in three distinct but interrelated areas ; 
(i) restoration of fiscal balance; 
(ii) restructuring of public sector; 
(iii) strengthening of the fiscal-monetary coordination. 
The strategy for restoring fiscal balance comprised tax and non-tax 
reforms, expenditure management and institutional reforms. Public sector 
restructuring mainly involved divestment of Government ownership. 
Contemporaneously, the steps towards improving fiscal-monetary 
coordination encompassed deregulation of financial system, elimination of 
automatic monetisation, and reduction in pre-emption of institutional 
resources by the Government. At the sub-national level, fiscal adjustments 
began as a consequence of the deterioration in state's finances also. 
The fiscal performance during the reform period, however, was 
characterized by a clear divide in the mid 1990s in the attainment of fiscal 
targets. There is evidence of the successful fiscal correction during 1991-92 
to 1996-97 (except for 1993-94) in terms of a significant fall in the fiscal 
deficit and public debt as a proportion of GDP. Since then, there has been a 
significant reversal of trend. Indeed, many deficit indicators presently are 
even higher than the levels prevailing at the time of the crisis in 1991. The 
revenue deficit has not only persisted, but has grown in size during this 
period. The resultant dissaving arising from the revenue deficit has reduced 
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the aggregate saving and investment capacity in the economy. Consequently, 
there was a steady fall in the share of capital expenditure, impacting on the 
infrastructure investment and thereby threatening the growth potential of the 
economy. Several pointers indicate a reversal of the fiscal consolidation 
process in the recent years. These include decline in tax to GDP ratio, 
downward rigidity in current expenditure, steady deterioration in public 
investment in productive sectors, slow progress of public sector 
Undertakings (PSUs) restructuring and faster accumulation of public debt. 
Thus, even after a decade of reforms, sustained fiscal consolidation remains 
unattained. 
5.2 EFFECTIVENESS OF FISCAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES 
IN INDIA 
As we have discussed in the previous chapters that there is fiscal 
imbalance leading to deepening deficits. The crisis period was started in mid 
eighties. The Central Government took various steps to check the 
expenditures and tried to improve the revenues. In this chapter, I have tried 
to show the effectiveness of fiscal adjustment programme with the help of 
buoyancies of tax revenues with respect to GDP at market prices by dividing 
the study period of 1985-86 to 2002-03 in three periods. The first period 
consists 1985-86 to 1990-91. The second period is 1991-92 to 1996-97. The 
third period consists the year 1997-98 to 2002-03. Since the fiscal 
imbalances started in the mid of 1980s, as we know, and the Government of 
India started macroeconomic reform in 1991 with fiscal adjustment 
programme. After 1997 a slippage has been seen on the front of expenditure 
of the Central Government. The pace of fiscal adjustment programme was 
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slightly affected due to the political change at the centre. The third period 
has tried to cover the change in revenue and expenditure of the Government. 
Further, compound rate of growth has also been calculated period wise to 
show the growth and changes in revenues and expenditures of the Central 
Government. 
Table 5.1 
Trends of Tax and Non-Tax Revenues of the Central Government 
Percent of GDPmp 
Averages 
1985-86 to 1987-88 
1990-91 to 1992-93 
1995-96 to 1997-98 
2000-01 to 2002-03 
Difference 
4-1 
4-2 
4-3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Direct 
Taxes 
1.97 
2.23 
2.95 
3.22 
1.25 
0.99 
0.27 
Indirect 
Taxes 
8.53 
7.90 
6.31 
5.36 
-3.17 
-2.54 
0.95 
Total Tax 
Revenue 
10.48 
10.13 
9.31 
8.66 
-1.82 
-1.47 
-0.65 
Non-Tax 
Revenue 
2.61 
2.41 
2.45 
2.87 
0.26 
0.46 
0.42 
Total 
Revenue 
17.41 
15.76 
14.40 
15.96 
Percentage 
points 
-1.45 
0.2 
1.56 
Source : Basic data from Economic Survey (various issues). 
Table 5.1 gives three-year averages for selected periods. Total 
revenues relative to GDP show an downward thrust till 1997-98. As 
compared to the average of 1985-86 to 1987-88, total revenue relative to 
GDP shows a decrease of about 1.45. percentage point, starting from 17.41 
per cent of GDP and declining to 14.40 per cent of GDP during 1995-96 to 
1997-98. The contraction phase saw an increase of about 0.2 percentage 
point between average of 1990-91 to 1992-93 and increase of about 1.56 per 
310 
cent point between 1995-96 to 2002-03. Most of the decline in total 
revenues to GDP was due to decrease in indirect taxes than increase in direct 
taxes which is obvious from the table 5.1. The average decline in indirect 
taxes between 1985-86 to 1987-88 was 3.17 per cent point, which was 
greater than the increase in direct taxes of 1.25 per cent point during the 
above period. During the period 1990-91 to 1992-93, average of indirect 
taxes was 7.9 per cent of GDP and that of direct taxes was 2.23 percent of 
GDP. The decline in indirect taxes is further greater than the increase in 
direct taxes which was 0.99 per cent point. 
Table 5.2 
Buoyancies of Tax Revenue with Respect to GDPmp 
Period -1985-86 to 2002-03 
Gross tax revenue 
Tax revenue (net to 
Centre) 
Direct Taxes 
Corporation Taxes 
Personal Income Tax 
Indirect Taxes 
Custom duties 
Union Excise Duties 
Non-tax Revenue 
Coefficient 
0.882 
0.875 
1.252 
1.267 
1.217 
0.751 
0.873 
0.785 
1.048 
t-value 
42.760 
51.056 
39.904 
36.743 
43.289 
41.985 
4.691 
42.95 
29.805 
Se 
0.021 
0.017 
0.031 
0.034 
0.028 
0.018 
0.186 
0.018 
0.035 
R^ 
0.991 
0.994 
0.990 
0.998 
0.992 
0.991 
0.579 
0.991 
0.982 
D-W 
2.128 
2.250 
1.688 
1.195 
1.452 
1.095 
2.028 
1.392 
1.320 
Source : Calculated, 
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The total tax revenues, as percent of GDP during the period of 
1985-86 to 1987-88 were 10.48 per cent. This value declined and average of 
this variable during the period of 1990-91 to 1992-93 was 10.13 per cent of 
GDP. In 1995-96 to 1997-98 this figure was 9.31 percent of GDP, which 
further declined to 8.66 per cent of GDP. The decline in total tax revenue as 
percent of GDP was more due to decline in indirect taxes to GDP than the 
increase in direct taxes as percent of GDP. The non-tax revenue as percent 
of GDP declined marginally from the period 1985-86 to 1987-88 to further 
1990-91 to 1992-93. There was slight improvement in the variable, which 
reach to 2.45 per cent and further increased and reached to 2.87 per cent of 
GDP. 
Table 5.3 
Buoyancies of Tax Revenues with respect to GDPmp* 
Item 
Gross Tax 
Revenue 
Tax Revenue 
(net to Centre) 
Direct Taxes 
Corporation Tax 
Personal Income 
Tax 
Indirect Taxes 
Custom Duties 
Union Excise 
Duties 
Non-tax 
Revenue 
Source : calcu 
*using log-log 
Period-I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Coefficient 
0.982 
0.999 
1.001 
0.900 
1.129 
0.997 
1.046 
0.909 
0.717 
ated 
model, LnY = 
t-value 
28.44 
23.62 
16.495 
15.459 
14.062 
23.973 
14.872 
26.703 
6.781 
= a + pLn 
Period-II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Coefficient 
0.889 
0.882 
1.304 
1.237 
1.395 
0.729 
0.902 
0.633 
0.887 
iX 
t-value 
10.33 
8.74 
24.787 
16.184 
26.016 
7.384 
4.805 
14.971 
12.143 
Period-Ill 
(1997-98 to 2002-03) 
Coefficient 
0.932 
1.017 
1.208 
1.686 
1.660 
0.765 
0.183 
1.129 
1.317 
t-value 
7.88 
7.733 
5.957 
15.206 
12.061 
7.999 
0.809 
20.690 
14.233 
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These changes can also be corroborated with the changes of 
buoyancies of tax revenues with respect to GDP at market prices during the 
three different periods (table 5.3). The buoyancy of gross tax revenue in the 
period I was 0.982, which further declined to 0.889. But in period III, this 
bounced back to 0.932. The buoyancies measure the relative change in 
revenues due to change in base of taxes as gross domestic product (GDP). 
The buoyancies of tax revenue (net to Centre) were 0.999, which reached to 
greater than unity in period III. Buoyancy of direct taxes was greater than 
unity in all three periods. The contribution comes from the positive changes 
in corporation taxes and personal income tax, both having buoyancies 
greater than unity. The buoyancy of indirect tax was 0.977 in 1985-86 to 
1990-91, further it declined to 0.729 and in period III, there was marginal 
increase in the buoyancy of this variable. Before the initiation of economic 
reform, buoyancy of custom duties was greater than unity. But after 1990-
91, there was a decline in its buoyancy and reached to 0.183 in the period of 
1997-98 to 2002-03. A steep decline in the buoyancy of custom duties can 
be attributed to the shift in the Government policies. The Central 
Government initiated a major simplification of customs tariff by merging the 
auxiliary duty with basic customs duty. The peak rate of import duty was 
reduced. The duty rate on personal baggage was brought down over the 
years. Import duty on general capital goods and project imports was 
reduced. Rationalization of the customs duty was also initiated. The 
buoyancy of union excise duties was 0.909, which declined in the second 
period and was 0.633. This can be attributed to the Government objective of 
simplifying the excise structure, providing some relief to articles of mass 
consumption and stimulating industries suffering from exceptionally 
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depressed demand conditions. Further, due to slower growth in industrial 
output, revenues from excise were affected. But in the third period, 
buoyancy of union excise duties was greater than unity, which shows the 
healthy sign of growth in the excise duties. This positive change was due to 
major changes taken by the Government. There is positive change in the 
buoyancy of the non-tax revenue, which was 0.717 in first period increased 
lo 0.887 in the second period. In the third period, the buoyancy was greater 
than unity. 
Table 5.4 
Growth Rate of Different Components of Revenue Receipts of the 
Central Government: 1985-86 to 2002-03 
Model : log y = a + pt 
S. Variables 
No. 
'• Revenue 
Receipts 
2 Tax Revenue 
(Net to 
Centre) 
(a) 
Direct Tax 
Period 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Reg 
Coei 
a 
10.121 
10.927 
11.717 
9.814 
10.625 
11.39 
8.454 
9.408 
10.611 
ression 
Fficients 
P 
0.136* 
(27.62) 
0.132* 
(10.367) 
0.109* 
(10.380) 
0.146* 
(30.382) 
0.131* 
(7.691) 
0.095* 
(6.499) 
0.145* 
(12.84) 
0.195* 
(18.138) 
0.166* 
(7.250) 
R-Square 
0.995 
96.4 
96.4 
99.6 
93.7 
91.3 
97.6 
98.8 
92.9 
Compound 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
14.6 
14.1 
11.2 
15.7 
14.0 
10.0 
15.6 
21.5 
12.3 
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(i) Corporation 
Tax 
(ii) Income Tax 
(b) 
Indirect Tax 
(i) Custom 
(ii) Excise 
Duties 
3. Non-Tax 
Revenue 
(a) Interest 
Receipts 
(b) 
Dividends and 
Profits 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period U 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period HI 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
7.098 
8.745 
9.793 
7.646 
8.564 
9.635 
9.908 
10.698 
11.360 
9.036 
9.771 
10.631 
9.324 
10.133 
10.684 
8.792 
9.579 
10.468 
8.296 
9.168 
10.113 
6.095 
7.071 
8.327 
0.131* 
(12.379) 
0.185* 
(13.24) 
0.158* 
(10.678) 
0.164* 
(12.422) 
0.209* 
(18.211) 
0.155* 
(8.813) 
0.143* 
(48.692) 
0.109* 
(6.703) 
0.711* 
(6.397) 
0.153* 
(25.993) 
0.134* 
(4.488) 
0.0143* 
(0.654) 
0.132* 
(27.225) 
0.09465* 
(12.938) 
0.107* 
(17.884) 
0.106* 
(7.879) 
0.133* 
(13.359) 
0.125* 
(15.536) 
0,136* 
(12.368) 
0.135* 
(15.824) 
0.0806* 
(5.883) 
0.0808* 
(2.311) 
0.210* 
(3.694) 
0.282* 
(21.256) 
97.5 
97.8 
96.6 
97.5 
98.8 
95.1 
99.8 
0.918 
0.911 
0.994 
0.834 
0.097 
0.995 
0.977 
0.988 
0.939 
0.978 
0.984 
0.975 
0.984 
0.896 
0.572 
0.773 
0.991 
14.0 
20.3 
17.1 
17.8 
23.2 
16.8 
15.4 
11.5 
7.4 
16.5 
14.3 
1.4 
14.1 
9.9 
11.3 
11.2 
14.2 
13.3 
14.6 
14.5 
8.4 
8.4 
23.4 
32.6 
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(4) Other Non-Tax 
Revenue 
Capital Receipts 
(a) Recovery of 
Loans 
(b) Other 
Receipts 
(Disinvestments 
Receipts) 
(6) Gross Tax 
Revenue 
(7) Total Receipts 
(RR+CR) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
7.689 
8.344 
8.344 
9.729 
10.454 
11.453 
7.859 
8.654 
8.866 
8.947 
7.313 
10.117 
10.934 
11.749 
10.633 
11.412 
12.289 
0.02932* 
(0.705) 
0.0896* 
(2.575) 
0.0896* 
(2.575) 
0.133* 
(10.402) 
0.144* 
(2.786) 
0.0978* 
(4.707) 
0.136* 
(10.219) 
0.0348* 
(2.909) 
0.154* 
(7.09) 
-0.585* 
(-2.037) 
0.142* 
(0.898) 
0.143* 
(40.141) 
0.133* 
(9.011) 
0.0881* 
(7.869) 
0.138* 
(48.48) 
0.126* 
(11.611) 
0.104* 
(15.226) 
0.111 
0.688 
0.688 
0.964 
0,660 
0.847 
0.963 
0.679 
0.926 
0.580 
0.168 
0.998 
0.953 
0.939 
0.998 
0.971 
0.983 
3.0 
9.4 
15.1 
14.2 
12.1 
10.3 
14.6 
3.5 
16.6 
-44.3 
15.3 
15.4 
14.2 
9.2 
14.8 
13.4 
11.0 
Source : calculated 
*Significant at 5 per cent level. 
Figures in parentheses indicate 't' values. 
It is also necessary to know the growth pattern of taxes and non-
taxes of the Central Government. This has been discussed in the Table 5.4. 
The table describes the growth rate of different components of revenue 
receipts of the Central Government of the period 1985-86 to 2002-03. The 
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growth pattern of taxes gives an indication of the changes in the role of each 
tax in the expansion of tax revenue. The compound growth rate is useful in 
describing the growth. The study period is divided into three sub-periods 
namely period-I - 1985-96 to 1990-91, period-II 1991-92 to 1996-97 and 
period-Ill 1997-98 to 2002-03. 't' values of the estimates are worked out to 
test the significance. The coefficient determination R is calculated to know 
the explaining power of the model. 
The trend values of all variables in the revenue receipts of the 
Central Government are significant during 1985-86 to 2002-03. Comparing 
the period II (1991-92 to 1996-97) with period I (1985-86 to 1990-91) the 
compound growth rates of direct tax, corporation tax, income tax, non-tax 
revenue, dividends and profits, other non-tax revenue have increased. The 
compound growth rate of other variables, which has not been mentioned, has 
decreased (Table 5.4). Highest growth rate has been witnessed in dividends 
and profits in period-Ill, which was 32.4 per cent. The second highest was 
also of the same variable in period II. Income tax is the second variable, 
which showed the second highest growth in period II. Since, as already 
discussed non-tax revenue of the Central Government as a proportion to 
GDP recorded an improvement due to the enhancement of user charges and 
returns on Government investments through restructuring of PSUs. Surplus 
transfers from the Reserve Bank, which is a major component of dividend 
and profits, increased from Rs. 210 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 10,320 crore in 
2001-02. thereby raising its share in total. At the same time Government 
also took various steps to restructure the direct taxes, which resulted high 
yields. 
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The size of government is indicated by total expenditure net of 
interest payments and pensions, which represent transfer payments and do 
not directly contribute to government current purchases of goods and 
services, a significant change can be noticed in government's capacity to 
intervene in the economy by current purchases of goods and services 
relative to GDP, as a result of clear contraction. 
Table 5.5 
Trends in Expenditure of the Central Government Relative to GDPmp 
Percent of GDPmp 
Averages 
1985-86 to 1987-88 
1990-91 to 1992-93 
1995-96 to 1997-98 
2000-01 to 2002-03 
Difference 
4-1 
4-2 
4-3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Revenue 
Exp. 
13.54 
13.40 
11.80 
13.43 
-0.11 
0.03 
1.63 
Interest 
payments 
3.17 
4.17 
4.20 
4.77 
1.6 
0.6 
0.57 
Subsidies 
1.73 
1.80 
1.13 
5.30 
3.57 
3.5 
4.17 
Capital 
Exp. Net 
of loan 
recoveries 
5.59 
3.76 
2.69 
1.81 
-3.78 
-1.95 
-0.79 
Total 
Exp. 
19.48 
17.32 
14.98 
15.94 
-4.5 
-2.34 
0.96 
Total Exp. 
Net of 
interest 
payment 
and 
subsidies 
14.93 
11.60 
9.60 
9.80 
Percentage 
points 
-5.13 
-1.8 
0.20 
Source : Basic data from Economic Survey (various issues). 
Table 5.5 provides an indication of changes in the size of 
government relative to GDP. There was marginal decrease in the size of 
Government since revenue expenditure has declined to 13.40 per cent 
(average 1990-91 to 1992-93) i.e. 0.14 percentage point. Interest payments 
showed the continuous increase in terms of GDP. The average of period 
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1990-91 to 1992-93 noticed an average increase of one percent point. 
Thereafter remaining period saw marginal increase. For subsidies an 
increase from 1.73 percent to 1.80 percent of GDP is observed, comparing 
three-year averages over the first period. Most of the adjustment in 
expenditures shows up in a persistent decline in capital expenditures, which 
fell from a peak of 5.59 percent in the mid eighties to 2.69 per cent in the 
late nineties. Total expenditure declined upto third period (average) in the 
fourth period started increasing. Total expenditure net of interest payments 
and subsidies witnessed the continuous decline upto third period average. 
But in the fourth period there is marginal increase of 0.20 percent point. 
Table 5.6 
Growth Rate of Different Components of Expenditure of the Central 
Government: 1985-86 to 2002-03 
Model : log y = a + pt 
S. Variables 
No. 
I. Total 
Expenditure 
2- Revenue 
Expenditure 
3- Capital 
Expenditure 
Period 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Regression 
Coefficients 
a P 
3.042 
2.989 
2.640 
2.584 
2.644 
2.461 
2.149 
1.795 
0.814 
-0.00850* 
(-1.233) 
-0.0544* 
(-3.605) 
0.02550* 
(9.190) 
0.00940* 
(1.366) 
-0.0296* 
(-4.186) 
0.02739* 
(7.431) 
-0.0878* 
(-3.309) 
-0.153 
(-4.094) 
0.02100* 
(1.308) 
R-Square 
0.276 
0.765 
0.955 
0.318 
0.814 
0.932 
0.732 
0.807 
0.300 
Compound 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
-0.8 
-5.6 
2.6 
0.9 
-3.0 
2.8 
-9.2 
-16.5 
2.1 
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4, Plan 
Expenditure 
5. Non-Plan 
Expenditure 
6. Interest 
Payments 
7. Major 
Subsidies 
8. Defence 
Expenditure 
Grants to 
9 State and 
Union 
Territories 
10. Social 
Services 
11. Economic 
Services 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period HI 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period 11 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period 11 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
Period I 
(1985-86 to 1990-91) 
Period II 
(1991-92 to 1996-97) 
Period III 
(1997-98 to 2000-03) 
9.874 
10.303 
10.851 
10.256 
11.170 
11.903 
8.619 
10.028 
11.024 
8.337 
9.373 
9.635 
9.112 
9.199 
10.140 
8.122 
8.256 
8.083 
7.289 
7.914 
9.416 
9.397 
9.982 
10.538 
0.06856* 
(8.091) 
0.101* 
(6.288) 
0.129* 
(20.155) 
0.156* 
(16.903) 
0.110* 
(20.730) 
0.117* 
(10.695) 
0.226* 
(36.674) 
0.161* 
(53.257) 
0.114 
(12.360) 
0.153* 
(6.095) 
0.02277* 
(2.348) 
0.147* 
(8.940) 
0.04559* 
(1.150) 
0.127* 
(16.152) 
0.08549* 
(6.548) 
0.127* 
(7.924) 
0.01959* 
(0.126) 
0.279* 
(4.230) 
0.146* 
(6.558) 
0.203 
(16.484) 
0.07078* 
(2.496) 
0.123* 
(5.011) 
0.09536* 
(9.305) 
0.164* 
(15.289) 
0.942 
0.908 
0.990 
0.986 
0.991 
0.966 
0.997 
0.999 
0.974 
0.903 
0.580 
0.952 
0.248 
0.985 
0.915 
0.940 
0.004 
0.817 
0.915 
0.985 
0.609 
0.863 
0.956 
0.983 
7.1 
10.6 
13.8 
17.2 
11.6 
12.4 
25.4 
17.5 
12.1 
16,5 
2.3 
15.8 
4.7 
13.5 
8.9 
13.5 
2.0 
32.2 
15.7 
22.5 
7.3 
13.1 
10.0 
17,8 
Source : calculated 
^Significant at 5 per cent level. 
Figures in parentheses indicate 't' values. 
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Table 5.6 describes the growth rate of different components of 
expenditure of the Central Government by using log-linear model. Total 
expenditure shows a decline in the compound rate of growth in the second 
period, but there is increase in the third period. The highest decline was 
witnessed in the capital expenditure over the period 1991-92 to 1996-97. 
The revenue expenditure declined in the period second but compound 
growth of this variable saw increase in the third period. We can summarise 
that the compound growth of all variables related to expenditure declined 
immediately after the economic reform i.e. the second period (1990-91 to 
1996-97) but in the third period growth rate of most of the expenditure 
variables increased showing that Central Government is not able to control 
expenditure effectively as desired by the policies of the Government. 
5.3 FISCAL REFORMS IN INDIA : POLICY MEASURES AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
A more towards fiscal adjustment was discernible in the 
pronouncements made as a part of long-term fiscal policy announced in the 
mid-1980s, a comprehensive fiscal reform programme at the Central 
Government level was initiated only at the beginning of the 1990s as part of 
the economic adjustment programme initiated in 1991-92. 
Fiscal reforms at the Centre covered tax reforms, expenditure 
pruning, restructuring of PSUs, and better coordination between monetary 
and fiscal policies. 
5.3.1 Tax Reforms 
Restructuring of the tax system constituted a major component of 
fiscal reforms with the aim of augmenting revenues and removing anomalies 
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in the tax structure. The main focus of the reforms was on simplification and 
rationalisation of both direct and indirect taxes drawing mainly from the 
recommendation of the Tax Reforms Committee, 1991. Since the rates were 
very high and the structure of indirect taxes highly complex, it was 
considered undesirable to augment revenues merely by raising tax rates. The 
Committee had recommended adoption of a small number of simple broad-
based taxes with moderate and limited number of rates, and with very few 
exemptions and deductions. 
Accordingly, the tax rates were significantly rationalized and 
progressively brought down to the levels comparable to some of the 
development economies. The key tax reforms have been : 
• Lowering of the maximum marginal personal income tax rate from 60 
per cent in 1980-81 to the present level of 33 per cent (inclusive of 10 
per cent surcharge on annual income of above Rs. 8.5 lakhs, announced 
in the Union Budget 2003-2004). 
• Widening of the tax base by way of a series of steps including 
introduction of presumptive taxes, adoption of a set of six economic 
criteria for identification of potential tax payers in urban areas and 
taxation in services. 
• Reducing corporate tax rate on both domestic and foreign companies 
for the current level of 35 per cent and 40 per cent respectively from a 
level of 65 per cent and 70 per cent in 1980-81. 
Unificadon of tax rates on closely held as well as widely held domestic 
companies, 
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• Rationalization of capital gains tax and dividend tax. 
• Progressive reduction in the peak rate of customs duty on non-
agricultural products from a level of more than 300 per cent during the 
period just prior to reforms to the level of 25 per cent as announced in 
the Union Budget 2003-04, and 
• Reduction of 11 major ad-valorem excise duties to three viz., Central 
rate of 16 per cent, merit rate of 8 per cent and demerit rate of 24 per 
cent in year 1999-2000, introduction of a uniform 16 per cent 
CENVAT effective from 2000-01, while retaining special excise duties 
on specified goods and in the Union Budget 2003-04 rationalisation of 
excise rate structure by proposing a 3-tier structure of 8 per cent, 16 per 
cent and 24 per cent which are however, not applicable to goods 
attracting specific duty rates. 
The concern with tax rationalization has been reflected in the 
appointment of a number of committees to review the tax system in the last 
few years. The Advisory Group on Tax Policy and Tax Administration for 
the Tenth Plan, 2001 , recommended deletion of a number of exemptions 
and deductions which have become redundant and are not in harmony with a 
modern tax regime. Similarly, the Expert Committee to Review the System 
of Administrative Interest Rates and other Related Issues, 2001^ 
recommended the withdrawl of tax concessions available on small savings. 
Furthermore, the Task Force on Direct Taxes and Indirect Taxes, 2002"^ , has 
reiterated the need to withdraw exemptions and concessions to widen the tax 
base. 
323 
5.3.2 Expenditure Management 
Successive Central Government budgets in the 1990s contemplated 
a host of measures to curb built - in growth in expenditure and to bring 
about structural changes in the composition of expenditure. These included 
subjecting all ongoing schemes to zero based budgeting and assessment of 
manpower requirements of Government departments. This was sought to be 
achieved by reviewing norms for creation of posts and fresh requirement and 
introduction of a Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) for surplus staff. The 
process also involved review of all subsidies with a view to introducing 
cost-based user charges wherever feasible, review of budgetary support to 
autonomous institutions and encouragement to PSUs to maximize generation 
of internal resources. These measures, by and large, focused on downsizing 
Government and reducing its role and administrative structure. Further, as 
an institutional arrangement, the Government constituted an Expenditure 
Reforms Commission (ERC) to look into areas of expenditure correction. 
Areas identified by the ERC include, inter alia, creation of a national food 
security buffer stock and minimisation of cost of buffer stock operations and 
rationalization of fertilizer subsidies through dismantling of controls in a 
phased manner. It also included optimizing Government staff strength by a 
ban on the creation of new posts for two years, introduction of VRS and 
redeployment of surplus staff in various Government departments and 
autonomous institutions, to which the Government provides budgetary 
support through grants. With a view to promoting transparency and curbing 
the growth of contingent Government liabilities, a Guarantee Redemption 
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Fund has been set up as a part of expenditure management strategy. Steps 
undertaken in the light of above proposals included : 
• dismantling of the Administered price Mechanism (APM) in the 
petroleum sector and the oil Pool Account effective from April 2002. 
• restriction on fresh recruitments to 1 per cent of the total civilian staff 
strength over the 4 years beginning fiscal 2002-03, and 
• introduction of a new pension scheme of defined contribution for new 
recruits in the Budget for 2003-04. 
5.3.3 Restructuring of the Public Sector 
During the reform period, there has been a distinct change in the 
public perception in favour of reducing the size of public sector and 
improving private participation. With these underlying objectives, a two-
pronged strategy was adopted by the Central Government - reduction in 
budgetary support to the PSUs and privatization of existing PSUs. 
5.3.4 Fiscal-Monetary Coordination 
Another important objective of the reform process has been to 
improve fiscal-monetary coordination. This involved steps to ensure wider 
participation in the Government securities market so as to facilitate 
elimination of automatic monetisation and pre-emption of institutional 
resources by the Government. During the 1990s, the Reserve Bank 
undertook a series of steps towards deepening and widening the Government 
securities market. Some of the major steps in this direction included aligning 
of coupon rates on Government securities with market interest rates, 
introduction of auction system, introducfion of primary dealers and setting 
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up of Delivery Versus Payment (DVP) system. Furthermore, following the 
'Supplemental Agreement' between the government of India and the 
Reserve Bank in September 1994, the abolition of ad hoc Treasury Bills was 
made effective from April 1997, thereby replacing the automatic 
monetisation of deficit by a system of Ways and Means Advances (WMA) 
to meet only the temporary mismatches in cash flows of the Central 
Government. Concomitant to these measures. Statutory Liquidity Ratio 
(SLR) was reduced to 25 per cent by 1997 and cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) 
was reduced in phases to 4.75 per cent by November 2002. 
5.3.5 Institutional Measures 
As an institutional mechanism to strengthen fiscal discipline, the 
Central Government enacted Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management 
(FRBM), 2000. The Act Stresses on inter-generational equity in fiscal 
management and long-term macroeconomic stability. The original Bill 
envisaged a complete elimination of revenue deficit and reduction of the 
fiscal deficit-GDP ratio to 2 percent by the Central Government by end-
March 2006. The Act also envisaged a reduction in total liabilities of the 
Centre to no more than 50 per cent of GDP by March, 20121. 
5.4 EMERGING ISSUES 
The analysis shows that the level of fiscal deficit relative to GDP in 
India at present is higher than that of most internationally comparable 
benchmark levels (e.g. the Maastricht Treaty requires fiscal deficit to be 3.0 
per cent of GDP). Furthermore, the present level has also exceeded the 
levels witnessed on the eve of the 1991 crisis. Notwithstanding these 
developments, most other macroeconomic parameters have been sustainable. 
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As a result, the higher fiscal deficit has not spilled over to the external 
sector. In this setting, questions have been raised whether the high fiscal 
deficit should be a matter of much concern. 
Another issue, which emerges in the context of downward rigidity 
exhibited by the fiscal deficit, is the rise in debt-GDP ratio. It needs to be 
reviewed whether the fiscal stance and debt accumulation process is 
sustainable or not. This is particularly so as the debt-servicing of market 
loans now accounts for more than 70 per cent of the gross market 
borrowings. 
As stated earlier, the underlying objective of improving monetary 
fiscal co-ordination by eliminating automatic monetisation and reducing pre-
emption of institutional resources was to contain crowding-out arising from 
pre-emption of funds by the Government and, thus, allow level playing field 
to the private investor. Although the Government at present borrows from 
the market on equal terms with private borrowers, the crowding out effect of 
Government borrowings still remains a critical issue in view of the high 
fiscal deficit. 
In the content of role of fiscal policy in reinvigorating growth, it 
needs to be recognized that the fiscal stance affects output itself as well as 
the variability of output. Imbalances between aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply feed back into the realised fiscal deficit. Given this 
simultaneity, an important question is to examine the design of fiscal policy 
to see whether fiscal policy automatically smoothens the business cycle or 
discretionary interventions are required. This aspect is usually examined by 
looking at built-in automatic stabilizers and by decomposing the actual 
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fiscal deficit into a structural component (unresponsive to cycles in the 
economy) and a cyclical component (responsive to cycles). Previous 
research has shown that fiscal deficits in India have been predominantly 
structural with cyclical component almost negligible.^ This suggests that 
discretionary policy had an important role to play in counter-cyclical 
measures in the Indian content. 
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Chapter - 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
6.1 CONCLUSIONS 
The conceived strategy of fiscal consolidation as reflected in 
various official pronouncements focused on compressing consumption 
expenditure and augmenting revenue. This is akin to 'Type 1' approach of 
fiscal consolidation experimented elsewhere as enumerated in Alessina and 
Perotti (1996). In terms of actual outcome, however, the adjustment was 
predominantly brought through cuts in capital expenditure. This is similar to 
Alessina and Perotti's 'Type 2' approach, though the essential difference in 
the Indian case has been that household taxes have been reduced but the tax 
base has not widened significantly. The inability to effect a large cut in 
consumption component of expenditure resulted in an increasing proportion 
of borrowed funds being pre-empted by such expenditure. This could slow 
down future revenue growth. Inadequate returns on Government expenditure 
get reflected in rising debt-service obligations. This gives rise to the 
emergence of a vicious cycle of deficit and debt. 
The detailed analysis of the fiscal performance during the reform 
period in Chapter-Ill, drew attention to the downward rigidity in current 
expenditure. In the face of sluggish revenue growth, as discussed in 
Chapter-IV, results in a persistent increase in revenue deficit. This has been 
a critical factor in the resurgence of fiscal deficit during the latter half of the 
1990s. Ahhough the tax reform measures initiated have imparted rationality 
to the tax structure, the revenue buoyancy expected through a Laffer-curve 
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effect have not come through. This is because cuts in indirect tax rates were 
not accompanied by removal of concessions and exemptions. Therefore, 
these has been neither significant increase in the tax base nor has tax 
compliance improved. With the result, the improvement in direct tax 
collection on account of an expansion of tax base and perhaps better 
compliance was not adequate to compensate the drop in customs and excise 
duty collections. Eventually, the tax-GDP ratio suffered deterioration during 
the reform period. The non-tax revenue of the centre as a proportion to GDP 
recorded some rise, poor cost recovery for the services provided by the 
Governments have been responsible for this trend. Inadequate progress in 
public sector restructuring, specifically reflected in the inability to raise user 
charges and continued low returns on investments, have also resulted in 
stagnation in non-tax revenue at, both, the Central and state Governments 
level. Thus, on the whole, reforms did not result in adequate pick up in 
revenue growth in relation to growing expenditure requirement during the 
1990s. 
The faster growth in committed expenditure like interest payments, 
wages and salaries and subsidies has imparted downward inflexibility in 
revenue expenditure. More importantly, expenditure on interest payments 
continued to grow unabated, reflecting the impact of sizeable outstanding 
liabilities contracted at higher interest rates in the first half of the 1990s. 
Progress towards better fiscal-monetary coordination during reform 
period was an important achievement. The major policy initiative in this 
direction was the elimination of automatic monetisation of Central 
Government fiscal deficit. This, together with structural and institutional 
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reforms undertaken by the Reserve Bank in the 1990s, has strengthened the 
public debt management process enabling wider market participation in the 
government securities market and significant reduction in the pre-emption of 
institutional resources by the Government to finance fiscal gap. The 
Government borrowings at market related rates have intended to provide 
level playing field for the private investor. It was also expected to induce 
fiscal discipline. The overall reform experience has been that, while the 
public debt management has been made market-based, fiscal deficits remain 
unrestrained. Market based regime with unrestrained fiscal deficit could 
worsen the fiscal situation. The above development unfolds certain 
important issues for the Indian fiscal system. 
6.2 SUGGESTIONS : 
A few important points may however, be mentioned in the light of 
above discussion so as to make fiscal adjustment programme a long-lasting 
feature. Undertaking fiscal adjustment often requires difficult decisions 
involving increasing government revenue and reducing spending. 
Measures to Improve the Tax System and Increase Revenue 
In some cases, raising rates within an existing system can increase 
revenue. However, the ability to generate increased revenue in this manner 
may be limited. This is particularly likely when an economy is undergoing 
substantial structural change, and there is fundamental weakness in the tax 
system. It must be emphasized, however, that improvements in tax policy 
are more likely to be successful when they are accompanied by measures to 
strengthen tax administration. 
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The essential elements required for successful tax administration 
reform include 
an explicit and sustained political commitment 
a team of capable officials dedicated to tax administration reform. 
relevant training for staff 
additional resources for the tax administration 
changes in incentives for both tax-payers and tax administrators. 
Tax administration reform must strive to enhance both its 
effectiveness and efficiency. Interventions to improve effectiveness include 
promotion of tax payer self-assessment, provision of tax payer education, 
adoption of procedures for minimizing the cost of compliance, 
implementation of systems for tax returns processing and accounting that 
quickly detect noncompliance and take appropriate actions, and 
establishment of an audit plan to detect violations as efficiently as possible. 
Also needed are adequate penalties for violations that strike at the heart of 
the tax system, such as failure to file returns and to pay taxes on time. 
Along with a strategy for enhancing effectiveness, tax 
administration can adopt a number of measures to focus their scarce 
resources in the most efficient manner for revenue collection and 
enforcement. These measures include establishment of a large taxpayers' 
unit, adoption of a threshold for tax registration that exempts small 
enterprises from major taxes; the imposition of an alternative tax on small 
enterprises with limited revenue potential; use of final withholding of taxes 
on individual taxes; and use of banks for receiving tax payments. 
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A desirable tax system is needed whicii should be responsive to 
GDP growth and its revenue generating capacity should be high. 
* Revenue generating capacity: The tax system should be such that it 
should generate revenue - at least in line with the growth in nominal income 
without frequent changes in tax rates or introduction of new taxes. 
* Efficiency : Taxes influence relative prices in the economy and, therefore, 
have an impact on the pattern of production, consumption, and income. A 
desirable 'tax from the point of view of efficiency is one that minimizes its 
impact on relative prices, thus leaving the allocation of resources essentially 
undisturbed. Too heavy a tax on a particular commodity will result loss of 
efficiency. 
* Equity : Taxes should be levied in a fair and equitable manner. 
* Transparency : Tax codes should be clearly drafted, well defined, and 
easily understood by the tax paying community. It is important to have tax 
rates that are both stable and predictable. Once tax laws are established that 
can generate buoyant revenue growth, it is preferable to minimize the 
frequency of discretionary modifications to these laws. If changes are 
planned over a reform period, tax payers should ideally know in advance the 
tax implications of their production and consumption decisions. A simple, 
transparent tax system is also relatively easy to administer and promotes 
compliance. 
* Reasonable overall tax burden : There are constraints on how much a 
government can raise in taxes. Too high a tax burden will undermine the 
system's effectiveness by encouraging tax evasion and distorting the 
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structure of relative prices in the economy. One measure of the tax burden is 
the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, which is low in case of India relative to 
other developed countries. It should be increased at appropriate level. 
Following taxes and their rates may be helpful in raising revenues 
of the Central Government -
• Sales tax/value-added tax (VAT) : This should be a broadly based tax 
on final domestic consumption that does not tax intermediate 
consumption or export, and one that does not differentiate by source of 
production (foreign or domestic). Because of its efficiency and revenue 
security) the ideal instrument to achieve this objective is a VAT at a 
single rate, with crediting provisions and zero rating of exports. 
• Excises : A selected number of excises can be introduced to discourage 
consumption of particular items (for example, alcohol and tobacco), to 
link tax payments to the existence of negative externalities or to tax 
certain luxury goods. Excises should be levied equally on domestic 
production and imports and, particularly in an inflationary 
environment, on an ad valorem basis. 
• Custom duties : If a moderate level of protection is thought desirable 
to encourage local industry, a low uniform customs duty, when 
properly coordinated with a VAT and excises, is the preferred 
instrument. Duty drawback or suspension schemes are needed to 
relieve exporters of the anti-export bias caused by customs duties on 
inputs. Exemptions from customs duties should be limited and clearly 
defined to avoid abuse. 
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• Export taxes : Export taxes should generally be avoided, since they 
tend to cause an outflow of resources in the export sector toward less 
efficient uses, thus comprising growth objectives. 
• Profit Taxes : A tax on profit should ideally be levied at a single rate 
comparable to the top marginal rate of personal income tax. This 
minimizes the likelihood of tax-induced shifts between personal 
income, partnership, and corporations. Deductions, allowances, and 
credits are best applied neutrally across sectors and assets to foster 
efficiency. 
• Income Taxes : A basic personal income exemption should be set high 
enough to exclude the very poor, and sufficient progressivity can be 
achieved with only a few income tax brackets. 
Rationalization of Expenditure Policies 
Expenditure reduction measures have to be pragmatic, adequate to 
achieve the intended stabilization, but nonetheless economically, politically, 
and socially feasible. Several types of expenditure measures can be adopted 
quickly to contain a deteriorating fiscal situation. Sustainable expenditure 
reform, however, requires a review of underlying government policies, the 
composition of spending, the coverage of activities by the public sector, and 
the modes of delivery of public services. Similar to the importance of tax 
administration in tax reform, efficient spending reduction usually requires 
improvements in systems of budget design, preparation and execution. 
There are no hard and fast rules about how public expenditure should 
be cut. This will depend partly on the factors driving the growth in spending 
336 
(for example, wages and salaries or the capital programme), as well as on 
the social and political constraints facing policymakers. However some 
guidelines may be suggested. 
• Avoid across-the-board cuts : Across-the-board cuts often seem 
attractive, this approach allows each individual operating ministry to 
decide how to cut its budget - whether to delay the purchase of goods 
and services, run down stocks, cut back on temporary staff, etc. and it 
appears to imply equal hardship for all and is thus seen as equitable. 
• Identify specific program reductions : Some programmes should be 
dropped, pruned, or consolidated, as economic development is there. 
Such as subsidies etc. 
• Cutting the public sector wage bill : Wage restraint in the public 
sector can be a major source of savings. But there is limit for wage 
freezing. Cutbacks in civil services numbers are more appropriate since 
it has expanded more to absorb a growing labour force. 
• Target social programmes narrowly 
• By reviewing the capital program 
• By raising fees and charges 
• By reforming public enterprises : Public enterprise should, in 
general*, not be a drain on the budget. If they are in deficit, pricing 
structures should be adjusted, the scope of activities redefined, their 
employment policy reassed, and their capital programme rationalized. 
Preferably, they should be privatized and fully exposed to a 
competitive market environment. 
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• 
• 
Following types of reforms may be suggested to eliminate wasteful 
expenditure : 
• The elimination of unproductive or very low-priority services. 
Privatization of activities that can and should be carried output in the 
private sector. 
The introduction of a mere commercial approach to public activities, 
including competitive tendering, the contracting out of some services to 
the private sector, and the use of commercial accounting techniques to 
set the basis for full cost recovery. 
The wider use of improved accounting techniques, not just by 
presenting accounts on a commercial basis where appropriate, but also 
by using balance sheets to improve the analysis of the long-term 
implications of existing and new expenditures. 
• The simulation of market discipline, including separate assessment of 
its application to the government's role as purchaser and provider of 
services (for example, in health care). 
• For those services that are to remain in the public sector, measures 
designed to improve managerial performance, efficiency and 
effectiveness, including establishing cost centres - which combine 
under a unified management the costing of interlinked activities, setting 
objectives, output requirements, and inputs for each centre, more 
developed managerial authority for the centres, and the linking of 
managers' salaries to performance. 
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It may be concluded that viable and effective fiscal adjustment may be 
restored, if the above suggestions are taken into consideration and 
implemented in an earnest and proper manner. 
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